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Dear Chainnan Good lane and Ranking Member Conyers:
On behalf of the United States Copyright Office, I am pleased to deliver thi s Report to the House
Committee on the Judiciary, which by the tenns of the Committee's request is due today. The Report
documents the challenges of resolving small copyright claims in the current lega l system, and
recommends the creat ion of a voluntary system of adjudication to be administered by the Copyright
Office.
The Copyright Office appreciates the Committee's dedication to copyright matters generally and to the
small claims issue in particular. In requesti ng the Report, fonner Chainnan Lamar Smith wrote of the
increasingly prohibitive cost of federal court and thc " immeasurable contribution that American authors
and other copyright owners make to the strength of our nation." He also made reference to the
Com mittee's previous interest in these issues, including its 2006 hearing on sma ll claims remedies. That
hearing. an outgrowth of Congressional deliberations on orphan works, provided an early forum for
creators to voice their fnJ strations about the challenges of tile federal cou rt system.
As reflected in the details of the study, small claims issues are anything but sma ll. On the contrary, they
present a range of complex considerations, from constituti ona l constrai nts to procedural concerns to
questions of what claim s should be eligible for altemative treatment. While the conclusions in the Report
are our own, we are grateful to those who participated in our public process. The Office conducted four
days of public hearings in New York and Los Angeles. and received written comments from individual
authors, industry associations, public interest groups, technology com panies, publishers, and scholars.
The perspectives ofthese parties appear everywhere in the Report and are further reflected in the Office's
legi slative proposal.
Thank you for the opportunity to prepare this Report.
Respectfully,

Maria A. Pallante
Register of Copyrights and Director
U.S. Copyright Office
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October 11, 2011
The Honorable Maria A. Pallante
Register of Copyrights
United States Copyright Office
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Dear Ms. Pallante,
I enjoyed our meeting last month to exchange views on copyright policy. Following our
discussion, I wanted to take a moment to raise an issue that has needed to be addressed for some
time. As we near the introduction of legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives that is
designed to provide meaningful and effective new tools to authors and other copyright owners
who are victims of large-scale online copyright infringement, I'm reminded of the need to revisit
and address the opposite end of the spectrum. Specifically, I am referring to our responsibility to
ensure that authors, photographers and other copyright owners - many of whom rely upon the
promise of exclusive rights associated with the grant of copyright to earn a living and provide for
their families - have a realistic ability to enforce those rights when they have a comparatively
modest claim for damages.
As background, while serving as Chairman of the former Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property in 2006, I conducted a hearing to consider the need for new
remedies to address small copyright claims. At that hearing, several witnesses testified that the
costs of obtaining counsel and maintaining an action in federal court effectively precluded many
authors whose works were clearly infringed from being able to vindicate their rights and deter
continuing violations.
On an individual level, the inability to enforce one's rights undermines the economic
incentive to continue investing in the creation of new works. On a collective level, the inability
to enforce rights corrodes respect for the rule of law and deprives society of the benefit of new
and expressive works of authorship. Witnesses suggested that Congress should consider
providing new and more efficient processes to enable the resolution of small claims. In
testimony submitted for the record, the Office indicated a willingness to undertake such a study
and suggested possible solutions that could include permitting state court adjudication, providing
for administrative resolution, establishing streamlined procedures in federal court or facilitating
alternative dispute resolution procedures such as arbitration and mediation.
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Following the hearing, I included a requirement that the Office conduct a study in H.R.
5439, the "Orphan Works Act of 2006". Similar language was also included in H.R. 5889, a bill
introduced in the following Congress.
Given the importance of this matter to many individual copyright owners and the
realization that the costs of litigating in federal court have become increasingly prohibitive over
the past five years, I request the Office evaluate this matter and undertake a study to assess: 1)
the extent to which authors and other copyright owners are effectively prevented from seeking
relief from infringements due to constraints in the current system; and 2) furnish specific
recommendations, as appropriate, for changes in administrative, regulatory and statutory
authority that will improve the adjudication of small copyright claims and thereby enable all
copyright owners to more fully realize the promise of exclusive rights enshrined in our
Constitution. In undertaking this study, I request the Office solicit the input of an array of
copyright owners and stakeholders who might be impacted by proposed improvements and that
the report be completed no later than September 30,2013.
American authors and other copyright owners make an immeasurable contribution to the
strength of our nation. I would appreciate your invaluable assistance in committing to undertake
this study.

~

Lamar Smith
Chairman
U.S. House Judiciary Committee
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution empowers, and the Copyright Act conveys, a system of exclusive rights for
authors, for the benefit of their livelihoods, the livelihoods of other actors in the chain of
commerce, and the overall public good.1 To protect and promote these rights, the law has always
included a corresponding set of enforcement provisions allowing copyright owners to redress the
unauthorized use of their works. While infringement is nothing new when it comes to the world
of creative works, there is no question that it has proliferated with the ascendance of digital
culture and the unprecedented desire for content. Today it is not only easy to make unauthorized
copies, but to do so at virtually no cost, much to the detriment of authors and the market for their
works.
As provided in the Constitution, the rights granted to authors are not merely to be articulated, but
also “secur[ed].”2 Unfortunately, and perhaps ironically, as the rate of infringement has
increased, so too have the barriers to pursuing copyright claims in the federal courts. These
barriers are largely practical: federal litigation is expensive and time-consuming, and therefore
out of reach for many copyright owners. The problem is especially vexing in the context of
small claims, where the injury may be limited or difficult to measure. If exclusive rights are
unenforceable, they are weakened as the pillars of the copyright law, and public respect for our
nation’s creativity is eroded in turn.3
The problem of modest-sized copyright claims, on the one hand, and costly enforcement, on the
other, appears to be especially acute for individual creators. In comments submitted to the
Copyright Office in the course of this study, the Graphic Artists Guild wrote that “[a]s a practical
matter, except for large corporate copyright owners, our current copyright laws are virtually
unenforceable when it comes to the infringement of visual works.”4 In a similar vein, American
Photographic Artists explained that “the current system deters authors from asserting their rights,
renders these cases difficult for any attorney to take on, and encourages copyright infringement
by all phases of society.”5 The Alliance for Visual Artists pointed out that “[t]he traditional
method of protecting copyrights … is simply impracticable for a small business photographer
with limited income.”6 Observing that “[w]e weaken markets for valuable goods at our
collective peril,” the Authors Guild reported that a majority of authors surveyed saw the need for

1

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress empowered “[t]o promote the Progress of Science … by securing for
limited Times to Authors … the exclusive Right to their respective Writings….”); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
2

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

3

See Letter from Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, to Hon.
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and Director, U.S. Copyright Office (Oct. 11, 2011) (“Smith Letter”).
4

Graphic Artists Guild (“GAG”), Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Oct. 27, 2011
Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Jan. 16, 2012) (“GAG First Notice Comments”).

5

American Photographic Artists (“APA”), Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Oct. 27,
2011 Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“APA First Notice Comments”).

6

Alliance of Visual Artists (“AVA”), Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Aug. 23, 2012
Notice of Inquiry at 2 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“AVA Second Notice Comments”).

1
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a copyright small claims tribunal.7 A representative of the Songwriters Guild of America opined
that while “[s]uch small claims and random infringements may seem unimportant, … taken in
the aggregate, they have an effect on the livelihoods of individual creators akin to the infamous
torture ‘death by a thousand cuts.’”8
Creators are not alone in voicing these concerns. Citing the “hindrances that currently exist in
preventing copyright owners from pursuing copyright claims of relatively small economic
value,” the American Bar Association’s Section of Intellectual Property Law offered
recommendations in support of “a much needed avenue for small copyright claims
adjudication.”9 Organizations that provide pro bono assistance to lower-income artists, such as
California Lawyers for the Arts and the New York-based Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts,
emphasized what they saw as a pressing need for alternatives to federal litigation.10
Finally, the frustrations of those seeking to defend against claims of infringement – who
themselves may be smaller actors and who also face high litigation costs – cannot be overlooked.
The Copyright Office trusts that the findings and recommendations of this Report will be helpful
to Congress as it continues to explore the issue of small copyright claims.

7

Authors Guild, Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Oct. 27, 2011 Notice of Inquiry at 23 (undated) (“Authors Guild First Notice Comments”) (citing survey showing 55% of authors favor small claims
court).
8

Songwriters Guild of America (“SGA”) & Nashville Songwriters Association International (“NSAI”), Comments
Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Oct. 27, 2011 Notice of Inquiry at 1 (undated) (“SGA & NSAI
First Notice Comments”).

9

See American Bar Association (“ABA”) Section of Intellectual Property Law (“ABA IP Section”), Comments
Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Aug. 23, 2012 Notice of Inquiry at 1, 10 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“ABA
IP Section Second Notice Comments”).
10

See California Lawyers for the Arts (“CLA”), Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Oct.
27, 2011 Notice of Inquiry (undated) (“CLA First Notice Comments”); Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc.
(“VLA”), Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Feb. 26, 2013 Notice of Inquiry (Apr. 12,
2013) (“VLA Third Notice Comments”).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It appears beyond dispute that under the current federal system small copyright claimants face
formidable challenges in seeking to enforce the exclusive rights to which they are entitled. The
Copyright Office therefore recommends that Congress consider the creation of an alternative
forum that will enable copyright owners to pursue small infringement matters and related claims
arising under the Copyright Act.
In light of the state court tradition of referring to claims of modest economic value as “small
claims,” many have adopted that term to reference the nature of the claims that are the focus of
this Report, as does the Report itself. Such claims, however, are not small to the individual
creators who are deprived of income or opportunity due to the misuse of their works, and the
problem of addressing lower-value infringements is not a small one for our copyright system.
But how would we structure an alternative process? Concerns of pragmatism and efficiency are
core considerations, but they are not the only ones, and they must be viewed in the larger context
of federal powers. Our Constitution protects both the role of the federal judiciary and the rights
of those who participate in adjudicatory proceedings. These principles are enshrined in Article
III and the Fifth and Seventh Amendments, and in judicial interpretations of these and other
constitutional provisions. Any alternative process must fit comfortably within the constitutional
parameters.
In light of the existing constitutional landscape, the challenges of the current system, and the
views and insights of those who participated in this study, it appears that the most promising
option to address small copyright claims would be a streamlined adjudication process in which
parties would participate by consent. Perhaps not surprisingly, a number of the commenting
parties viewed the Copyright Office as the logical and appropriate home for such a small claims
system.
In recent years, many have emphasized the potential of voluntary solutions to certain problems
of copyright enforcement.11 In this case, a voluntary approach necessarily will fall short of a
full-fledged judicial process, offering the complete panoply of copyright remedies, to which
small copyright claimants could turn reliably and affordably to pursue infringers. Such a process
is what our legal system would provide in an ideal world. But in the real world of constitutional
and institutional limitations, a voluntary system with strong incentives for participation on both
sides seems more attainable, at least in the near term. Importantly, such a voluntary approach
would retain a mandatory backstop; parties who declined to consent to the alternative small
11

See The Role of Voluntary Agreements in the U.S. Intellectual Property System Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (discussing various
voluntary initiatives to combat copyright infringement); Center for Copyright Information, The Copyright Alert
System, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/ (click on embedded video) (explaining
recently implemented U.S. Copyright Alert System, a voluntary system established by content owners and internet
service providers (“ISPs”) by which consumers are warned against infringing conduct through participating ISPs);
see also THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY App. A at 102-03 (July 2013) (noting Task Force’s desire to support
development of voluntary enforcement initiatives).

3
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claims proceeding could still be summoned to federal district court by a claimant who was able
to take that path.
In brief summary, the Report makes the following recommendations:
•

Congress should create a centralized tribunal within the Copyright Office, which would
administer proceedings through online and teleconferencing facilities without the
requirement of personal appearances. The tribunal would be staffed by three
adjudicators, two of whom would have significant experience in copyright law – together
having represented or presided over the interests of both owners and users of copyrighted
works – with the third to have a background in alternative dispute resolution.

•

The tribunal would be a voluntary alternative to federal court. Its focus would be on
small infringement cases valued at no more than $30,000 in damages. Copyright owners
would be required to have registered their works or filed an application before bringing
an action. They would be eligible to recover either actual or statutory damages up to the
$30,000 cap, but statutory damages would be limited to $15,000 per work (or $7,500 for
a work not registered by the normally applicable deadline for statutory damages).

•

Claimants who initiated a proceeding would provide notice of the claim to responding
parties, who would need to agree to the process, either through an opt-out mechanism or
by affirmative written consent. Respondents would be permitted to assert all relevant
defenses, including fair use, as well as limited counterclaims arising from the infringing
conduct at issue. Certain DMCA-related matters relating to takedown notices, including
claims of misrepresentation, could also be considered, and parties threatened with an
infringement action could seek a declaration of noninfringement.

•

Parties would provide written submissions and hearings would be conducted through
telecommunications facilities. Proceedings would be streamlined, with limited discovery
and no formal motion practice. A responding party’s agreement to cease infringing
activity could be considered by the tribunal and reflected in its determination. The
tribunal would retain the discretion to dismiss without prejudice any claim that it did not
believe could fairly be adjudicated through the small claims process.

•

Determinations of the small claims tribunal would be binding only with respect to the
parties and claims at issue and would have no precedential effect. They would be subject
to limited administrative review for error and could be challenged in federal district court
for fraud, misconduct, or other improprieties. Final determinations could be filed in
federal court, if necessary, to ensure their enforceability.

4
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STUDY HISTORY

Congress identified the problem of small copyright claims in 2006 as an outgrowth of its
consideration of orphan works.12 As Congress considered potential solutions to the problem of
orphan works, it became clear that certain claims for copyright infringement – in particular, those
involving lesser amounts of damages – could not practically be pursued within the existing
federal court structure. Recognizing that this concern was not limited to orphan works, in March
2006, the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property held a separate hearing on the question of small copyright claims.13 The hearing
focused on possible alternative dispute resolution systems such as a copyright “small claims
court.”14 At the hearing, witnesses, including representatives of authors, musicians, illustrators,
photographers, and graphic artists, testified about the challenges of the current system and the
inability to address smaller infringement matters. The Copyright Office submitted a statement to
the Subcommittee in which it also observed these difficulties and suggested possible avenues to
be considered.15
In October 2011, the House Judiciary Committee revisited the question of small copyright
claims, requesting that the Copyright Office conduct a study to evaluate the issue.16 In a letter to
the Register, then-Chairman Lamar Smith asked the Office to review “the extent to which
authors and other copyright owners are effectively prevented from seeking relief from
infringement due to constraints in the current system.”17 Additionally, the Office was tasked to
“furnish specific recommendations, as appropriate, for changes in administrative, regulatory and
statutory authority that will improve the adjudication of small copyright claims and thereby
enable all copyright owners to more fully realize the promise of exclusive rights enshrined in our
Constitution.”18

12

“Orphan works” is a term used to describe the situation where the owner of a copyrighted work cannot be
identified or located by someone who wishes to make use of the work in a manner that requires permission of the
copyright owner. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf (“Orphan Works Report”).
13

See Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG109hhrg26767/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg26767.pdf (“2006 Hearing”). The statement submitted by Register of Copyrights
Marybeth Peters on behalf of the Copyright Office is attached as Appendix A.
14

2006 Hearing at 2.

15

Id. at 45 (statement of the United States Copyright Office). The Office also identified “small claims” challenges
in its Orphan Works Report, and proposed orphan works legislation in 2006 and 2008 included provisions that
specifically directed the Copyright Office to conduct a study addressing remedies for small claims. See Orphan
Works Report at 114; Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, § 5, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works
Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, § 6, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, § 4, 109th Cong. (2006).

16

See Smith Letter.

17

Id.

18

Id.
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In response to the October 2011 request, the Office published an initial Notice of Inquiry in the
Federal Register (“First Notice of Inquiry”).19 There, the Office requested public comment on
how copyright owners have handled small copyright claims and the obstacles they have
encountered, as well as potential alternatives to the current legal system that might better
accommodate such claims. The Office received fifty-five substantive responses to its notice
from a broad spectrum of interested parties, including industry associations, public interest
groups, technology companies, publisher representatives, legal scholars, and individual
creators.20 Commenting parties expressed frustration with the inaccessibility of the current
system, as well as concern over defendants’ rights in any alternative system.
In May 2012, the Copyright Office, along with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”),
participated in a roundtable event sponsored by the George Washington University School of
Law regarding small claims.21 There, legal scholars and other interested parties helped to frame
the issues and debated the merits of potential small claims solutions in both the copyright and
patent contexts. The PTO, which is conducting its own inquiry into the area of patent small
claims, has been supportive of the Copyright Office study and followed it with close interest.
The Office published a second Notice of Inquiry in August 2012 (“Second Notice of Inquiry”).22
This additional notice focused on potential alternatives to federal court litigation and identified a
host of issues raised by commenting parties and the Office’s own research. The Second Notice
of Inquiry asked for public comment on the nature of an alternative tribunal or process,
qualifications of the adjudicators, discovery parameters, available relief, treatment of frivolous
claims, appeal mechanisms, and constitutional concerns, among other topics. The Office
received twenty-five additional comments addressed to these issues, which provided helpful
guidance as the Office continued to contemplate alternatives to federal court litigation.23
In November 2012, the Office held two two-day public hearings regarding the copyright small
claims issue at Columbia Law School in New York City and UCLA School of Law in Los
Angeles. Each hearing was divided into seven panels addressed to the following broad topics:
forum, jurisdiction, and decisionmakers; subject matter, claims, and defenses; practice and
procedure; litigation alternatives; relief and appeals; constitutional issues; and moving forward
(which included empirical data, funding considerations, and future assessments). At each

19

Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,758 (Oct. 27, 2011). This Notice of Inquiry is attached,
along with the Office’s two additional Federal Register notices, as Appendix B.
20

These comments are posted on the Office’s website at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/comments/.
Additionally, lists of the parties who responded to each of the Office’s Notices of Inquiry, as well as the participants
in the Office’s public hearings, can be found in Appendix C.
21

See The George Washington University Law School, Event Videos, http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/FocusAr
eas/IP/Pages/Videos.aspx (hyperlinks for videos of the proceedings are under the heading “The IP Small Claims
Roundtable, May 20, 2012”).
22

Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Additional Comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 51,068 (Aug. 23, 2012) (included in
Appendix B).
23

These comments are posted on the Office’s website at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/comments/noi_
10112012/index html. A list of parties who responded to the Second Notice of Inquiry is included in Appendix C.
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hearing, participants representing a range of views and interests participated in lively discussions
regarding potential alternative systems.24
Finally, the Office published a third Notice of Inquiry in February 2013 (“Third Notice of
Inquiry”)25 which requested additional comments on some of the subjects raised in earlier
comments and at the hearings. This Notice focused on whether an alternative system should be
voluntary or mandatory, the types of copyrighted works that should be covered, the types of
claims that would be appropriate, whether injunctive relief should be available, the role of
attorneys, the enforceability of judgments, and other pertinent issues. The Office received
twenty-seven further comments, again representing a wide variety of viewpoints, on these
subjects.26

24

Transcripts of the hearings are available on the Office’s website at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/tra
nscripts/. A list of participants in the public hearings is included in Appendix C.

25

Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Third Request for Comments, 78 Fed. Reg. 13,094 (Feb. 26, 2013)
(included in Appendix B).
26

These comments are posted on the Office’s website at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/comments/noi_
02263013/. A list of parties who responded to the Third Notice of Inquiry is included in Appendix C.
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THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Copyright disputes are governed by federal law and, by statute, must be brought in federal
district court.27 United States district courts capably serve a multitude of claimants, presiding
over a wide range of disputes, including highly complex litigations with significant rights and
millions of dollars at stake. In many cases, federal courts offer distinct advantages over other
venues. Federal judges tend to be highly skilled and are more likely to have experience in the
interpretation and application of federal law, including the Copyright Act.
In recent years, the number of copyright complaints filed in the U.S. district courts has ranged
from slightly above 2,000 to something over 3,000, currently representing about one out of every
100 cases initiated in the federal system.28 But, as is discussed in more detail throughout this
Report, federal court is effectively inaccessible to copyright owners seeking redress for claims of
relatively low economic value, especially individual creators who are of limited resources.29 It
has been estimated that the median cost for a party to litigate a copyright infringement lawsuit
with less than $1 million at stake through appeal is $350,000.30 Such costs, of course, are not
only completely disproportionate to what most individuals could invest in a lawsuit, but also to
what a copyright claimant could ever hope to recover in a relatively modest infringement case.
Small copyright owners, who frequently lack experience with federal courts, often find federal
litigation too difficult or expensive to pursue31 and may be unable to navigate “the often complex

27

See 17 U.S.C. § 301; 28 U.S.C. § 1338.

28

See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, TABLE C-2: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE
OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2011 AND 2012, available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2012/december/C02Dec12.pdf. The 3,266
copyright claims filed in federal district courts in 2012 – a number which appears to be on the rise – comprised
approximately 1.2% of the 267,990 civil cases filed overall. Id. In 2011, the number of federal district court
copyright filings was 2,375. Id. In 2010, there were 2,033 copyright cases, and in 2009, the number was 2,018. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
TABLE C-2: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT,
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2009 AND 2010, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2010/dec10/C02Dec10.pdf.
29

For example, on average, most individual professional photographers earn $50,000 or less per year. See APA
First Notice Comments at 3. Similarly, the median pay for writers and authors in 2010 was $55,420 annually. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: WRITERS AND AUTHORS (2012), available at
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/media-and-communication/writers-and-authors htm.
30

See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION (“AIPLA”), REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
2011, at 35 (2011) (“AIPLA Report”).
31

See GAG, Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 2 (Apr. 10, 2013) (“GAG Third Notice
Comments”) (“[The] existing court system is unaffordable and impractical for most occurrences of typical
infringement. The result is a significant and seriously detrimental loss of income to American visual creators ….”);
VLA Third Notice Comments at 3 (“The cost, time and resources that need to be devoted to federal court litigation
often exceed the amount in controversy in a small copyright matter, which discourages authors and artists from
bringing such claims.”).
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procedural rules that govern federal litigation, leading to resentment and frustration.”32
Stakeholders described federal court litigation as a “very daunting task [where] it is virtually
impossible to have pro se representation.”33 A number expressed the view that “most
[infringements] will never be prosecuted because it is economically unfeasible for the creators to
commence an action in federal court.”34 Moreover, because the potential for recovery of
damages is limited, small claimants have less ability to retain counsel, as most attorneys are
unwilling to take copyright cases that are unlikely to yield a certain level of damages.35
Accordingly, even meritorious claims can effectively be shut out of court. For these reasons, the
number of infringement actions actually filed in federal court likely significantly underrepresents
the number of cases that copyright owners would choose to bring if they were able.
A.

Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction

Copyright infringement claims are governed by federal law and are required to be brought in
federal – not state – court.36 In considering a case under the Copyright Act, a federal court may
also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a related state court claim,37 such as a breach of
contract action, in appropriate circumstances.38
In their limitation to the federal courts, copyright cases resemble patent actions, which also must
be brought in federal court. But while patent cases initially are filed and heard by federal district
courts, unlike copyright cases, they are appealed from the district courts to a specialized
appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is responsible for appeals in
32

PUBLIC COUNSEL, THE PUBLIC COUNSEL FEDERAL PRO SE CLINIC ANNUAL REPORT FEBRUARY 2009-FEBRUARY
2010, at 1, available at http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/publications/files/Public-Counsel-Federal-Pro-Se-ClinicAnnual-Report-2009-2010.pdf.
33

Tr. at 26:08-11 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Bruce Lehman, Former Asst. Sec’y of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents &
Trademarks). Throughout theis Report, transcripts of the Office’s public hearings are cited with the abbreviation
“Tr.” along with the page and line numbers, and date, of the cited material. These citations also include the name of
the speaker and organization (if any) with which the speaker is affiliated.
34

National Press Photographers Association (“NPPA”), Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry
at 7 (Jan. 16, 2012) (“NPPA First Notice Comments”).
35

See ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 7 (survey results indicating that less than one-third of surveyed
copyright attorneys would accept an uncomplicated copyright infringement case with under $30,000 at stake).
36

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Additionally, the Copyright Act preempts all state law claims that “are equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103 ….” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Nevertheless, states can provide for claims that protect rights that fall outside
of the Copyright Act, including some claims that are somewhat similar to copyright matters. For example, some
states protect unfixed works, moral rights (beyond the limited rights set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106A), and pre-1972
sound recordings.
37

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

38

See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[B][2] (rev. ed., 2013)
(“NIMMER”) (“When federal jurisdiction exists over at least one count of a complaint, the district court may
entertain other pendent counts (as to which federal jurisdiction would be lacking were they brought independently)
involving the same parties and arising ‘from the same nucleus of operative facts.’ For example, supplemental
jurisdiction will lie as to a contract action for breach of a publishing agreement where the facts of such breach also
give rise to a claim for copyright infringement.”).
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patent cases and other specific types of matters.39 Copyright cases, by contrast, are appealed to
the courts of appeals for the circuits in which the matters are initially decided.40
The limitation to federal jurisdiction for copyright and patent matters differs from the treatment
of trademark cases. Unlike patents and copyrights, trademarks are governed by both federal and
state statutes and caselaw.41 The federal law regarding trademarks, the Lanham Act, does not
preempt all state law claims.42 States therefore are able to provide additional protections against
the misuse of unregistered marks, unfair competition, and similar wrongdoing.
Additionally, the Lanham Act allows for concurrent federal and state jurisdiction so that both
federal and state courts can adjudicate federal trademark cases.43 Conversely, federal courts
often hear state law trademark claims either as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction or on
diversity grounds.44 But despite the availability of both federal and state courts to enforce
trademark rights, given the option, trademark owners tend to prefer the federal system, evidently
because federal judges are perceived as more knowledgeable about trademark law.45
B.

Proceeding Pro Se in Federal Court

Although, in theory, they can proceed pro se, federal court litigants typically hire attorneys to
help them navigate federal procedural rules as well as the substantive law that applies in their
case. When parties do proceed pro se, they encounter significant challenges. A recent Federal
Judicial Center report on pro se civil litigants (the “2011 FJC Report”) identified the following
major issues in pro se cases: unnecessary or illegible submissions; problems with responses to
39

28 U.S.C. § 1295. In addition to patent appeals, the Federal Circuit hears appeals from various other tribunals,
including certain matters from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
40

28 U.S.C. § 1291. But note that “[o]ccasionally, the Federal Circuit will hear copyright infringement claims
brought as part of patent appeals.” WILLIAM F. PATRY, 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:278 (2013) (“PATRY”).

41

While the Constitution specifically provides that Congress can enact laws regarding patents and copyrights in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, federal trademark law is grounded in Congress’ more general authority under the
Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 3; 1-1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §
1.04[2][b] (3d ed. 2013) (“GILSON”).
42

2-7 GILSON § 7.04 (noting that Lanham Act does not occupy the field of trademark infringement entirely, as states
may themselves regulate trademark activity “in the absence of a clear conflict with the Act or the attributes of
federal trademark registration.”).

43

6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:1 (4th ed. 2013)
(“MCCARTHY”) (“[A] plaintiff wishing to file suit for violation of a provision of the Lanham Act has a choice to sue
on the claim in either federal or state court”).
44

Id. §§ 32:20, 32:33.

45

Id. § 32:1 (“As a matter of litigation strategy, however, most plaintiffs appear to bring such cases in the federal
courts, perhaps on the assumption that federal judges are more likely to be familiar with problems of trademark
infringement under a federal statute.”); see also Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella Martinez & Fabrizio Miazzetto, The
Community Trade Mark and Design Court of Alicante and Forum Shopping Regarding European Community
Intellectual Property Rights Litigation, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1308, 1316 n.21 (2005) (“Taking the example of the
United States: it is reported that the great majority of litigants prefer to file trade mark cases in the federal courts
instead of state courts because the former ‘have far more experience in adjudicating trademark cases than do the
state courts.’”) (citation omitted).
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motions; lack of knowledge about the law; failure to know when to object; and failure to
understand the legal consequences of their actions or inactions.46 Similarly, a self-help center for
pro se litigants established by the Northern District of California notes that pro se litigants are
less likely to succeed in federal court “because they lack the [necessary] legal knowledge,
training and experience.”47 Needless to say, such fundamental limitations can have significant
consequences for the outcome of an action.48
In light of these concerns, pro se litigants often receive more leeway from courts than parties
represented by attorneys. For example, pro se pleadings generally are held to less stringent
standards than those applied to attorney-drafted pleadings.49 Courts typically review pro se
pleadings “carefully and liberally and interpret such pleadings to raise the strongest arguments
that they suggest.”50 Some districts also have local court rules designed to help pro se parties.51
The 2011 FJC Report specifically noted that effective ways to assist pro se litigants included the
provision of “clear orders and instructions, standardized forms, prompt decisions on matters
submitted to the court, and use of hearings and conferences to better understand the case and let
litigants know the court has heard their case.”52 Additionally, the study identified two practices
that were “especially helpful” in helping pro se litigants: dedicated court staff to provide
specially tailored information to pro se litigants, including forms and instructions;53 and pro
bono programs, including mediation/settlement procedures and pro se help centers.54

46

DONNA STIENSTRA, JARED BATAILLON & JASON A. CANTONE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE
LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES vii (2011),
available at www fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/proseusdc.pdf/$file/proseusdc.pdf (“STIENSTRA ET AL.”).
47

Federal Legal Assistance Self Help Center (“FLASH”), Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of
Inquiry at 1-2 (Apr. 1, 2013) (“FLASH Third Notice Comments”).
48

For example, despite noting that “the right to a jury trial is constitutionally protected and casual waivers are not to
be presumed,” a court held that a pro se defendant had waived his right to a jury trial when he participated in a
bench trial without objection. CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Tr. at 75:1220 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Jay Rosenthal, National Music Publishers’ Association (“NMPA”)) (“[W]e were very
concerned about the idea that a plaintiff in pro se represent themselves [in a music-related matter], as well as a
defendant going pro se, not really understanding the complexities of the compulsory license or the complexities of
the consent decree with BMI or ASCAP or authorship claims against each other, fair use, first use, rights of
termination, on and on and on.”).
49

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).

50

Bauer v. Yellen, 548 F. Supp. 2d 88, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

51

For example, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York require opposing counsel to provide pro se parties
with unreported cases cited in submissions to the court as well as special notices in connection with motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment. See S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y L.R. 7.2, 12.1, 56.2.
52

STIENSTRA ET AL., at 34.

53

Id. at vi.

54

Id. at 17.
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Pro se copyright litigants occasionally find success managing the federal court system on their
own.55 Nevertheless, proceeding pro se in the procedurally complex federal courts can be a risky
endeavor in which rights or defenses may inadvertently be waived or otherwise jeopardized due
to a lack of familiarity with the court system or substantive law.
C.

Federal Court Procedure

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) govern federal district court litigation,
with the goal of “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”56 The Federal Rules apply to a wide variety of procedural issues – from how to
serve a complaint to the amount and types of permissible discovery to how to request injunctive
relief. In addition to the Federal Rules, federal court litigants typically also must abide by local
court rules and specific rules of the presiding judge. The Federal Rules, while helpful in laying a
comprehensive logistical framework for a wide range of lawsuits, can be difficult to navigate
even for experienced litigators, much less pro se litigants. Unlike in state court systems, there is
no streamlined federal “small claims” procedure for lower-stakes disputes.
1.

Initiating a Lawsuit

The Federal Rules and principles of constitutional law constrain a plaintiff’s choice of forum.
When initiating a lawsuit, the plaintiff must determine which court has personal jurisdiction over
the parties, the proper venue for the action, and the correct method to serve notice of the
lawsuit.57 Depending upon the defendant’s conduct and location, the plaintiff may not be able to
hale the defendant into the preferred court. Such decisions can be complicated, especially for an
inexperienced plaintiff. Additionally, service of process – to ensure that the defendant is
properly notified of the action – may be costly depending on the type of service required. There
are no shortcuts for copyright claimants or those with small claims – all litigants must follow the
same procedures. Once a plaintiff undertakes this analysis, he or she initiates a case by filing a
complaint and paying the federal court filing and administrative fees, which currently total
$400.58
2.

Discovery

After a lawsuit is initiated, parties normally engage in discovery. Under the Federal Rules, this
process typically entails mandatory initial disclosures,59 as well as depositions (including of

55

See, e.g., Macklin v. Mueck, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (awarding pro se plaintiff a $300,000 default
judgment that represented the maximum statutory damages for infringement of his poetry).
56

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

57

Personal jurisdiction and service of process are discussed further in Part IV.E, infra.

58

See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (providing for $350 filing fee); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURT
MISCELLANEOUS FEE SCHEDULE (May 1, 2013) (additional $50 administrative fee to be charged by district court for
filing of civil action), available at http://www http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Fees/DistrictCourt
MiscellaneousFeeSchedule.aspx.
59

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
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potential experts),60 up to twenty-five written interrogatories per party61 (unless more are
permitted by the court),62 and potentially unlimited requests for both production of documents63
and party admissions.64 Document requests almost always include requests for electronically
stored information, which may require extensive search and review of document files, email, and
other records.
Civil litigation attorneys cite the discovery process as the primary reason for the length of federal
court litigation.65 In addition to the time it takes to respond to written discovery requests and
take depositions, the parties may have discovery disputes that require motions to compel and
associated hearings, adding still more time and expense to the proceeding. The discovery
process provokes significant frustration due to its often substantial costs and potential for abuse
by exploitative litigants.66
Estimates put the cost of discovery at 50% to 90% of the total cost of litigation.67 The current
state of discovery, including the forbidding cost of electronic discovery, may well persuade a
party to forego bringing a lawsuit or cause a party to settle on less than ideal terms.68 As the
Supreme Court has observed, “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching [even summary judgment]
proceedings.”69 While sanctions for discovery abuse are available at the discretion of the court,70
60

Id. 27.

61

Id. 33.

62

Id. 26(b)(2).

63

Id. 34.

64

Id. 36.

65

See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: FULL REPORT 12 (2009) (“ABA 2009
SURVEY”), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/litigation/survey/docs/report_aba_re
port.authcheckdam.pdf (“Discovery is the reason most often picked by respondents as the primary cause of delay.
48% picked that reason, while the next most popular reason (delayed rulings on motions) garnered only 25%.”).
66

See Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989) (outlining both the
frustration parties have over discovery and the perspective that some litigators value discovery “not by its
contribution to an anticipated judgment but by its contribution to an anticipated settlement”).

67

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Adopts Rules Changes - Confronts Projected
Budget Shortfalls (Sept. 15, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/99-0915/Judicial_Conference_Adopts_Rules_Changes_-_Confronts_Projected_Budget_Shortfalls.aspx; see also T.
WILLGING ET. AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR. DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES, 15 (Table 4) (1997)
(even before the rise of electronic discovery, the median percentage of clients’ total litigation expenses accounted
for by discovery was 50%), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf nsf/lookup/discovry.pdf/$file/discovry.pdf.
68

See JOHN H. BEISNER, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE CENTRE CANNOT HOLD: THE NEED
FOR EFFECTIVE REFORM OF THE U.S. CIVIL DISCOVERY PROCESS 2 (2010) (“BEISNER”) (“[T]he effort and expense

associated with electronic discovery are so excessive that settlement is often the most fiscally prudent course –
regardless of the merits of the case.”), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke
%20Materials/Library/John%20Beisner,%20The%20Centre%20Cannot%20Hold.pdf.
69

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).

70

See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2).
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some believe that “courts have been reluctant to take a strong hand in managing the discovery
process or to impose meaningful sanctions for abuses.”71
3.

Dispositive Motions and Trials

Parties may try to end a case expeditiously through a dispositive motion, such as a motion for a
default judgment, a motion to dismiss,72 a motion for judgment on the pleadings,73 or a summary
judgment motion.74 Such motions – especially summary judgment motions – may themselves be
costly and time-consuming. Apart from default motions, most dispositive motions are contested,
and parties may file cross-motions that further complicate the proceedings and drive up litigation
costs. While these motions can remove vexatious claims from court, at least some lawyers
believe that dispositive motions – such as those for summary judgment, which are frequently
denied so that the litigation continues on – are not proportionately beneficial compared to their
cost.75
If the parties forego dispositive motions or the motions are denied, and the case is not settled, the
parties proceed to trial, adding another layer of expense. Trial can be a daunting experience for
lawyers, much less inexperienced litigants. Before the trial begins, parties typically must
exchange exhibit and witness lists, prepare proposed exhibits, furnish evidentiary objections and
replies, prepare to examine and cross-examine witnesses, prepare and object to opposing jury
instructions if a jury is involved, and create demonstrative exhibits, among many other things.
Trial materials and testimony generally must abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence,76 with
which litigants must be familiar in order to lodge and respond to objections during the
proceedings. Litigants also must be prepared to offer procedural and substantive legal arguments
in response to the plethora of issues that inevitably arise during a trial.
4.

Magistrate Judges

Federal district courts rely on federal magistrate judges to ease burdens on both the district
judges and the court system generally.77 The Federal Magistrates Act78 allows federal district
71

BEISNER, at 3. This sentiment appears to be echoed by practitioners. See ABA 2009 SURVEY, at 67 (“86.5% of
all lawyers agree … that sanctions allowed by the discovery rules are seldom imposed.”), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/litigation/survey/docs/report_aba_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
72

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).

73

Id. 12(c).

74

Id. 56.

75

See ABA 2009 SURVEY, at 114 (“62.2% of plaintiffs’ lawyers believe that summary judgment increases costs and
delays without proportionate benefit, while defense lawyers agree only 10.9% of the time”); Tr. at 158:20-159:05
(Nov. 26, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm) (“There’s always a motion for summary judgment that says, ‘My
gosh. The plaintiff made a tiny error in the registration certificate. This is fraud on the Copyright Office. Bands
must play. Dirges must sound. The solar system must stop. And the plaintiff must be kicked out’ for what turns out
to be essentially trivial claims.”).
76

FED. R. EVID. 101, 1101.

77

In addition to magistrate judges, courts sometimes also appoint special masters to assist the court in exceptional
situations. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a). A special master can hold trial proceedings in a nonjury matter or handle complex
findings of fact or difficult damages computations. Id. 53(a)(1)(B).
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courts to delegate certain pretrial matters to magistrate judges without the consent of the parties,
including the ability to draft proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the resolution of
nondispositive matters.79 The magistrate judge’s recommended decision stands unless a party
lodges an objection within fourteen days. If there is an objection, the referring district judge will
review the matter de novo.80
In addition, with the consent of the parties, magistrate judges can conduct civil trials and enter
judgments in particular matters.81 In such cases, magistrate judges, like district court judges,
abide by both the Federal Rules and the Rules of Evidence.82 Thus, while a decision may be
rendered more promptly if the magistrate judge’s schedule permits an earlier trial, referral to a
magistrate judge may not yield any actual savings in terms of the overall complexity or cost of
litigation.
5.

Special Patent Procedures

Patent cases present formidable challenges for the judicial system because of the considerable
resources required to construe complex patent claims and render determinations on prior art and
obviousness, evaluate highly involved scientific and technological evidence, and ascertain
economically appropriate damages if infringement is established. For these reasons, some
federal courts have adopted specialized procedural rules to govern patent infringement cases.
Courts that have taken this approach include the Southern District of New York and the Western
District of Pennsylvania, both of which are also participating in a pilot program established by
Congress for patent cases.83 The modified patent rules adjust the Federal Rules to address the
specific complexities of patent litigation by altering procedures for the initial scheduling
conference, initial disclosures, and claim construction proceedings.84 Another court, the Eastern
District of Texas, has adopted special patent rules that are notoriously challenging but have
shortened trial timelines in such a manner as to make that district a magnet for patent plaintiffs.85
Some have expressed concern that the Eastern District of Texas’s local patent rules unfairly

78

Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1113 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39). For further discussion of
the role of federal magistrates, see Part III.C.4, infra.
79

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

80

Id. § 636(b)(1)(C).

81

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

82

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 72 (Magistrate judges: pretrial order); id. 73 (Magistrate judges: trial by consent;
appeal); FED. R. EVID. 1101(a) (“These rules apply to proceedings before … magistrate judges”).
83

See Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011).

84

See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. PATENT L.R. 2 (initial scheduling conference), 6-8 & 10-12 (initial disclosures), 12 (claim
construction hearing).

85

See generally E.D. TEX. P.R. (local rules for patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas); see also Michael C.
Smith, Feature: Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent Cases, 69 TEX. B.J. 1045, 1046
(2006).
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favor plaintiffs by compressing the period in which defendants must respond even though
plaintiffs may have spent significant time preparing the case before filing.86
D.

Specific Challenges in Copyright Cases

Unlike in the patent context (at least in some jurisdictions), federal court procedural rules are not
tuned to the specific needs of copyright litigants. At the same time, the Copyright Act and
decisional law impose additional requirements on those seeking to pursue copyright infringement
claims, which can add to the legal complexity of a case.
1.

Registration Requirement

The Copyright Act states, with certain limited exceptions, that “no action for infringement of the
copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title.”87 This means that owners of United States works88 must either
register or receive a refusal of registration for the subject work prior to bringing a copyright
infringement lawsuit.89 While this requirement may impose a procedural hurdle for copyright
claimants, it helps to produce a valuable public record of American creativity as well as material
information to parties in litigation.90
The registration requirement, however, is not as straightforward as it may appear. There is a
circuit court split concerning whether the copyright owner can satisfy this obligation merely by

86

See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern
District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 219 (2007).
87

17 U.S.C. § 411(a). Although the registration requirement is not jurisdictional, it is a precondition to a suit. See
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 163-66 (2010).

88

Non-U.S. works need not be registered prior to bringing a lawsuit, but they must be timely registered if the
copyright owner wishes to seek statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and/or costs. See, e.g., Football Ass’n Premier
League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[Section 411(a)] allows suits to be
brought upon foreign works without registration of them; but it does not impair the operation of Section 412, which
forbids the recovery of statutory damages in any infringement action (except, among others, those under Section
411(c) concerning live broadcasts) unless the work has been registered.”).
89

See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).

90

See AVA Second Notice Comments at 4 (“As means of preserving the mission of the Copyright Office and
Library Congress, access to this alternative body, like the federal courts, should be contingent upon registration of
the infringed photograph(s).”); see also Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (“MPAA”), Comments
Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 5 (Apr. 12, 2013) (“MPPA Third Notice Comments”)
(“Generally speaking, a fully-populated registration system aids in searches by potential users of others’ copyrighted
works. A small claims system should not be designed in such a way as to lessen the incentive to register, which
would lead to various negative outcomes, including an increase in the volume of potential orphan works. Moreover,
in the litigation context, it is vitally important for a defendant to know exactly what it is he is accused of
infringing.”). Because the registration process requires that claimants deposit copies of the works for which
registration is sought, the registration requirement also contributes substantially to the unequaled collection of the
U.S. Library of Congress. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: FISCAL
YEAR ENDING SEPT. 30, 2011 29-30 (2011) (showing that the average annual value of materials transferred from the
Copyright Office to the Library of Congress from 2007 through 2011 was $33 million).
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applying to register, or whether the owner instead must wait to receive the Office’s registration
decision before bringing suit.91
Regardless of whether a completed application will suffice for purposes of filing a lawsuit, a
copyright plaintiff may only recover statutory damages and attorneys’ fees – as opposed to actual
damages and profits – if the work at issue was registered within a statutorily prescribed time
frame.92 Generally speaking, to qualify for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees, the work must
have been registered within three months of its publication or, if unpublished, before the act of
infringement.93 The registration requirement can be problematic for small copyright claimants,
who may not be aware of the repercussions of not registering in a timely manner. Moreover,
while online registration fees are relatively modest (currently $35 for a simple online
application), a claimant in a hurry to go to court must pay a significantly higher fee (currently
$760) to expedite the registration process.94
When deciding whether to register a work, individual artists and smaller entities face a
difficult choice in weighing the costs of registration against the possibility of
infringement and future ability to proceed in court. Individual photographers, for
example, who tend to produce numerous works, may lack the administrative or financial
resources to register their works within the statutory deadline.95 Yet the inability to
recover statutory damages can effectively preclude legal action against an infringer.96

91

Compare La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. 154 (“[W]e reject the proposition that § 411 confers
federal court jurisdiction for an infringement action upon mere submission of a copyright application to the
Copyright Office. In our view, the statute requires more: actual registration by the Register of Copyrights. Until
that happens, an infringement action will not lie in the federal courts.”) with Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. R.D. Beard,
730 F.2d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir.1984) (allowing suit to proceed upon Copyright Office’s receipt of application,
payment of required fee, and deposit of work in question).
92

See 17 U.S.C. § 412.

93

See id.

94

See 37 C.F.R. § 201.3.

95

See AVA, Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at Attachment A (Jan. 17, 2012) (“AVA
First Notice Comments”) (noting that in a survey of photographers, 84% never register their works and of those who
do not register, 25% said they never heard about it, 24% said it was too time consuming, and 13% said it was too
expensive); Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts (“Kernochan Center”), Comments Submitted in
Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“Kernochan Second Notice Comments”) (“Requiring
that a plaintiff wait for a registration certificate to be issued or denied before bringing an action … would seem to
run counter to the goals of a small claims proceeding. Many potential plaintiffs would have to choose between a
significant delay or a significant payment (for faster processing of its application) before commencing an action.”);
Tr. at 40:22-41:04 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (noting that photographers have difficulty registering
because they produce photographs in large numbers).
96

American Society of Media Photographers (“ASMP”), Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of
Inquiry at 5 (Jan. 16, 2012) (“ASMP First Notice Comments”) (“[O]ne of the impediments to professional
photographers’ access to the current copyright enforcement system is the requirement of copyright registration
before litigation can be instituted (and earlier, for eligibility for an award of attorney fees and/or statutory
damages).”); Tr. at 141:07-09 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Randy Taylor, Copyright Defense League, LLC (“CDL”))
(“[S]tatutory damages are an essential and major element in getting the other side to actually talk to you.”); Tr. at
272:10-17 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Lisa Wilmer, Getty Images) (noting that untimely registration eliminates the option of
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During the course of the study, photographers and others pointed out that in some cases, actual
damages for an infringement – as measured by a typical licensing fee for use a work, for example
– could be several thousand dollars or less.97 Given the costs of litigation, “[u]nless actual
damages are truly substantial, the copyright holder will be without an effective remedy in federal
court.”98 As one sole proprietor explained: “I had failed to register my work before the
infringement occurred and was forced to decide whether to spend my hard-earned capital
fighting with the infringer in court, knowing full well that my attorney’s [sic] fees would not be
recouped. Ultimately, after consulting with an attorney, it became clear that I simply could not
afford to defend [sic] myself, even if I was on the right side of the law. The infringer got away
with it and went on to win several awards with my artwork, claiming it as his own.”99
2.

Identification of Online Infringers

Before filing a federal lawsuit, a copyright owner seeking to pursue an infringement claim must
first identify and locate the alleged infringer. In the internet age – where wrongdoers can act
anonymously – this can be difficult. While not unique to the copyright context, the prevalence of
online infringement makes this a particular concern for creators. For example, the copyright
owner may want to bring a lawsuit to stop unlawful conduct on a website, but might not know
who operates the website or where the operator is located.100 Thus, the small copyright claimant
might need to turn to the court for a subpoena requiring an internet service provider to identify

statutory damages and leaves the challenging option of seeking only actual damages, which are not a deterrent to
defendants).
97

Tr. at 255:24-256:06 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (noting that even though an exclusive license may
only cost a few thousand dollars, widely distributing that image online is an infringement can affect the market for
that image and should be subject to some sort of damages multiplier); Tr. at 261:02-07 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Bruce
Lehman, Former Asst. Sec’y of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks) (“I think if the damages are
$300, if an illustrator, photographer licenses a work for some kind of a use for $300 or $500, which wouldn’t be
totally uncommon for particularly a secondary use, you know, that’s hardly worth their time.”).
98

Alma Robinson, Small Copyright Claimants Need Access to Justice, CALIFORNIA ARTS BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.calawyersforthearts.org/california_arts_blog?mode=PostView&bmi=1213811.
99

Sheana Firth, Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 1. Another commenter noted that
“[i]n many instances, works created by individuals or other small copyright owners will not have been registered
until the infringement is found, eliminating any statutory damages or attorney’s fees.” Copyright Alliance,
Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 2 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“Copyright Alliance First Notice
Comments”).
100

See Getty Images, Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 2 (Apr. 12, 2012) (“Getty
Images Third Notice Comments”) (“We frequently encounter infringement of images on websites where the
infringer’s identity is unknown, often because the domain name has been registered through a proxy and there is no
valid contact information.”); National Writers Union (“NWU”), Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of
Inquiry at 11 (Jan. 16, 2012) (“NWU First Notice Comments”) (“[I]nfringers…may be located in cyberspace rather
than at any readily identifiable geographic location”); Tr. at 54:10-18 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Christos Badavas, Harry Fox
Agency, Inc. (“HFA”)) (noting that even when a plaintiff finds an infringing company, sometimes that plaintiff still
cannot identify any owners of that company); Tr. at 143:20-24 (Nov 15, 2012) (Randy Taylor, CDL) (estimating
that 15% of unauthorized users on the internet are using private online systems and are “going out of their way to
make it very difficult to find who the infringer actually is”); Tr. at 204:18-205:07 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Carolyn Wright,
Law Offices of Carolyn E. Wright, LLC) (noting that infringers on the internet are hard to find).
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the unknown operator.101 Some courts, however, have been reluctant to order subpoenas to
identify unknown defendants. 102 For example, while the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) includes an expedited process for a copyright owner to obtain a subpoena requiring
an internet service provider to identify an alleged infringer, courts have construed that provision
narrowly so as to preclude issuance of a subpoena in many cases.103
3.

Potential Bars to Recovery

Potential copyright plaintiffs also must analyze whether their infringement claims will withstand
the defenses to infringement available under the Copyright Act. A primary consideration is
whether the three-year statute of limitations for copyright claims has expired.104 In cases where
the infringement commenced more than three years ago, but has continued, this analysis may
present challenges.105
In addition, a number of important limitations and exceptions to copyright protection – some of
which are legally complex – may preclude a lawsuit, including: the safe harbors for qualifying
online service providers available under the DMCA;106 the applicability of a statutory license;107
and exceptions for libraries and archives, for certain educational, religious and charitable uses,
and to benefit the print disabled.108 Additionally and apart from these exceptions, in many cases
a plaintiff must assess whether the defendant may have a credible claim for fair use.109 The fair
101

FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (subpoenas generally); 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (specific provision relating to online service
providers).
102

See Art of Living Found. v. Does 1-10, No. 10-CV-05022-LHK, 2011 WL 5444622, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
2011) (granting motion to quash a subpoena to protect defendant’s right to “anonymous speech”); LaFace Records,
LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL 544992, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) (quashing all but one of
thirty-eight subpoenas to identify unknown defendants allegedly using a peer-to-peer network); Millenium TGA Inc.
v. Does 1-800, No. 10-C-5603, 2011 WL 10468128, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (severing 800 defendants as
being improperly joined, then granting single remaining defendant’s motion to quash subpoena due to lack of
personal jurisdiction). But see Maverick Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Does 1-2,115, 810 F.Supp.2d 1, 7-9 (D.D.C. 2011)
(denying fifty-two motions to quash subpoenas issued to ISPs for the purpose of identifying defendants accused of
infringing plaintiff’s copyrighted works).
103

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (finding that “a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP engaged in storing on its servers material that is
infringing or the subject of infringing activity,” and not to an ISP that is a mere conduit for infringing material);
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) (adopting reasoning of
Verizon court).
104

17 U.S.C. § 507.

105

Compare Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983) (allowing a copyright infringement suit arising
from acts outside the statute of limitations to proceed because the infringing activities continued) with Roley v. New
World Pictures, 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court’s summary judgment order and
rejecting the theory that a continuing wrong tolls the statute of limitations).

106

See 17 U.S.C. § 512.

107

See, e.g., id. §§ 114, 115, 118.

108

See id. §§ 108, 110, 121.

109

See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Tr. at 171:07-08 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Randy Taylor, CDL) (“The [defendant’s] initial response
[to a claim of copyright infringement] … always includes fair use.”).
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use doctrine, embodied in section 107 of the Copyright Act, serves to protect legitimate uses of
copyrighted works for purposes such as criticism, comment, teaching and research.110
4.

Remedies

Parties may seek a variety of remedies in copyright infringement lawsuits, including monetary
relief, declaratory judgments, preliminary and permanent injunctions, impoundment and
destruction of infringing articles, and recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees. Each of these
remedies presents unique challenges for copyright litigants.
a.

Damages

A plaintiff who is successful in a copyright infringement claim has the option of electing to
recover either statutory damages or actual damages and profits of the defendant.111
Actual damages can be difficult to prove and measure in copyright cases.112 First, information
about the extent of infringement and resulting profits is unlikely to be known, or fully known, to
a plaintiff and may be difficult to obtain from a defendant who did not keep records of infringing
activities or is reluctant to produce them in discovery.113 Second, it may be difficult to assess the
full value of the harm caused by an infringer’s unauthorized use of a work. In some cases, the
use may violate not just the owner’s rights but an exclusive licensing arrangement for the work,
110

Section 107 provides that the fair use of a copyrighted work
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching …, scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include –
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
….

17 U.S.C. § 107.
111

Id. § 504.

112

See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. 07-11446, 2012 WL 3639053, at *4 (D. Mass. 2012)
(“Congress gave a Copyright Act plaintiff the right to elect statutory in lieu of actual damages, in part because it
recognized that actual damages are extremely difficult to measure and prove in a copyright case.”) (citations
omitted); Tr. at 37:11-12 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Charles Sanders, SGA) (“[P]roving actual damages is really, really
expensive.”).
113

See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT §14.0 at 14:1 (3d ed. 2006 Supp.) (Copyright Act
“anticipates that copyright owners will sometimes encounter difficulty in establishing actual damages and profits,
and so entitles the copyright owner to elect statutory damages instead”); 6 PATRY § 22:153 (2013) (statutory
damages were adopted “to give the owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done him, in a case where the
rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits.”) (citing Douglas v.
Cunningham 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935)).
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thus impacting third-party interests and the relationship between the copyright owner and
licensee.114 In other cases, a creator may not want to have the work published or used in a
manner that may be harmful to the integrity of the work, an injury that is difficult to value.115
For these reasons, statutory damages have long played an important role in the protection of
copyright interests.116 In addition, many view statutory damages as essential to deterring
infringing conduct. If all that can be recovered from an infringer at the end of a lawsuit is what
the infringer would have paid for a license in the first place, exploiters of copyrighted works
have little reason not to adopt a “take now, pay later” philosophy.117
Under the Copyright Act, standard statutory damages for copyright infringement range from
$750 to $30,000 per infringed work.118 Willful infringement can increase damages to as much as
$150,000 per work, while a finding that the infringement was innocent can reduce damages to as
low as $200.119 The range of possible recovery if statutory damages are elected is therefore
substantial, especially in cases involving willful infringement.
Concerning the amount of damages to be awarded, the Copyright Act mandates only that within
the prescribed range, statutory damages are to be assessed “as the court considers just.”120 When
a jury trial is requested, it is up to the jury to decide the amount of statutory damages.121
Typically, in assessing statutory damages, the jury (or judge if a jury is waived) considers the
range of possible damages under the law, whether the infringement was willful or innocent, and
other factors such as “the nature of the infringement; the defendant’s purpose and intent, the
profit that the defendant reaped, if any, and/or the expense that the defendant saved; the revenue
lost by the plaintiff as a result of the infringement; the value of the copyright; the duration of the
infringement; the defendant’s continuation of infringement after notice or knowledge of
copyright claims; and the need to deter this defendant and other potential infringers.”122
114

Tr. at 121:19-22 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Lisa Shaftel, GAG).

115

See Tr. at 46:06-19 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Alicia Calzada, NPPA) (“For artists who produce work, the ability to
control their work is not just about money. It is about how their work is used. … [T]he ability to control your work
is just as important as money for some situations.”).
116

Great Britain’s first copyright act, the 1710 Statute of Anne, provided for statutory damages of “‘one Penny for
every Sheet which shall be found in [the infringer’s] custody.’” Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523
U.S. 340, 349 (1998) (quoting 8 Anne ch. 19 (1710)). The amount and availability of statutory damages are topics
of longstanding debate among copyright stakeholders. See, e.g., THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTERNET
POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY App. A at 102
(July 2013) (Task Force will seek to conduct dialogue regarding application of statutory damages in certain
contexts).
117

See Tr. at 263:2-6 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Charles Sanders, SGA) (asking whether adopting a “reasonable
compensation” damages regime would “set up a situation where you have to catch me if you can? My liability is
what I would have paid . . . had I actually licensed, but otherwise I am not going to pay until you ask?”).
118

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).

119

Id. § 504(c)(2).

120

Id. § 504(c)(1).

121

Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342.

122

Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 503-04 (1st Cir. 2011).
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In practice, statutory damages may be more likely to be awarded to larger entities because
“individual authors and small firms do not typically register their copyrights within three months
of publication, … [and thus] rarely qualify for statutory damages or attorney’s fee awards.”123
Several commenters concurred with the view that the registration requirement for statutory
damages places individuals and smaller entities at a disadvantage because it is difficult and
burdensome for them to meet the statutory requirement for timely registration.124
b.

Injunctive Relief

Parties may try to obtain early injunctive relief in a copyright case by filing a motion for a
preliminary injunction.125 This process requires the expense of briefing and, typically, a separate
hearing. The court may issue the preliminary relief only if the moving party posts a bond or
“security” in an amount large enough to cover the costs and damages of a party wrongfully
restrained.126
Parties also may seek permanent injunctive relief following a trial on the merits. The Supreme
Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,127 though a patent infringement case, set a
standard for injunctive relief that also applies in copyright actions.128 Citing earlier copyright
decisions to support its holding, the eBay Court rejected judicial interpretations favoring the
automatic grant of an injunction upon a finding of infringement.129 eBay thus held that, to secure
an injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a

123

Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454 (2009).
124

NWU, Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Apr. 12, 2013) (“NWU Third Notice
Comments”) (“The lack of any means of effective redress for copyright infringement genuinely accessible and
affordable to most individual writers makes the investment of time and money in the attempt to satisfy copyright
registration formalities an economically unjustifiable investment of writers’ time and money, and a diversion from
revenue-generating creative work.”); Tr. at 41:17-20 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (“[O]ften the reason
that an individual creator cannot afford to go to federal court is because they can’t afford to register all their work[s]
as they create them.”).
125

FED. R. CIV. P. 65. They may also seek a temporary restraining order. Id.

126

Id. 65(c).

127

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).

128

Courts have adapted and applied the eBay test to the preliminary injunction context as well. See, e.g., Flava
Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012) (though eBay “was a case about patents rather than
copyrights and about permanent rather than preliminary injunctions, we are persuaded … that eBay governs a
motion for a preliminary injunction in a copyright case, as well”); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir.
2010) (“We hold today that eBay applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for
alleged copyright infringement.”).
129

eBay, 547 U.S. at 392-93 (noting that “this Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional
equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has
been infringed.”) (citations omitted).
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remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.130
c. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
The Copyright Act provides that a prevailing party in a copyright lawsuit may recover his or her
costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.131 Such fee-shifting, however, is at the discretion of a court
and, if the prevailing party is a copyright owner, only if the work was registered in a timely
fashion as provided in section 412.132 One copyright law scholar has observed the importance of
attorneys’ fees for small claimants, stating that “[g]iven the high costs of litigation, [attorneys’
fees are] crucial and indeed, for smaller litigants, may determine whether bringing an
infringement action is financially viable.”133
But an attorneys’ fee award is not automatic upon a finding of infringement.134 Rather, in
considering an application for fees, courts look to a variety of factors, including “frivolousness,
motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the
case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence.”135 Thus, a court ultimately may decline to make an award even in a case where the
plaintiff has successfully pursued a legitimate claim of infringement.136
130

Id. at 391.

131

17 U.S.C. § 505 (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full
costs … the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”).
132

Id. § 412 (registration generally must be made within three months of publication or, for unpublished works,
before the commencement of infringement).
133

Jane Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience With Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 339 (2010). Similarly, as one court explained, “[a]n award of attorney’s fees helps to
ensure that all litigants have equal access to the courts to vindicate their statutory rights. It also prevents copyright
infringements from going unchallenged where the commercial value of the infringed work is small and there is no
economic incentive to challenge an infringement through expensive litigation.” Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash.,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981).

134

See 5 NIMMER § 14.10[D] (“The most difficult question presented in connection with attorney’s fees is when a
court should exercise its discretion to make such an award. In the words of one appellate decision, ‘[a]lthough
attorney’s fees are awarded in the trial court’s discretion, they are the rule rather than the exception and should be
awarded routinely.’ Nevertheless, in view of the Supreme Court’s later rejection of categorical rules in favor of the
trial court’s discretion, that statement should no longer be taken as prescriptive. Even where the prevailing party has
in fact incurred no attorney’s fees at all, as where he represents himself pro se, an award of reasonable attorney’s
fees may be justified (although some decisions tacitly assume the contrary).”).

135

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 535 n.19 (1994) (internal quotation omitted).

136

See 5 NIMMER § 14.10[D]; see also, Nat’l Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458,
485 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to award a plaintiff attorneys’ fees due to the novelty and complexity of the issue,
the lack of bad faith on the part of defendant, and the adequacy of the statutory damages already awarded to
plaintiff); LZT/Filliung P’ship, LLP v. Cody/Braun & Assocs., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(reasoning that plaintiff should not be awarded attorneys’ fees because defendant’s counterclaim was not frivolous
and “was motivated by sound litigation strategy,” even though it was not ultimately successful); Alexander v.
Chesapeake, Potomac, and Tidewater Books, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 544, 551 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that attorneys’
fees should not be awarded to plaintiff because there was no evidence of willful infringement, defendant’s
arguments were objectively reasonable, the facts did “not call for deterrence of future frivolous claims or infringing
conduct”).
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In weighing the possibility of litigation, a would-be copyright plaintiff also must consider that
attorneys’ fees are available to a “prevailing party,”137 and that both plaintiffs and defendants in
copyright suits are, under Supreme Court precedent, to be “treated alike.”138 That is, courts are
to be “faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act” and apply the relevant standard to prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants “in an evenhanded manner.”139 Thus, the possibility that a defendant
might collect fees if the infringement claim fails may discourage some copyright claimants from
pursuing litigation.140 And, even if the copyright owner prevails, his or her ability to recover
attorneys’ fees is far from assured.
5.

Costs and Burden of Litigation

Copyright owners whose works are infringed often are deterred from enforcing their rights due to
the burden and expense of pursuing litigation in the federal system. Especially in the case of
lower-value copyright claims, the potential for monetary recovery can be quickly overcome by
the costs of discovery, motion practice, and other litigation expenses. Of course the same may
be true for defendants seeking to vindicate their interests in modest-sized copyright dispute.141
Litigation of a copyright claim in federal court requires substantial amounts of time, money, and
effort. An aggrieved copyright owner must either hire a potentially costly attorney who
understands federal court procedure and substantive copyright law, or attempt to enforce his or
her rights pro se. The costs of filing, service, discovery, and transcripts can quickly compound.
A court proceeding entails other costs as well, as it requires a creator plaintiff to forsake incomegenerating work to attend to the litigation. As one artist noted, faced with a choice between
paying an attorney to pursue an infringer or continuing to focus on her work, “I am just going to
work because that is the sure thing.”142
137

Compare 17 U.S.C. § 505 (“the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs … the court may also
award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”) with 35 U.S.C. § 285 (for patent
cases, “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”), and 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) (for trademark cases, “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney [sic] fees to the
prevailing party.”).
138

Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534.

139

Id. at 535 n.19 (internal quotation omitted). But see New Media Rights, Comments Submitted in Response to
Second Notice of Inquiry (Oct. 19, 2012) (“New Media Rights Second Notice Comments”) at 2-3 (“Despite the
Fogerty decision, there has not been a fundamental alteration in the application of § 505. Prevailing plaintiffs are
routinely able to access attorney’s fees simply by having registered the copyright according to the statute, whereas a
prevailing defendant often must show that a plaintiff’s claims or conduct during the litigation are frivolous or
brought in bad faith in order to earn attorney’s fees. Although Fogerty has made it somewhat easier for prevailing
defendants to win fee awards, defendants are not on equal footing under § 505 as currently interpreted.”).
140

See, e.g., Tr. at 284:25-289:19 (Nov. 16, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA).

141

New Media Rights, Comments in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 18 (undated) (“New Media Rights First
Notice Comments”) at 2 (noting that small-scale defendants can be “intimidated by the threat of federal litigation.”).
142

Tr. at 112:16-19 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Molly Knappen, designer and developer); see also Tr. at 92:25-93:10 (Nov. 15,
2012) (Joseph DiMona, Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”)) (“I suspect that even if there were a small claims court, a
modestly cheaper way to do it, that songwriters would not have the wherewithal and really wouldn’t want to have to
spend their time bringing 10,000 small claims proceedings, even if they were cheap. That’s not what songwriters
want to do. They want to create, perform, and that’s why they have turned to publishers, and in some cases record
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The excessive cost of federal litigation relative to case value is an overarching issue for litigants
with lower-value claims. Indeed, recent surveys confirm a widespread belief among attorneys
that litigation costs are generally disproportionate to the value of “small” cases, though not
necessarily disproportionate to “large” cases.143 For example, a survey by the ABA indicated
that, for attorneys representing both plaintiffs and defendants, 89% of respondents agreed that in
small-value cases litigation costs were not proportional to the value of a case.144
If a copyright owner hires an attorney to enforce his or her copyrights, those costs can easily
exceed the value of the work that is being infringed. In a 2011 email survey of 2,577 members
of the American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”), the median cost in 2010 for a
party to litigate a copyright infringement lawsuit with less than $1 million at risk through to
appeal was $350,000.145 To reach even the close of discovery, the median cost was $200,000.146
The fact that nearly two-thirds of litigation costs accrue before parties even proceed to trial
demonstrates how much case preparation, discovery, and pretrial motion practice add to the total
cost of a lawsuit. While the AIPLA figures do not provide a breakdown of cases in the “below
$1 million” category, they attest to the high cost of enforcing copyrights, a great many of which
do not begin to approach $1 million in value.
Building on the AIPLA study, the ABA IP Section attempted to determine at what perceived
value a copyright attorney would agree to take a case. The section asked its members: “At what
value of likely recovery (and disregarding the potential for also recovering attorneys’ fees)
would you consider litigation of an uncomplicated copyright claim economically justifiable
….”147 Section members were offered a range of seven recovery amounts, from less than
$10,000 at the bottom and increasing in $10,000 increments to over $60,000.148 The results were
that 32% of the respondents indicated that they would accept a case with less than $30,000 at
stake, 29% of the respondents would only accept a case between $30,000 and $60,000, and 39%
of respondents would only accept a case with more than $60,000 at stake.149 The median for the
responses thus indicated that an attorney would not file an uncomplicated copyright case in
federal court unless the value of recovery was in the $40,000-$49,999 range.150
labels and PROs to manage the business side.”); see also Quinto, 511 F. Supp. at 581 (“[A] pro se litigant must
forego other activities in order to prepare and pursue his case.”).
143

EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, 10
(Mar. 1, 2010) (surveying members of the American College of Trial Lawyers, the ABA Section of Litigation, and
the National Employment Lawyers Association), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1606885 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1606885. The survey did not define “large” versus “small” matters.
144

ABA 2009 SURVEY, at 153.

145

AIPLA Report, at 35 (2011).

146

Id. App. I-163.

147

ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 7.

148

Id.

149

Id. at 6-7 (noting limited sample pool of thirty-one members who responded to the survey).

150

Id. at 7.
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GAG also conducted a survey of its members concerning their efforts to enforce their copyrights.
The survey found that 60.1% of Guild members believed that their works had been infringed.151
Works were primarily infringed on the internet or from a printed piece152 and in a commercial
context.153 In response to the infringement, most authors contacted the infringers themselves,154
but most of the infringers did nothing in response.155 Guild members offered several reasons for
not hiring an attorney to pursue the infringer, including: “too much of an ordeal/I didn’t want to
go through with it”; “my work was not registered, and I would not recoup attorneys’ fees and
court costs (could not afford an attorney)”; and “the amount I would have been awarded or
would ask for was less than the legal costs.”156 For those who took their cases to court, most
were successful, with only 2.2% of cases lost by Guild members and 14.1% of cases dismissed
or dropped.157 From this survey, it appears that most authors in the graphic arts suffer from
infringement and could be successful if they were able to bring a lawsuit, but most graphic artists
do not bring cases because of the prohibitive costs and inherent difficulties of the current system.
Moreover, Guild members overwhelmingly indicated that they would use an alternative system
for small-value copyright infringement cases that did not require them to go to federal court or
hire an attorney.158
6.

Time to Trial

In addition to costing money, litigation of a copyright case through to resolution also takes time.
From 2000 to 2012, some 39,432 copyright cases were filed in U.S. federal district courts.159
During that period, the two districts in which most copyright cases were filed were the Central
District of California, with 6,184 cases, and the Southern District of New York, with 3,588.160 In
those same years, the median time to trial in the Southern District of New York was 720 days
and in the Central District of California, 589 days.161 In districts that see the most copyright
cases, it is likely to be a year and a half before the parties can get to trial.

151

GAG, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry App. at 7 (Oct. 18, 2012) (“GAG Second
Notice Comments”).
152

Id. App. at 8 (70.7% and 49.4% respectively; responses were not mutually exclusive).

153

Id. App. at 9 (64.3%).

154

Id. App. at 10 (68.3%).

155

Id. App. at 11 (51.7%).

156

Id. App. at 13.

157

Id. App. at 12 (21.7% of claims were won by Guild members and collected on, 14.1% of claims were won but the
infringer did not pay, and 50% of claims were settled out of court).

158

Id. App. at 14 (80.3% would use such a system, 1.3% would not, 18.5% responded “maybe”).

159

LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/ (last visited May 30, 2013).

160

Id.

161

Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

While it is apparent that many copyright owners are effectively precluded from pursuing small
claims through the existing federal court system, a workable solution will depend on
constitutional considerations as much as procedural and pragmatic concerns. In contemplating
potential alternatives to the current system, a number of significant constitutional issues emerge,
namely: the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial; separation of powers questions relating to
the creation of non-Article III tribunals; Appointments Clause requirements; and various due
process concerns, including those relating to personal jurisdiction, service of process, and the
conduct of streamlined proceedings.
A.

The Seventh Amendment

The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ....”162 Until
1998, when the Supreme Court decided Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,163 there
was no firmly established rule that a party to a copyright infringement action seeking statutory
damages was entitled to a jury trial. Indeed, the language of the Copyright Act suggests
otherwise, as section 504 makes no mention of a jury or jury trial but instead provides that
statutory damages shall be awarded “as the court considers just.”164 Before Feltner, although it
was understood that a party to an infringement action seeking actual damages,– a remedy at law
– was entitled to a jury,165 courts were divided on the question of whether statutory damages
were equitable in nature and thus outside the purview of the Seventh Amendment.166
In Feltner, the Supreme Court laid the jury trial issue to rest. In that case, a defendant found to
have infringed copyrighted television programs challenged the district court’s denial of his jury
trial demand and judge-determined award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court held that
even though section 504 of the Copyright Act provided no right to a jury trial, the Seventh
162

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

163

523 U.S. 340 (1998).

164

17 U.S.C. § 504(c).

165

Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir.1991) (“There is little question that the right to
a jury trial exists in a copyright infringement action when the copyright owner endeavors to prove and recover its
actual damages ….”) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517
(1994).
166

Compare Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 642 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[s]tatutory
damages ... are unquestionably money damages and ... the assessment of money damages by a jury is a fundamental
component of common-law trial by jury”) and Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 119-20 (4th Cir.1981)
(parties were due a jury trial as copyright infringement was similar to a claim of tortious interference with property
and statutory damages analogous to civil actions for debt) with Video Views, Inc., 925 F.2d at 1014 (“It is ... clear
that it is for the district court and not for a jury to determine the appropriate award of statutory damages.”),
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6, 7 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (after plaintiffs requested
minimum statutory damages, court determined that “[t]he whole case before the Court was equitable in nature as to
which the appellant had no constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial”) and Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods.,
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1178 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that an award of statutory damages is within
the sole discretion of the court).
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Amendment did, with respect to “all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages,”
including the amount.167
The Court’s opinion in Feltner is notable for its examination of the historical roots of U.S.
copyright law. Although copyright law, including its rights and remedies, has long been a
creature of federal statute, the Court explained that “[b]efore the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment, the common law and statutes of England and this country granted copyright owners
causes of action for infringement …. [C]opyright suits for monetary damages were tried in courts
of law, and thus before juries.”168 Having reviewed the historical record, the Court concluded
that the statutory damages provisions found in copyright laws – from Great Britain’s 1710
Statute of Anne to their modern-day embodiment in title 17 – were legal, rather than equitable, in
nature, as were infringement actions for damages generally.169
Interestingly for purposes of this report, although looking to copyright law as it stood at the time
of adoption of the Seventh Amendment – which was approved by Congress in 1789 and ratified
as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791170 – the Feltner Court did not consider that certain cases
seeking statutory damages would have been exempt from the jury trial right in that era. The first
federal copyright act, enacted in 1790, provided for statutory damages of fifty cents “per sheet,”
far below the twenty-dollar threshold of the Seventh Amendment.171 Thus, it would appear that
the first Congress may well have been comfortable leaving certain “small” copyright claims to be
decided without a jury.
While the Supreme Court’s holding in Feltner confirms the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial in a copyright infringement action for damages, the law is equally clear that a party can
choose to waive that right. Although constitutional in stature, the right to a jury trial is
considered an individual right that can be voluntarily relinquished.172 Accordingly, while
Feltner poses an obstacle to the creation of a mandatory forum for small copyright claims that

167

Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355.

168

Id. at 348-49.

169

Id. at 350-53. The Statute of Anne provided for damages of one penny for every “Sheet” in the infringer’s
custody, half of which were to be paid to the Crown, and half to the copyright owner. Id. at 349 (citing 8 Anne ch.
19 (1710)).
170

See U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE CREATION OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION (2013), http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history html.
171

Half of the statutory damages were payable to the copyright owner, and half to the United States. Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15, §§ 2, 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125; see also Feltner, 523 U.S. at 351. With the passage of the 1831 Copyright
Act, Congress increased statutory damages to one dollar per sheet. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 7, 4 Stat. 436, 438;
see also Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352 (citing mid-nineteenth century cases with jury-awarded damages ranging from
$200 to over $2,000).
172

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986) (explaining that personal
constitutional rights can be waived, including the right of trial by jury in civil cases); Seaboard Lumber Co. v. U.S.,
903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that a private litigant may waive its
right to a jury and to an Article III court in civil cases.”); Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir.
1954) (“[T]he right of jury trial is personal to the litigant, who may waive it by his action or nonaction.”) (citations
omitted).
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does not include juries, it would not appear to bar a voluntary system where parties consented to
proceed without a jury.173
B.

Article III Considerations

While the Supreme Court’s views concerning the right to a jury trial in a copyright damages
action, and a party’s ability to waive that right, seem relatively settled, its decisions concerning
the constitutional parameters of non-Article III courts are less so. Although a comprehensive
review of the Court’s treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this Report, a basic
understanding of the jurisprudential terrain – inauspiciously referred to by one Justice as “‘a
darkling plain’ where ignorant armies have clashed by night”174 – is essential to any
consideration of a streamlined resolution process for small copyright claims that would rely on
non-Article III decisionmakers.
1. From Murray’s Lessee to Northern Pipeline
Article III of the Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time ordain
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”175 The Framers believed that
an independent judiciary – with judges not removable at will and salaries that could not be
reduced – was essential to maintain the checks and balances of their constitutional design.176
Article III thus “serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the
constitutional scheme of tripartite government … and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims
decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government.’”177
In 1855 the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret Article III in the case Murray’s Lessee v.
The Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.178 The case concerned the constitutionality of a
nonjudicial proceeding to seize property from a customs collector who owed a significant sum of
money to the U.S. government. In that case, the Court recognized that not every dispute had to
be decided by an Article III court, and that Congress could withhold from Article III courts
certain matters “involving public rights” – such as a government action to recover public
funds.179 But at the same time the Court also observed that Congress should not be able to
173

Kernochan Center, Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 5 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“Kernochan
First Notice Comments”) (“One way of preserving jury trial rights is to have the small claims system be completely
voluntary.”).
174

Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

175

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

176

See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608-09 (2011); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 57-60.

177

Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985), and
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
178

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272.

179

Id. at 284.
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“withdraw from judicial cognizance” matters subject to suits at common law, in equity, or in
admiralty.180
Over time, as the nation’s governmental functions grew more complex, Congress began to create
specialized tribunals with adjudicators who did not enjoy lifetime tenure or protected salaries to
resolve certain types of disputes more practically or efficiently addressed outside of an Article III
court. Perhaps most notable among non-Article III tribunals have been the bankruptcy courts,
which perform a wide range of duties to carry out the provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Others include the Tax Court,181 Social Security Appeals Council,182 Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims,183 and Court of Federal Claims.184 In the copyright realm, Congress has
created the Copyright Royalty Board to set rates and terms and distribute royalties payable under
government-established licensing schemes.185
The fundamental question that arises in connection with Congress’ creation of such courts is
whether they violate the separation of powers principle embodied in Article III. Since the time
of Murray’s Lessee, the Supreme Court has approached this issue in varying ways. As was aptly
stated by Justice Rehnquist, “[t]he cases dealing with the authority of Congress to create courts
other than by use of its power under Art. III do not admit of easy synthesis.”186
In the significant 1932 case Crowell v. Benson, the Supreme Court considered Congress’
authority to create an agency-administered process to award compensation for injuries sustained
in navigable waters.187 Departing from a strict interpretation of Murray’s Lessee, the Court
instead adopted a more flexible reading of the Constitution to uphold the congressional scheme.
Even though the disputes being adjudicated involved a “private right” – that is, “the liability of
one individual to another” – and thus did not fall within the narrow public rights exception
articulated in Murray’s Lessee, in light of Congress’ general authority over maritime law, the
Court believed that Congress could constitutionally assign the task of determining compensation
awards to a specialized agency.188
Several decades later, in 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act, replacing the older
system of bankruptcy referees with bankruptcy courts.189 The newly formed bankruptcy courts
180

Id.

181

See 26 U.S.C. § 7441.

182

See 42 U.S.C. § 405.

183

See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-52.

184

See 28 U.S.C. § 171.

185

See 17 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The Copyright Royalty Board, established in 2004, was preceded by the Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panels, in effect from 1993 to 2004, and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, in effect from 1976 to
1993. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419; Copyright Royalty Tribunal
Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304; 118 Stat. 2341; H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 60 (1976).
186

Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

187

285 U.S. 22, 49-54 (1932).

188

Id. at 51-53.

189

Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 52-53.
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were bestowed with expansive powers of equity, law and admiralty; they could conduct jury
trials and issue any order, process, or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.190 Because they had authority over all civil proceedings arising under title 11
and matters related to cases under title 11, they were authorized to decide claims based on state
as well as federal law.191 Their orders and judgments were reviewable by Article III courts under
a clearly erroneous standard on appeal.192
In 1982, in the case Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co, the Supreme
Court confronted the constitutionality of the new bankruptcy courts.193 The specific issue in
Northern Pipeline was whether the non-Article III bankruptcy judges could constitutionally
adjudicate state law claims for breach of contract and tortious conduct asserted in the course of a
bankruptcy proceeding.194 In a plurality opinion joined by three other members of the Court,
Justice Brennan took an expansive approach to the question, concluding that the courts could not
adjudicate such claims and that in fact, Congress’ broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts was unconstitutional.195 Justice Brennan expressed the view that only three types of
courts should be recognized as exempt from the constraints of Article III: territorial courts;
military tribunals; and administrative tribunals falling under the public rights doctrine.196
Drawing upon Murray’s Lessee, Justice Brennan further suggested that the public rights doctrine
should apply only to disputes between the “government and others.”197
Justice Brennan acknowledged that “when Congress creates a statutory right … it may also
provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals
created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.”198 But even if the
“restructuring of debtor-creditor relations” could be considered a “public right,” because many of
the rights subject to adjudication by the bankruptcy courts – including the state law claims at
issue in the case – were “not of Congress’ creation,” Justice Brennan concluded that the entire
scheme was unconstitutional.199
Justice Brennan did not command a majority for his reading of Article III or broad invalidation
of the bankruptcy courts. While two other Justices concurred in the judgment, they would have
decided only the narrower question of whether the state-law based action initiated by Northern
Pipeline could be adjudicated by a non-Article III court.200 The three other Justices dissented.201
190

Id. at 55.

191

Id. at 54.

192

Id. at 55 & n.5.

193

Id. 50.

194

Id. at 56-57.
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Id. at 87.
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Id. at 63-70.

197

Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).

198

Id. at 83.

199

Id. at 71, 84.

200

458 U.S. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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2. Administrative Proceedings: Thomas and Schor
Following Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court continued to grapple with Article III but
declined to adhere to the formalistic stance advocated by Justice Brennan, instead adopting a
more pragmatic approach in subsequent cases challenging the constitutionality of non-Article III
tribunals.
In the 1985 case Thomas v. Union Carbide, the Court was called upon to consider a mechanism
adopted by Congress to resolve compensation disputes among parties who shared research data
pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).202 When a party
wished to rely on another party’s research data to support registration of a pesticide, the relevant
statutory provision required the two to negotiate and, if necessary, submit to binding arbitration
to determine appropriate compensation as between them. Similar to the standard set forth in the
Federal Arbitration Act,203 the arbitrator’s decision was subject to judicial review only for
“fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.”204
Despite the seeming retreat by some Justices from Crowell in Northern Pipeline, all nine Justices
(three in concurring opinions) agreed that the Environmental Protection Agency’s arbitration
scheme was compatible with Article III. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor expressed a
considerably more flexible view of Article III than had Justice Brennan: “[T]he Court has long
recognized that Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest
decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts …. Many
matters that involve the application of legal standards to facts and affect private interests are
routinely decided by agency action with limited or no review by Article III courts.205
The Thomas opinion was careful to limit the plurality decision in Northern Pipeline, explaining
that the case established “only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to
adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising
under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate
review.”206 Moreover, the Thomas Court expressly rejected Justice Brennan’s brightline test
requiring that the federal government be a party to an action before the “public rights” exception

201

In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger observed that the Court’s holding should be understood not as a declaration
that the bankruptcy courts were inherently unconstitutional, but rather as a more limited determination that “a
‘traditional’ state common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to
an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law, must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by an ‘Art. III
court’ if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United States.” Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
202

473 U.S. 568.

203

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (arbitral awards may be vacated for corruption, fraud, undue means, evident partiality,
misconduct, or exceeding the powers delegated to the arbitrators).
204

Thomas, 473 U.S. 568 (quoting FIFRA, § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii)).

205

Id. at 583.

206

Id. at 584.
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could apply, opining instead that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance
on formal categories should inform application of Article III.”207
Turning to the substance of the FIFRA provision, the Court was persuaded that, in light of its
relationship to the pesticide registration program, the right created by FIFRA was not purely a
“private” right, but bore many characteristics of a “public” right.208 Even though arguably akin
to a state law property claim, the Court found it significant that the compensation right at issue
did not in fact arise from state law.209 The Court also pointed to Congress’ desire to overcome
the litigation “logjam” in the courts that was holding up the pesticide registration process, as well
as the fact that the compensation decisions rendered through the agency arbitration process were
subject to a limited form of Article III review.210 Weighing all of these factors together, the
Court concluded that the administrative compensation scheme at issue did not contravene Article
III.211
In 1986, in Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Supreme Court addressed
another agency-administered compensation process.212 Under the Commodity Exchange Act
(“CEA”),213 the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) administered a reparations
procedure through which disgruntled customers of professional commodity brokers could seek
redress for brokers’ violations of the CEA or of CFTC regulations. Any person so injured could
apply for a reparations order from the CFTC and could enforce that order in federal district
court.214 To further the congressional goal of promoting efficient dispute resolution, the CFTC
adopted a regulation that allowed it to adjudicate counterclaims “‘aris[ing] out of the transaction
or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint.’”215
In the case, Schor had filed a complaint with the CFTC for reparations against a broker
employed by ContiCommodity Services, Inc. (“Conti”). Conti asserted a state law counterclaim
to recover a debit balance in Schor’s account.216 After discovery, briefing and a hearing, an
administrative law judge ruled in Conti’s favor on both Schor’s reparations claim and Conti’s
counterclaim.217 Schor appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, which sua sponte raised the question of whether the CFTC could adjudicate Conti’s
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Id. at 585-87.
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Id. at 589.
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Id. at 584-85.
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Id. at 573, 590, 592-93.
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Id. at 589, 594.
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478 U.S. at 833.
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7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
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Schor, 478 U.S. at 836.
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Id. at 837 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2) (1983)).

216

Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 740 F.2d 1262, 1265 (1984).

217

Schor, 478 U.S. at 838.
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common law counterclaim in light of Northern Pipeline, ultimately concluding it could not.218 A
majority of the Supreme Court, again led by Justice O’Connor, disagreed.
Finding that the CFTC process designed by Congress was dependent upon the ability to resolve
related counterclaims, the Court again took a pragmatic, rather than formalistic, approach to the
Article III analysis. Observing that “Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to
plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court,” the Court explained that
Article III served to protect “primarily personal, rather than structural interests,” and further that,
“as a personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication
is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by
which civil and criminal matters must be tried.”219 Here, Schor had “indisputably” waived his
right to have Conti’s common law counterclaim decided by a federal district court, and “with full
knowledge that the CFTC would exercise jurisdiction over that claim, chose to avail himself of
the quicker and less expensive procedure Congress had provided him.”220
While emphasizing Schor’s consent to the jurisdiction of a non-Article III court as a significant
factor in its analysis, the Court at the same time paid heed to the separate institutional interest
served by Article III of safeguarding against encroachment upon the judicial branch. “To the
extent that this structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by consent
cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on
the federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III, §
2.”221 Thus, the Court proceeded to consider whether the CFTC process threatened the
institutional integrity of the judicial branch, identifying several factors to be weighed: “the
extent to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts, and
conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercised the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article
III.”222
Against this backdrop, the Court determined that the CEA’s adjudication of related common law
counterclaims was not fatal to the congressional scheme, as the statute left “far more of the
‘essential attributes of judicial power’ to Article III courts” than the portion of the Bankruptcy
Act invalidated by Northern Pipeline.223 Unlike the bankruptcy courts, the CFTC dealt with
“one particularized area of law,” its orders were enforceable only by order of the district court,
and its orders were reviewable by the district court.224 Even though Conti’s counterclaim was
218
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“private” in nature, Congress had not withdrawn it from “judicial cognizance.” Rather, Congress
“gave the CFTC the authority to adjudicate such matters, but the decision to invoke th[e] forum
[was] left entirely to the parties and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these
matters [was] left unaffected. In such circumstances, separation of powers concerns are
diminished, for it seems self-evident that just as Congress may encourage parties to settle a
dispute out of court or resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the separation of
powers, Congress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism through which willing parties
may, at their option, elect to resolve their differences.”225
3.

The Federal Magistrates Act

Another context in which the Supreme Court has considered the assignment of duties to nonArticle III decisionmakers is the Federal Magistrates Act, which, as noted above, permits the
assignment of certain matters by district courts to non-Article III magistrate judges.226 The Court
has upheld the ability of Article III judges to delegate responsibilities to magistrate judges under
the Act on a number of occasions.227
In one of the Court’s recent decisions considering the Act, the 2003 case Roell v. Withrow, a
magistrate judge had presided over the trial and entered judgment in a state prisoner’s section
1983 action.228 Section 636(c)(1) of the Act provides that “[u]pon consent of the parties, a fulltime United States magistrate judge … may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury
civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise
such jurisdiction by the district court.”229 Unlike nonconsensual referral of a pretrial matter
under section 636(b) to a magistrate judge for findings and recommendations – which are
reviewable de novo by the referring district court230 – section 636(c)(1) gives the magistrate
judge full authority over dispositive motions, conduct of the trial and the entry of final judgment,
without district court review and appealable directly to a court of appeals “in the same manner as
an appeal from any other judgment of a district court.”231
The particular question before the Court in Roell was whether the prisoner’s implied consent to
trial before the magistrate judge by participating fully in the proceedings was adequate to confer
“civil jurisdiction” on the magistrate judge notwithstanding a requirement in Federal Rule 73(b)
225
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that the parties’ consent be in writing.232 Drawing on earlier precedent upholding the
constitutionality of the Federal Magistrates Act,233 as well as the waiver theory articulated in
Schor,234 Justice Souter’s practically oriented majority opinion held that the prisoner’s implied
consent sufficed, finding that judicial efficiency had been “served” and the Article III right
“substantially honored.”235 The opinion further held that “[i]n giving magistrate judges casedispositive civil authority, Congress hoped to relieve the district courts’ ‘mounting queue of civil
cases’ and thereby ‘improve access to the courts for all groups.’”236
4.

Bankruptcy Courts Revisited

Congress responded to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the bankruptcy courts in Northern
Pipeline by revising the law in 1984 to provide that bankruptcy judges be appointed by the
federal courts of appeals and limiting the judges’ authority to enter final judgments to certain
“core” bankruptcy proceedings.237 In 1989 the Supreme Court returned to the bankruptcy arena
in Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Norberg, which considered whether, notwithstanding Congress’
designation of a fraudulent conveyance action as a “core” proceeding under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, noncreditors sued in bankruptcy court for a fraudulent conveyance were entitled to
a jury trial.238 The petitioners in Granfinanciera, who sought and were denied a jury trial by the
bankruptcy judge, relied on the Seventh Amendment and did not invoke Article III in their
constitutional challenge. In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, however, the majority
viewed the Seventh Amendment question as closely tied to the question of whether the claim
could be tried in a non-Article III court: “Indeed, our decisions point to the conclusion that, if a
statutory cause of action is legal in nature, the question whether the Seventh Amendment permits
Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as fact-finders
requires the same answer as the question whether Article III allows Congress to assign
adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal.”239
The Court then elaborated on the public rights doctrine, reaffirming its prior holding in Thomas
that the federal government need not be a party for a case to come within that exception.240
Rather, “[t]he crucial question, in cases not involving the Federal Government, is whether
‘Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under
232
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Article I, [has] create[d] a seemingly ‘private right’ that is so closely integrated into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement
by the Article III judiciary.’”241 In Granfinanciera, the Court answered this question in the
negative, concluding that the bankruptcy trustee’s right to recover a fraudulent conveyance was
not integral to the proceedings in bankruptcy but instead “quintessentially [a] suit[] at common
law.”242 The petitioners therefore were entitled to a jury trial.243
The Supreme Court’s most recent significant opinion interpreting Article III, decided in 2011, is
Stern v. Marshall, also emerging from the bankruptcy context.244 In contrast to Thomas and
Schor, the Stern opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts on behalf of a five-member majority,
may suggest a less pragmatic inclination and at the very least, the Court’s continued wariness
concerning the powers granted by Congress to the bankruptcy courts.
The Stern case, which had already made its way to the Supreme Court once before, was part of a
long-running, well-publicized dispute over the estate of J. Howard Marshall (“J. Howard”),
whom Vickie Lynn Marshall (known to the public as Anna Nicole Smith) (“Vickie”) had
married about a year before his death.245 Vickie, who was not included in her husband’s will,
had sued J. Howard’s son E. Pierce Marshall (“Pierce”) in Texas probate court to set aside a
living trust that she claimed Pierce had fraudulently induced his father to sign.246 After J.
Howard’s death, Vickie filed a petition for bankruptcy in California, and Pierce filed a complaint
in the California bankruptcy proceeding contending that Vickie had defamed him by publicizing
her claims of fraud, followed by a proof of claim. Vickie responded by filing a counterclaim in
the bankruptcy court for tortious interference with the gift she had expected from J. Howard.247
The bankruptcy court eventually issued a judgment in Vickie’s favor, awarding her over $400
million in damages.248
Pierce contested the judgment, arguing that the court could not decide Vickie’s counterclaim
because it was not a “core” proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. When the Stern case
reappeared in the Supreme Court, the Court rejected the determination of the court of appeals
that Vickie’s counterclaim failed to qualify as a “core” proceeding, concluding that the relevant
statutory provision made clear that it did.249 But the Court further determined that Article III
prohibited the bankruptcy court from entering final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim.250
241
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Once again, the Court confronted the “varied formulations” of the public rights doctrine, finding
that the counterclaim – a state common law claim between two private parties – did not fall
within the exception. It did not “flow from a federal statutory scheme,” as in Thomas;251 it was
not “completely dependent upon adjudication of a claim created by federal law,” as in Schor;252
the asserted authority to decide Vickie’s claim was not limited to a “‘particularized area of the
law’” as in Crowell, Thomas and Schor;253 and it was not “a situation in which Congress devised
an ‘expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are
particularly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially
assigned to that task.’”254 Moreover, Pierce “did not truly consent to resolution of Vickie’s claim
in the bankruptcy court proceedings,” because, as a creditor, he had “nowhere else to go” if he
wished to recover from Vickie’s estate. Thus there was no reasoning “parallel” to Schor to
support a waiver theory.255
Acknowledging the elusive qualities of the public rights doctrine,256 the Court was careful to
limit its holding in Stern to the bankruptcy courts: “Given the extent to which this case is so
markedly distinct from the agency cases discussing the public rights exception in the context of
[an agency adjudicatory] regime … we do not in this opinion express any view on how the
doctrine might apply in that different context.”257
It seems, however, that in the bankruptcy context, the last chapter is always yet to be written.
Another bankruptcy case raising Article III concerns, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.
Arkison, is currently pending before the Supreme Court.258 Executive Benefits, involving a
bankruptcy court’s decision in a fraudulent conveyance action, presents the question whether
bankruptcy courts may exercise jurisdiction based on litigant consent, and if so, whether consent
can be implied based on a litigant’s conduct.259 Of course, the Court’s treatment of consent in
the bankruptcy arena could have implications for other non-Article III contexts as well.

lacked the authority to enter final judgment on his defamation claim was defeated by the fact that he had consented
to the bankruptcy forum. Id. at 2606-08.
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Relationship to a Copyright Small Claims Court

Although it is true that the Article III cases described above are not easily synthesized, some
themes emerge that could be helpful in framing a small copyright claims tribunal.
1.

General Observations

First, it seems that the Court has had the greatest difficulty with the broad mandate of the
bankruptcy courts, including those courts’ ability to decide state law claims that, even if related
to a bankruptcy proceeding, are not essential to the process. The comparatively wide-ranging
powers of bankruptcy courts makes them appear a lot more like federal district courts than the
more limited administrative processes at issue in Crowell, Thomas or Schor. Indeed, Chief
Justice Roberts was careful to distinguish these cases from the bankruptcy court context in his
Stern opinion. It seems that the Court may view the bankruptcy courts as a greater potential
threat to the Article III prerogative than more modest and specialized courts.
Second, the Supreme Court has moved away from the rigid interpretation of the “public rights”
exception to Article III espoused by the Northern Pipeline plurality, which – drawing on the
early case Murray’s Lessee – posited that outside of territorial and military courts, public rights
cases should be limited to those in which the government is a party. Since Northern Pipeline,
the Court has generally embraced a more pragmatic approach to evaluating the public rights
exception. The Court has acknowledged – most notably in Thomas and Schor – that even if a
claim derives from or resembles a traditionally private cause of action, if the claim is closely tied
to a federal statutory or regulatory scheme, it may nonetheless be amenable to determination by a
non-Article III body. Notably, in Schor, the Court extended this principle to include a state law
counterclaim where determination of the counterclaim was integral to the adjudication of the
statutory entitlement. In sum, while the Court clearly remains troubled by the specter of
relatively unfettered adjudication of traditional state common law causes of action by non-Article
III tribunals, where Congress has articulated specific rights and remedies pursuant to a statutory
scheme, the Court has been more deferential to Congress’ decision to assign an adjudicatory role
to a specialized agency.
Third, parties’ consent to non-Article III processes, including consent as evidenced by their
conduct, has played an increasingly significant role in the Court’s consideration of these issues.
Based upon the parties’ consent, the Court has confirmed that district courts are able to delegate
the conduct of entire civil trials, as well as other matters, to non-Article III magistrate judges. In
the administrative context, the Court has considered parties’ consent to non-Article III
adjudication a critical factor favoring the constitutionality of the alternative process. While the
Court in Schor observed that consent of a party is not itself sufficient to negate structural
separation of powers concerns arising from Congress’ assignment of adjudicatory functions to a
non-Article III body, it also made clear that consent overcomes any personal right of the parties
to have their matter heard by an Article III tribunal, and went on to uphold the alternative
administrative process. A party’s consent to an alternative forum thus substantially diminishes
Article III concerns, especially where the Article III court remains available to that party in the
first instance, and the alternative process is subject to at least limited Article III review. Even in
Stern, where the Supreme Court determined that the bankruptcy court could not constitutionally
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adjudicate a state law counterclaim, the Court considered it significant that Pierce had not “truly
consented” to have the claim decided by that non-Article III court.
That said, the Court’s decision in Stern marks a departure from the more pragmatically inclined
Thomas and Schor, and the Court will revisit the issue of consent in Executive Benefits.
Depending upon the Court’s analysis, the outcome of Executive Benefits could have an impact on
Congress’ approach to an alternative process for small copyright claims.
2.

Copyright-Specific Considerations

As the Supreme Court has observed, “[c]opyright law is a ‘creature of statute.’”260 From the
earliest days of the republic, the Court has affirmed that “[n]o one can deny that [Congress has]
the power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed.”261 More recently,
the Court has reiterated that the Copyright Clause “‘empowers Congress to determine the
intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the
Clause.’”262
Congress has exercised its constitutional prerogative under the Clause since 1790, when it
enacted the nation’s first copyright statute.263 For over two centuries it has defined and adjusted
the rights and remedies of copyright owners under federal law, including the term of copyright,
the requirements for infringement actions, and the remedies available for infringement.264 In
addition, Congress has long provided for a national system to register copyrighted works and
record copyright-related transactions, to the benefit of both authors and the general public.265
Because the rights and remedies for copyright are fixed by Congress pursuant to an overarching
statutory scheme, it would seem that under the Supreme Court’s post-Northern Pipeline
jurisprudence – most notably Thomas and Schor – at least some types of small copyright claims
260
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(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same, citing Stewart).
261
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should be amenable to non-Article III resolution. In considering the applicability of the Seventh
Amendment to statutory damages claims, Feltner emphasized the common law procedures for
the assertion of copyright claims in the early days of the nation. But even at that time, rights and
remedies of copyright owners were defined by Congress.266
More broadly speaking, the rights and remedies of copyright owners are statutorily created and
closely tied to the national system of copyright registration and recordation. Indeed, the
availability of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees in cases of infringement depends upon
timely registration of the work at issue,267 and a U.S. author must have registered (or received a
refusal to register from the Office) before a judicial remedy is available at all.268 The ability and
incentives to pursue infringement claims are calibrated by Congress to further the interests of the
copyright system generally, and thus have a significant public dimension.
Perhaps the most fundamental question to be considered in evaluating the constitutionality of a
potential small claims system is whether any such process must be based on consent, or whether
it could be mandatory. Consent has been an important – and arguably determinative – factor in
the Court’s more recent cases addressing administrative decisionmaking. Regardless, because a
process without juries would be inconsistent with Feltner’s holding that copyright litigants are
entitled under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial if they so choose, a mandatory approach
without juries would appear to present a seemingly insuperable obstacle. For this reason, the
Report need not further analyze the viability of a mandatory small claims system for purposes of
Article III.
In sum, a voluntary system appears far more promising at this time. Even under a voluntary
approach, however – where parties agree to waive their individual rights to an Article III forum
and jury – Congress will still need to be mindful of the structural safeguards embodied in Article
III and avoid undue encroachment on Article III courts. In this regard, the contrast between the
bankruptcy courts’ wide-ranging legal and equitable powers, and the more modest administrative
schemes upheld in Thomas and Schor, is instructive. But in any event, viewing the situation in
practical terms, the threat to Article III courts would appear to be substantially lessened when
many of the cases that would presumably be adjudicated in an alternative system could never be
practically litigated in an Article III court.
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The Appointments Clause

Recent experience with the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”), an existing administrative
tribunal housed within the Library of Congress whose functions are partially overseen by the
Register of Copyrights, underscores the potential significance of the Constitution’s
Appointments Clause to the selection and supervision of those who might serve as
decisionmakers in a copyright small claims system.
The Appointments Clause addresses the Framers’ concerns about potential diffusion of
government power by limiting Congress’ authority to provide for the appointment of officers of
the United States.269 Embodied in Article II of the Constitution, it provides that “[the President]
... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ...
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”270
As defined by the Supreme Court, an “officer of the United States” – as opposed to an
“employee” – is a person who “exercis[es] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States.”271 An inferior officer is an officer whose “work is directed and supervised at
some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent
of the Senate.”272 If the officer’s work is not so directed and supervised, the officer is considered
a principal officer who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.273 Inferior officers may be appointed by heads of departments.274
The CRB, consisting of three Copyright Royalty Judges (“CRJs”) appointed by the Librarian of
Congress – who is in turn appointed by the President – is an administrative body that sets the
rates and terms of statutory copyright licenses and distributes the royalties collected under such
licenses to copyright owners.275 In Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty
Board,276 Intercollegiate, an association of noncommercial webcasters unhappy with a royalty
rate determination of the CRB, challenged the constitutionality of the Board under the
Appointments Clause, arguing that the CRJs constitute principal officers who can only be
appointed by the President.277
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In reviewing the responsibilities and supervision of the CRJs, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit concluded that, while directed in certain respects by the Librarian of
Congress and Register of Copyrights, the Judges still had “vast discretion” in establishing the
rates and terms for statutory licenses.278 Moreover, they were not removable from office except
for misconduct or neglect of duty.279 Finally, the CRJs’ rate determinations were not reversible
or correctable by any other officer or entity within the executive branch, so their decisions –
while appealable to an Article III court – were final for purposes of that branch.280 Given the
CRJs’ nonremovability and the finality of their decisions, the Court of Appeals held that “the
Librarian’s and Register’s supervision functions f[ell] short of the kind that would render the
CRJs inferior officers.”281
In light of this determination, the court declared the CRB “as currently constituted” to violate the
Appointments Clause, but remedied the constitutional defect by invalidating and severing the
restrictions on the Librarian’s ability to remove the CRJs.282 In the court’s view, with this
statutory change, the Librarian – whom the court confirmed to be a head of department – could
now properly appoint the CRJs. But ensuring the Librarian’s “unfettered removal power,” the
Librarian would be able to “direct,” “‘supervise’” and “exert some ‘control’” over the Judges,
and they would now be proper inferior officers.283
In establishing an alternative forum for the adjudication of small copyright claims, consideration
should be given to the Appointments Clause, as well as the Court of Appeals’ decision in
Intercollegiate Broadcasting, to ensure that the decisionmakers (assuming they are not
Presidential appointees) are adequately supervised and appropriately subject to removal.
E.

Due Process Considerations

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution provide that “no person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”284 Due process safeguards are
essential to impartial adjudicative proceedings. Even in a voluntary system – where parties may
choose to forego certain traditional rights – for example, by waiving objections to personal
jurisdiction and formal service of process – the proceedings must be fundamentally fair both to
those who bring claims and those who respond. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the basic
precepts of due process as they might apply to a small copyright claims tribunal.
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Personal Jurisdiction

It is clear that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases arising under the
Copyright Act.285 But when plaintiffs – including copyright owners alleging infringement –
bring cases in federal court, they also must establish that the court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.286 In its simplest terms, personal jurisdiction refers to the idea that, as a matter of
due process, a defendant can be sued only in a location where it is fair to require the defendant to
appear in court. While it may be easy for a copyright owner to demonstrate personal jurisdiction
if he or she files a lawsuit in the state or federal district where the defendant resides, it can
become considerably more complicated if the plaintiff brings suit in a different jurisdiction.
Federal courts apply varying standards to determine whether a defendant is properly subject to
the jurisdiction of the court, depending upon the context. As a general matter, guided by the
1945 Supreme Court decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington and its progeny, courts
assess whether a defendant has sufficient ties – or “minimum contacts” – with the jurisdiction to
satisfy due process.287 Under such an analysis, a court might find that it has either general or
specific jurisdiction over a defendant, or both.
To establish general personal jurisdiction, a court must conclude that the defendant has had
“continuous and systematic contacts” with the forum.288 If so, the defendant is properly subject
to suit. Alternatively, to find specific jurisdiction, courts typically apply a three-part test that
considers whether the cause of action arose out of or resulted from the defendant’s forum-related
activities,289 or the defendant purposely directed his or her activities at the forum or availed
himself or herself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum;290 and, assuming that the
answer to both of these is “yes,” whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and
does not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”291
285

See 28 U.S.C. § 1338.

286

Only federal – and not state – courts have subject matter jurisdiction over statutory copyright infringement suits.
See id. While subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority over the subject of the suit, personal
jurisdiction addresses the court’s authority over the parties.
287

See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); see also, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
288

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.

289

This factor is derived from Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).

290

This factor is derived from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286.

291

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. Examples of federal courts employing this three-part test include O’Connor
v. Sandy Lane Hotel, 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1071 (10th Cir. 2008). But see Oldfield v.
Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1221 n.28 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying a different three-factor test for
intentional torts where personal jurisdiction is appropriate if the defendant “(1) committed an intentional tort (2) that
was directly aimed at the forum, (3) causing an injury within the forum that the defendant should have reasonably
anticipated.”); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the
following five-factor test: “(1) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of such
contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties”).
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These traditional analyses of personal jurisdiction are highly fact-dependent and can become
even more complicated when the case arises from online activities. If a defendant’s only contact
with a jurisdiction is through the internet, courts have developed additional factors to consider.
In the influential case Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, the Western District of
Pennsylvania announced a “sliding scale” assessment to determine when internet activity was
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.292 At one end of the scale are “active” websites
where “the defendant clearly does business over the internet” and “enters into contracts with
residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of
computer files over the internet”293 – in which case the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper.
At the other end of the scale are “passive” websites that do “little more than make information
available.”294 Such passive websites do not provide grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction.
“Interactive” websites, “where a user can exchange information with the host computer,” lie at
the middle of the scale. 295
Unlike a number of other federal statutes, the Copyright Act does not provide for nationwide
service of process.296 But as there appears to be interest in a centralized small claims process,
perhaps administered by the Copyright Office in Washington, D.C., a question arises as to how
parties from other jurisdictions might be brought before that tribunal (unless the infringing acts
occurred where it was located) – including whether such a centrally located small claims facility
could permit national service.
In considering where a party may be sued under a federal statutory regime that ostensibly
permits nationwide service, one approach has been simply to ask whether the defendant has
“minimum contacts” with the United States – rather than with a particular federal district – on
the theory “that [because] the relevant sovereign is the United States, it does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant residing within the United States.”297 This “pure minimum contacts” approach,
however, has not been widely adopted. In Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, for example,

292

Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

293

Id.

294

Id.

295

Id. Other courts have found that while the internet may inject some novel factual elements into the personal
jurisdiction question, there is no need to abandon the traditional “minimum contacts” personal jurisdiction factors
derived from International Shoe. For example, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly rejected the Zippo approach,
reasoning that “[u]sing a separate test for internet-based contacts would be inappropriate” when traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis “remains up to this more modern task.” uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, 623 F.3d 421, 431 n.3
(7th Cir. 2010).
296

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (granting district courts original jurisdiction over civil copyright actions, but not
mentioning national service of process) with 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (authorizing national service of process for violations
of the Securities Exchange Act), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (authorizing national service of process for violations of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (authorizing national service of process for
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).
297

Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that Texas district court
had jurisdiction over New York law firm that allegedly violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because the
firm wrote a tax opinion that was included in a nationwide promotional mailing).

45

United States Copyright Office

Copyright Small Claims

the Eleventh Circuit applied what has been called the “fairness approach.”298 Under this
standard, regardless of whether the statute permits nationwide service, the court considers not
only the defendant’s minimum contacts with the United States, but also “balance[s] the burdens
imposed on the individual defendant against the federal interest involved in the litigation.”299
Finally, a court needs to engage in one of the above analyses only if the defendant challenges
personal jurisdiction. Unlike a case in which a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction – a defect
that cannot be cured by parties’ consent to the forum300 – if a nonresident defendant voluntarily
submits to a court’s jurisdiction, he or she waives any objection and personal jurisdiction is
proper.301
2.

Service of Process

A court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant is not complete until the defendant is properly
served with process.302 In federal court, this means that the defendant must receive notice of the
lawsuit and a copy of the complaint as provided in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules. Without proper
notice, the judicial proceedings are invalid as to the defendant. If service of process is defective
and the defendant does not raise this defense in his answer, however, he or she is deemed to have
waived the defense of insufficient service.303
Federal Rule 4 prescribes the requirements for the service of process on both individuals304 and
entities.305 It includes procedures for formal service of process. As a general matter, formal
service of an individual can be accomplished by delivering a copy of a summons and complaint
personally to the defendant,306 by leaving a copy of the requisite papers at the defendant’s home
with a resident of suitable age and discretion,307 by delivering a copy of the papers to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process,308 or by following the rules
for service applicable in the forum state.309 Corporate and other entities may be served according
298

119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. §
1068.1 (3d ed. 2013) (“WRIGHT & MILLER”).
299

BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d at 946.

300

See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“This ... concept of subject-matter jurisdiction,
because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”).
301

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (defense of lack of personal jurisdiction) and 12(h)(1) (waiver of defenses).

302

4 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1063.

303

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4) (defense of insufficient process); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (waiver of defenses); see
also Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 68 (failure to raise deficiencies with summons
in district court bars defense on appeal).

304

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) & (f).

305

Id. 4(h) & (i).

306

Id. 4(e)(2)(A).

307

Id. 4(e)(2)(B).

308

Id. 4(e)(2)(C).

309

Id. 4(e)(1).
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to state rules or through an officer or authorized agent.310 Service also may be made through an
alternative process pursuant to which a defendant waives formal service by agreeing to accept
notice of the action by mail or other means, in which case the defendant will benefit from
additional time to respond to the complaint.311 Rule 4 also provides for the service of foreign
defendants, which is more complex and typically made pursuant to an international agreement
such as the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.312
3.

Conduct of Proceedings

The Supreme Court has held that, at a minimum, due process consists of “notice and opportunity
for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”313 In the civil arena, the Court has had the
opportunity to examine many elements of judicial procedure in light of due process concerns,
such as assistance of counsel, provision of evidence, and availability of appellate review.
Regarding the assistance of counsel, the Court has held that a court may not arbitrarily deny a
litigant the right to furnish himself or herself with counsel.314 Additionally, the Court has ruled
that the rules of evidence in effect in a given proceeding must, in order to comport with due
process, provide the litigant with “a reasonable opportunity” to submit facts bearing upon his or
her defense.315
A significant focus of inquiry has been whether due process requires appellate review of court
decisions. On this question the Court has held that, provided there has been a “full and fair trial
on the merits” of a case, a state is not obligated to provide for appellate review.316 This is true in
both the civil and criminal contexts.317
Small claims courts, by design, generally offer considerably less in the way of procedural
protections than courts of plenary jurisdiction. “The rules of small claims courts emphasize
conciliation and pragmatism over winning, and many rules of evidence and civil procedure have
been simplified to allow maximum access to the courts by individuals unable to afford an

310

Id. 4(h).

311

Id. 4(d); id.12(a)(1)(A).

312

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1).

313

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).

314

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (“If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be
doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional
sense.”). It also has held that, in some situations – particularly those where a defendant’s liberty interest is at stake –
the court must appoint counsel for an indigent litigant. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 US 18, 25 (1981).
315

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911).

316

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 114 (1996) (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972)).

317

See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (holding, in criminal context, that states are not
constitutionally compelled to provide for appellate review).
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attorney.”318 To take but one example, California small claims courts do not allow discovery or,
ordinarily, the assistance of counsel.319
The Supreme Court has not specifically opined on what processes and opportunities must be
provided by state small claims courts to comply with due process. Numerous lower federal and
state courts, however, have addressed these questions, though not in any systematic way. These
courts generally have held that by choosing to litigate in small claims court, plaintiffs effectively
waive any due process right that may not be provided for in the abbreviated forum.320
Caselaw in this area analyzes questions of assistance of counsel, availability of discovery,
appellate review, and the ability to cross-examine witnesses. Regarding assistance of counsel,
state courts in California, Nebraska and Idaho have all found that the denial of counsel in a small
claims proceeding does not violate due process where counsel is allowed if the case is tried de
novo on review.321 In the Virgin Islands, there is no statutory right for trial de novo on review,
but the U.S. district court there has held that denial of counsel at the small claims level is
nonetheless consistent with due process because, inter alia, the small claims judge has the
discretion, if counsel requests, to transfer the case to a different court.322 The overriding rule in
all of these cases is that “due process requires that a party have a right to be heard through
counsel at some stage.”323
Litigants have also challenged the rule in some jurisdictions that no discovery is permitted in
small claims proceedings. In Ohio, the state Court of Appeals found that such a rule does not
violate due process because parties may request leave from the court to conduct interrogatories
or take depositions, and because a defendant may request that the case be moved to the regular
docket of the court, where discovery is permitted.324
Following the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and state courts are consistent in holding that
appellate review of small claims verdicts is not required by due process, provided that “due
process [is] accorded in the tribunal of the first instance.”325
318

Bruce Zucker & Monica Herr, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small
Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 317-18 (Winter 2003) (quoting Marc Anthony Douthit, Humbling
Experiences: Trials of Small Claims, 27 LITIG. 27 (2000)).
319

Id. at 347; see also Summary of State Small Claims Procedures, attached as Appendix D, at col. Attorney
Representation.
320

See Fox v. Cal. Franchise Tax Board, 443 Fed. Appx. 354, 361 (10th Cir. 2011) (choosing to be heard in a small
claims forum that does not provide for appeal by plaintiff did not deprive plaintiff of his right to notice and
opportunity to be heard, because he chose that forum); Keeffe v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 627 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853
(1995) (“By voluntarily entering into an agreement for the resolution of a dispute in a manner which dispenses with
certain constitutional rights, a party can be deemed to have waived due process requirements.”).
321

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 382 (1946); Simon v. Lieberman, 193 Neb. 321,
324 (1975); Foster v. Walus, 81 Idaho 452, 459 (1959).
322

Carr v. Pena, 432 F. Supp. 828, 833 (D.V.I. 1977).

323

Id.

324

Powell v. Killian, No. 01AP-85, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4154, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2001).

325

Keeffe, 627 N.Y.S.2d 851; see also Blair v. Supreme Ct. of Wyo., 671 F.2d 389, 391 (11th Cir. 1982).
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One due process right that some courts have held must be preserved at the small claims level is
the right to cross-examine witnesses.326 Furthermore, because one of the purposes of crossexamination is to make determinations based upon witness behavior, it has been held that
testimony via telephone does not effectively preserve the right and cross-examination must be
allowed to be conducted in person.327 But notwithstanding such considerations, it is clear that
the right to cross-examination, however conducted, can be waived.328
Alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), specifically arbitration, is another way of settling legal
conflicts through the use of abbreviated or specialized procedures. Of course, because most
arbitration is conducted by private means and does not constitute “state action,” it is not subject
to the requirements of constitutional due process.329 Arbitration can, however, incorporate what
has been called a kind of “private due process” to protect parties against procedural unfairness.330
One way this is achieved is through the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a
federal statutory provision that provides for the judicial enforcement of private arbitration
awards.331 The FAA allows parties to challenge arbitral awards on a number of procedural
grounds, including: where the award was due to “corruption, fraud, or undue means”;332 where
there was “evident partiality”;333 where the arbitrators refused to postpone a hearing, refused to
hear pertinent evidence, or were guilty of “misconduct” prejudicing the rights of the parties;334
and where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or imperfectly exercised them so as to preclude
a “mutual, final, and definite award.”335 In addition to the procedural safeguards of the FAA,
courts may require arbitrators to provide a “fundamentally fair hearing,” meaning “notice,
opportunity to be heard and to present relevant and material evidence and argument before the
decisionmakers, and that the decisionmakers are not infected with bias.”336 Courts have declined
to enforce arbitral awards where an arbitral forum was not neutral,337 one party had exclusive
326

Graves v. Am. Express, 669 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1997) (“Although the procedures in Small Claims Court are relaxed,
the rules of substantive law must be followed and a person’s constitutional right to due process of law includes the
basic right to cross-examine witnesses.”).
327

Hughes v. Elliott, 768 N.Y.S.2d 74 (2003).

328

See, e.g., Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting that waiver of right to cross-examine
must be “clearly expressed or strongly implied from the circumstances”).
329

See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 563 (2008); Paul R. Verkuil,
Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 964 (2005).

330

Verkuil, at 983.

331

9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

332

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).

333

Id. § 10(a)(2).

334

Id. § 10(a)(3).

335

Id. § 10(a)(4).

336

Bowles Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Jill I. Gross,
AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 SW. L. REV. 47, 68-69 (2012).

337

Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2005).
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control over arbitrator selection,338 the arbitration agreement was unconscionable,339 or the
arbitration rules were one-sided.340

338

McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 2004).

339

Murray v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 303-305 (4th Cir. 2002).

340

Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).
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STATE COURTS

In addition to the federal court system described above, the United States has vibrant and
essential state court systems serving each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. There,
parties litigate a huge variety of cases, from breaches of contract to divorces to serious criminal
matters. As noted above, copyright cases are not currently within state court jurisdiction and
thus state court judges lack expertise and experience in copyright matters. As discussed below,
participants in the Copyright Office’s small claims study were overwhelmingly of the view that
copyright cases should continue to be the exclusive domain of federal courts or, in the case of
smaller claims, perhaps some other sort of federal process. But it is nonetheless important to
review the role of state courts, and state small claims procedures in particular, because they offer
valuable insight into established methods to address lower-value claims in relatively streamlined
fashion.
A.

Courts of General Jurisdiction

The state court systems of the United States share some common characteristics. Typically, state
courts have more than one level of tribunal, including trial courts and one or more appellate
courts. At the trial level, states divide cases based upon monetary value and/or subject matter.
Most cases are tried in state trial courts of general jurisdiction, where litigants must comply with
procedural rules that can encompass significant discovery and motion practice not unlike federal
court.
Many states follow a modified version of the Federal Rules,341 which, as described above, help to
structure litigation, but can also result in complex and expensive procedures, including extensive
pretrial practice. As in federal courts, state court trials can be long and costly, with lay and
expert witnesses, voluminous exhibits, evidentiary questions, motion practice, and juries. In fact,
one survey estimated that, for some of the most common causes of action, total court costs can
range from $43,000 to $122,000342 – well above what many might consider to be the value of a
small copyright claim.

341

See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of
Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1425 (1984) (noting 23 jurisdictions that use near replicas of the Federal
Rules, 4 jurisdictions that use rules substantially the same as the Federal Rules, and several other jurisdictions that
have differing degrees of variance with the Federal Rules (such as the pleading standard), but still retain many
aspects of the Federal Rules). But see Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things To Come: The Great Split
Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 114 (2010) (noting recent trend of
states creating rules of procedure that diverge from Federal Rules).
342

See Paula Hannafor-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, National Center for State
Courts, Court Statistics Project, (2013), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/D
ATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx. This monetary range is indicative of the six causes of action that “comprise
nearly 60 percent of non-domestic relations civil cases filed in state courts.” Although the data thus does not
represent an average of all civil litigation costs, it confirms that the costs of most state court civil cases can be very
high.
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Because copyright cases are reserved to the federal courts – and state court rights equivalent to
federal copyright protections are preempted by the Copyright Act343 – state courts lack expertise
and experience in copyright matters. That said, state courts do sometimes address somewhat
related issues involving state common law rights that have not been preempted, such as cases
involving pre-1972 sound recordings (which are not subject to federal copyright protection);344
cases involving the public performance of unfixed works (also not federally protected);345 and
certain moral rights issues, such as misattribution.346 But, as a rule, state courts are unfamiliar
with infringement and other matters that arise under the Copyright Act and lack state-developed
precedents to guide them.
B.

Small Claims Courts

In addition to courts of general jurisdiction, every state and the District of Columbia has a small
claims process to provide better access to the legal system for citizens with low-value civil
disputes.347 Small claims systems avoid many of the technical procedural rules normally applied
in state civil court proceedings, which can result in trial delays and increased costs.348 By using
simplified procedures, restricting attorney participation, and limiting the types of claims that
litigants can bring, states have designed small claims systems to be accessible, low cost, and
efficient.349

343

17 U.S.C. § 301 (As of January 1, 1978, “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 … are governed exclusively by [the
Copyright Act]. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.”).
344

Id. § 301(c) (“With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067.”); see also
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS (2011),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf.
345

17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (state law with respect to works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression not preempted).
346

See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21 (1990) (“[federal] law will not preempt a cause of action for a misattribution of
a reproduction of a work of visual art”).

347

See JOHN C. RUHNKA, STEVEN WELLER & JOHN A. MARTIN, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL
EXAMINATION 2 (1978); Arthur Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 343-44 (1994); Bruce Zucker & Monica Herr, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003).
348

See RUHNKA ET AL., at 1.

349

See id. at 2-3 (discussing goals of small claims process in terms of accessibility, speed, low cost, simplicity, selfrepresentation, fairness, and effectiveness); Josephine Y. King, Small Claims Practice in the United States, 52 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 42, 43 (1977) (explaining that small claims reformers sought to avoid expense and delay caused by
complex procedures while permitting self-representation); Zucker & Herr, at 317 (“Although the financial claims
limits, methods of procedure, and overall structure vary from state to state, the concept is essentially the same:
relatively minor disputes involving dollar amounts that are insufficient to warrant processing the case through
normal court procedure justify expedited and simplistic handling.”).
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While all state small claims systems serve the same fundamental purpose, they vary in terms of
structure and procedure.350 For example, small claims may be encompassed within the civil
jurisdiction of a state magistrate court or court of limited jurisdiction, as in Georgia,351 or may be
heard in a different division of the court system, such as in California or Illinois.352 In multilevel
court systems, which include New York and Massachusetts, small claims are handled within the
lowest level of the civil courts, or specialized parts of those courts.353 Although the court
systems differ, one theme holds constant: separate, less formal rules of procedure govern small
claims proceedings.
1.

Jurisdiction

Because they employ streamlined procedural mechanisms, small claims tribunals are limited to
certain types of claims. These limits turn on the monetary value or the nature of the claim
asserted, or both. In some cases, states also limit the parties who may use the small claims
procedure and/or attorney participation.
a.

Monetary Limits

All small claims courts are limited to adjudication of claims of smaller economic value; only
claims that fall under a certain dollar amount are eligible.354 The limit varies significantly across
the United States, ranging from $2,500 in Arizona and Rhode Island to $25,000 in Tennessee.355
States sometimes also impose limits on the number of claims a single claimant may file in a
given time period.356
States periodically evaluate whether to raise their small claims caps.357 Supporters of higher
limits principally argue that current limits are insufficient to cover basic disputes, and higher
350

See Zucker & Herr, at 317 (2003). For purposes of this Report, the Office focused primarily on small claims
systems in ten different states: California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. These states were selected by consulting the Lex Machina online database
(https://lexmachina.com) to determine the states containing the federal districts that have heard the most copyright
disputes during the past twelve years.
351

See THOMAS E. MARTIN, JR., CIVIL PRACTICE IN MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURTS 4 (2012); WAYNE M. PURDOM,
GEORGIA MAGISTRATE COURT HANDBOOK § 1-1 (4th ed. 2002).
352

See Paula Hannafor-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, National Center for State
Courts, Court Statistics Project, (2013), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/D
ATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx.
353

See Appendix D (summarizing state small claims practices).

354

See id. (summarizing monetary limits).

355

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-503(A) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-16-1 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-15501(d)(1) (2013); see also Appendix D (summarizing monetary limits).
356

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.231(a) (2013) (limiting number of claims over $2,500 a party may file
within a calendar year); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8407(2) (2012) (limiting the number of claims a party may file in
one week).
357

See, e.g., FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF THE SMALL CLAIMS PROCESS IN FLORIDA, S. REP. NO.
2009-121, Interim Rep., at 6-7 (2008), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2009/Senate/reports/
interim_reports/pdf/2009-121ju.pdf; N.Y. LOCAL COURTS ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
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limits would help clear regular civil dockets of claims more appropriate for a small claims
system.358 Those opposed to raising limits fear that rising caps will overburden small claims
systems,359 begin to intrude on defendants’ due process rights,360 and create inequalities between
one-time litigants and repeat corporate plaintiffs.361
b.

Permissible Claims and Parties

Small claims systems adjudicate a wide variety of matters, including claims involving contracts,
torts, and personal property.362 Different states, however, have different restrictions on the
claims that can be litigated in small claims court. For example, while most small claims courts
hear claims arising from breach of contract, unpaid debts, and motor vehicle accidents, they do
not necessarily address eviction cases, intentional torts, or defamation actions.363 Thus, plaintiffs
in different states with the same claims may have different access to their small claims courts.
Additionally, many states allow only certain types of parties to participate in small claims
systems. Some states prohibit assignees, collection agencies, and/or professional lenders from
bringing small claims actions.364 These entities must instead file in the regular civil division of
the applicable state court. The rationale for this prohibition is that, even without attorney
representation, such repeat claimants may have an unfair advantage over a one-time defendant
who is unfamiliar with court procedure.365

COMMITTEE ON LOCAL COURTS, at 28 (2003), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judiciaryslegislative/LocalC
ourts_03.pdf.
358

See, e.g., MICH. S. JUDICIARY COMM., SMALL CLAIMS COURT JURISDICTION BILL ANALYSIS, 2011-2012 Leg.
Sess., at 2 (2011) (“MICH. ANALYSIS”), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20112012/billanalysis/senate/pdf/2011-SFA-0269-A.pdf.
359

See, e.g., FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF THE SMALL CLAIMS PROCESS IN FLORIDA, S. REP. NO.
2009-121, Interim Rep., at 7 (2008), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2009/Senate/reports/in
terim_reports/pdf/2009-121ju.pdf (in five years following Florida’s increase from $2,500 to $5,000, small claims
caseload increased 89.5 percent).
360

See, e.g., CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., S.B. 221 ANALYSIS, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess., at 7-8 (2005), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_221_cfa_20110620_105740_asm_comm.html.

361

See, e.g., MICH. ANALYSIS, at 3.

362

See, e.g., FLA. SM. CL. R 7.010(b) (permitting “all actions at law of a civil nature”); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-10-2(5)
(2013) (permitting “[t]he trial of civil claims ... in which exclusive jurisdiction is not vested in the superior court”);
N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1801 (Consol. 2013) (allowing “any cause of action for money only not in excess of
$5,000”).
363

See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8424 (2012) (actions of fraud and actions of libel, slander, assault, battery, or
other intentional torts may not be brought in the small claims division).
364

See RALPH WARNER, EVERYBODY’S GUIDE TO SMALL CLAIMS COURT 138, 281 (13th ed. 2010) (“WARNER”); see
also, e.g. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.420(a) (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8407 (1) & (3) (2012); N.Y.
UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013); N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013); N.Y.
UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013).
365

See MICH. ANALYSIS, at 2-3.
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Attorney Representation

Most but not all states allow parties to use lawyers in small claims actions.366 A notable
exception is California, which generally prohibits attorney participation in its small claims
process except when an attorney is representing himself or herself or when the suit is by or
against a partnership or professional corporation of attorneys.367 Litigants who appear pro se,
however, may seek legal advice from attorneys to prepare their case.368
When attorneys are allowed to appear, small claims procedures may still limit the scope of
attorney participation369 or subject represented parties to discovery that otherwise would not be
available.370 Contrary to the usual rule requiring attorneys to represent corporations and other
legal entities,371 some states permit officers, directors, and/or employees of an entity to appear on
behalf of that entity in small claims court.372
3.

Small Claims Procedures

Small claims procedures tend to be far simpler and less formal than those applicable to ordinary
civil litigation.373 States’ time-tested procedures for adjudicating lower-value claims are useful
to keep in mind for a potential copyright small claims process.
a.

Filing Fees

A plaintiff must pay a filing fee to initiate a claim in small claims court.374 While such fees vary
across states – for example, from $15 to $20 in New York375 up to $150 in Massachusetts376 –

366

See WARNER, at 138; see also Appendix D (summarizing several states’ treatment of attorney representation).

367

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530(b) (2013).

368

See, e.g., id. § 116.530(c) (allowing attorneys to provide advice before or after commencement of an action, to
testify to facts, or to appear in order to enforce a judgment or on appeal); WARNER, at 138 (noting that most courts
allow attorney participation in a small claims proceeding, but even those courts that do not permit in-court attorney
representation allow parties to consult an attorney outside of court).
369

See, e.g., MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. R. 7(g) (limiting attorney participation “in a manner consistent with the simple
and informal adjudication of the controversy”).
370

See, e.g., FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.020(b) (subjecting represented parties to discovery pursuant to the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, while unrepresented parties are not subject to discovery unless they seek discovery).

371

This rule dates back to the common law. See Strong Delivery Ministry Ass’n v. Bd. of Appeals, 543 F.2d 32, 33
(7th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that “[a]t common law ‘... a plea by a corporation aggregate, which is incapable of a
personal appearance, must purport to be by attorney.’”) (quoting 1 CHITTY ON PLEADING 550 (12th Am.ed.1855)).
372

See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.4(b) (setting forth possible representatives for corporations in court actions);
PA.R.C.P.D.J. NO. 207(A)(2)-(3) (same).
373

See Rosenberg v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining state’s intent to
formulate a small claims procedure that would remove the expense and delay associated with ordinary methods of
litigation, which “[grew] out of the demand for more simple, less expensive, and more speedy decisions of cases
involving small amounts”) (quoting Leuschen v. Small Claims Court, 191 Cal. 133, 138 (1923)).
374

See WARNER, at 168; see also Appendix D (summarizing filing fees).

55

United States Copyright Office

Copyright Small Claims

they are typically lower than those assessed by states’ regular civil division counterparts, and
may be graduated with respect to the amount of damages claimed.377 In Florida, for example, a
plaintiff is required to pay a fee of $50 to commence an action for damages of less than $100, but
a fee of up to $380 for garnishment actions seeking more than $1000.378
b.

Assistance to Litigants

Small claims courts typically provide information and assistance to help litigants navigate the
court system and collect their judgments. Clerks may be required by statute or rule to provide
materials on the small claims process to litigants.379 Some small claims courts offer staff
assistance with the preparation of initial filings. California, for example, has established special
advisory services to help litigants prepare claims and defenses, while Massachusetts requires
clerks to offer assistance with claims forms upon request.380
c.

Commencement and Service of Action

In lieu of a formal pleading, a small claims plaintiff typically commences an action by filing a
simple statement or using a pre-established form in which he or she provides a description of the
controversy and states the amount sought in damages.381
Next, the claimant must serve the defendant. State small claims courts tend to have somewhat
relaxed service of process rules. For example, although personal service may be used, many
small claims systems allow parties to effect service by certified mail, with some courts even
permitting service by regular first class mail.382 Parties may be able to take advantage of
government options such as using a sheriff, marshal, or constable to serve papers on the
opposing party, or may use process servers or other disinterested adults.383

375

N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013); N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013); N.Y.
UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1809 (Consol. 2013) (filing fees based on
amount of claim).
376

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 22 (2013) (graduating fees based on the amount of the claim).

377

See Appendix D (summarizing filing fees).

378

FLA. STAT. § 34.041 (2013) (graduating filing fees based on the amount of claim, with additional $85 fee for
garnishment, attachment, replevin, and distress proceedings).
379

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.930 (2013); GA. UNIF. MAGISTRATE CT. R. 17; N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT.
ACT § 1803(b) (Consol. 2013); N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1803(b) (Consol. 2013); N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT.
ACT § 1803(b) (Consol. 2013); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1803(b) (Consol. 2013).
380

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 116.260, 116.940(b)(1) (2013) statutorily established small claims advisory service
helps prepare claims and defenses); MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. R. 2(a) (directing court clerk to assist small claims plaintiff
in completing court’s claim form, if requested); see also FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.050(c) (directing clerk to assist parties in
preparing statement of claim and other papers upon request).

381

See Appendix D (summarizing various simplified pleadings).

382

See WARNER, at 180-85.

383

See id. at 180.
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Once served, a defendant is expected to respond to the proceeding. Some states do not require
small claims defendants to file answers, but instead only to appear at a hearing to defend against
the claim.384 Similarly, defendants do not always need to file a counterclaim, and may instead
raise a counterclaim for the first time at trial.385 In many – though not all – small claims systems,
if a counterclaim exceeds the jurisdictional limit, the case will be transferred to a more general
court, resulting in a more expensive and complex proceeding than may have been anticipated by
the plaintiff.386
d.

Mediation

Small claims litigants are often encouraged to mediate their claims through a court-sponsored
mediation process. In some states, participation in mediation is mandatory before a trial on the
merits.387 Many states, however, merely encourage litigants to use an optional mediation
procedure available at the courthouse on the day of trial.388
e.

Pretrial Practice

The hallmark of a small claims proceeding is that traditional rules of civil procedure are
significantly relaxed in order to save litigants effort and expense.389 Modified procedures for
small claims actions typically preclude or limit the use of discovery.390 Florida’s small claims
court, for example, does not allow a party to make discovery requests of an unrepresented party
unless the unrepresented party has himself or herself initiated discovery.391 Other states do not
permit discovery at all.392
Even where more traditional rules of procedure apply, they may be construed liberally by the
court so litigants are not intimidated by the technicalities of formal court procedure. In most
384

See Appendix D (summarizing answer requirements).

385

See id.

386

See RUHNKA ET AL., at 119 (except for two courts examined in a two-year study, all courts required the case to be
transferred when the counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional limit; in the other two jurisdictions, counterclaims in
excess of the limit remained in small claims court).
387

See Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Increasing Referrals to Small Claims Mediation Programs: Models To Improve
Access To Justice, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361 (2013).
388

See id. at 375-80 (sampling court annexed mediation for litigants in small claims systems); see, e.g., FLA. S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF THE SMALL CLAIMS PROCESS IN FLORIDA, S. REP. NO. 2009-121, Interim
Rep., at 7 (2011), available at http://archive flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2009/Senate/reports/interim_reports/pdf/
2009-121ju.pdf (some judges may highly encourage or require pretrial mediation).
389

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 22 (2013) (both parties must consent to mediation); see also Appendix D
(summarizing various specialized procedures).

390

See Appendix D (summarizing discovery practices).

391

FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.020(b).

392

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.310(b) (“The pretrial discovery procedures described in Section 2019.010
are not permitted in small claims actions.”); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013) (noting that
“[d]isclosure shall be unavailable in small claims procedure except upon order of the court on showing of proper
circumstances”).
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small claims settings, judges significantly control the manner in which a case proceeds,
exercising considerable discretion concerning the application of procedural and evidentiary
rules.393 In some states, the judge is to decide the applicable rules and extent of discovery on an
ad hoc basis.394
f.

Conduct of Trial

At trial, parties will generally be asked to explain their “side” of the case, and the court may
request them to provide documentary proof to support respective claims and defenses.395 The
presentation of evidence at a small claims trial, however, is generally quite curtailed in order to
enable the resolution of the claim in a quick and efficient manner.396 Judges presiding over small
claims matters typically retain broad discretion to apply evidentiary rules in the interest of
fairness.397 For example, a judge may allow parties to present witness testimony
telephonically398 or may admit hearsay evidence.399 Additionally, a judge may limit the number
of witnesses or, in some states, permit an expert witness if the expert will aid the factfinder in
evaluating a technical matter.400
g.

Right to Jury

As discussed above, the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a
jury trial in federal proceedings.401 Many states, as well, have a jury trial right, and may permit
litigants in a nonjury small claims proceeding to appeal to a different court for de novo
determination of the claim before a jury.402 Some states, including Florida,403 Illinois,404 and
Texas,405 allow litigants the opportunity to demand a jury in small claims court, provided they
393

See, e.g., MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. R. 7(f); TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.3(e).

394

See Appendix D (summarizing discovery practices).

395

See WARNER, at 244.

396

See Sanderson v. Niemann, 110 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Cal. 1941); see also Appendix D (summarizing evidentiary
rules); Zucker & Herr, at 317.

397

See, e.g., MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. R. 6.10 (“The court should not require strict adherence to the rules of evidence in
small claims trials.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.3(e) (“The other Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence do
not apply except: (1) when the judge hearing the case determines that a particular rule must be followed to ensure
that the proceedings are fair to all parties; or (2) when otherwise specifically provided by law or these rules.”).
398

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.520(a) (2013); FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.140(f); TEX. R. CIV. P. 502.4(d)(1)(C).

399

See, e.g., Houghtaling v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 856 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1993); MASS. UNIF. SM.
CL. STANDARDS § 6:10.
400

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (2013); TEX. R. CIV. P. 503.4(a)(4).

401

7 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 5 (2013); see supra Part IV.A.

402

See Nancy M. King, Annotation, Small Claims: Jury Trial Rights in, and on Appeal From, Small Claims Court
Proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th 1119, § 5 (2008); see also GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-10-41(b)(1) (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 218, § 23 (2013) (providing defendants right to appeal to a jury); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1123(4) (2013).
403

FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.150.

404

ILL. SUP. CT. R. 285.

405

TEX. R. CIV. P. 504.1(a).
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are willing to pay jury fees.406 In other states, parties are considered to have waived their right to
a jury trial by participating in the small claims forum.407
h.

Available Relief

Full equitable relief, such as broad injunctive relief, is not widely available in state small claims
systems.408 Some states permit limited equitable relief, primarily in the form of rescission,
reformation, restitution, and specific performance.409 Equitable relief may be limited to
instances where the statute giving rise to the cause of action specifically authorizes a small
claims court to grant this type of relief.410
In many small claims courts, the prevailing party may recover reasonable costs that arise from
the action, such as court fees, cost of service, and costs associated with subpoenaing a witness.411
Consistent with the usual rule, however, attorneys’ fees are typically not available unless a
contractual provision authorizes such an award or a statute expressly permits it.412
i.

Decisions and Review

In the typical small claims system, parties must appear on the day of trial, either on their own or
through their attorney (if attorneys are permitted). A determination may be made at the hearing
or mailed to the parties a few days to a few weeks after the case is heard.413
States differ in their handling of a party’s failure to appear. If the plaintiff appears and the
defendant does not, a default judgment may be entered for the plaintiff.414 Before the court will
issue a default judgment, however, the plaintiff may still be required to demonstrate the
defendant’s liability, or provide evidence to establish the accuracy of the requested damages.415
406

See Appendix D (summarizing the availability of jury trials); see also Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 285; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
218, § 23 (2013); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1806 (Consol. 2013); TEX. R. CIV. P. 504.1(b).

407

See Nancy M. King, Annotation, Small Claims: Jury Trial Rights in, and on Appeal From, Small Claims Court
Proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th 1119, § 3(b) (2008).
408

See Appendix D (summarizing availability of equitable relief).

409

See WARNER, at 83-85.

410

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.220(a)(5) (2013) (small claims court has jurisdiction “[f]or an injunction
or other equitable relief only when a statute expressly authorizes a small claims court to award that relief”).
411

See Appendix D (summarizing recoverable costs); WARNER, at 251-52.

412

See, e.g., MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. STANDARDS § 7:05 cmt; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001 (2013).

413

See WARNER, at 360 (“[D]espite the fact that an occasional person may be upset, some judges are willing to
announce and explain their decisions in court, on the theory that both parties are entitled to know why a particular
decision was reached.”).

414

See id. at 238.

415

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.520(b) (2013) (requiring plaintiff to present evidence to prove the claim);
GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-10-43(e)(1) (2013) (requiring plaintiff to prove unliquidated damages); TEX. R. CIV. P.
503.1(a)(2), 503.6(c) (requiring plaintiff to provide damages evidence; if plaintiff cannot prove damages, judge must
render judgment for the defendant when defendant fails to file and answer).
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If the plaintiff or both parties fail to appear, the case is generally dismissed without prejudice,
allowing the plaintiff to refile at a later time.416 Default judgments generally are not appealable,
but may be set aside by the court upon a showing of good cause.417
The Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Constitution does not require states to provide
appellate review as a matter of due process.418 States therefore may prescribe procedures for and
place conditions upon the right to appeal, or decline to provide for appellate review.419 States
vary greatly as to the rules and procedures that govern small claims appeals. Some states do not
permit appeals in small claims actions at all because a party is considered to have waived the
appeal right by participating in the forum.420 Other states permit aggrieved parties to appeal to a
higher court.421 Many states restrict appeals to those parties present at the small claims trial and,
accordingly, in those jurisdictions, a default judgment is not appealable.422 The states that permit
appeals also differ in whether the simplified small claims procedure is carried forward to the
appellate action, or if different appellate procedures apply.423 In many states, an appeal is
conducted as a trial de novo.424 Alternatively, states that eschew the de novo approach may
permit appeals on questions of law.425
j.

Enforcement of Judgments

Once a judgment is rendered, prevailing parties generally must take additional steps to secure
payment. A persistent complaint with respect to small claims courts is the difficulty in collecting
on judgments.426
416

See WARNER, at 242; see, e.g., FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.160(b) (within judges’ discretion to keep open or dismiss for
want of prosecution); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-10-43(e)(3) (2013) (dismissing with or without prejudice is
discretionary).

417

See WARNER, at 240; see, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-10-41(b)(2) (2013).

418

Nat’l Union of M. C. & S. v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 43 (1954) (while statutory right of review “is important and
must be exercised without discrimination, such a review is not a requirement of due process”) (citations omitted).

419

See Lott v. Pittman, 243 U.S. 588, 591 (1917) (noting that the right to an appeal in a criminal case is “not
essential to due process” and observing that “[i]t was, therefore, competent for the State to prescribe the procedure
and conditions [to rehear the case]”); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894) (noting, in a criminal case, that
“the right of appeals may be accorded by the State … upon such terms as in its wisdom may be deemed proper.”).
420

See Appendix D (summarizing appeals).

421

See id. (summarizing appeals).

422

See WARNER, at 368; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.710(d) (2013); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-10-41(b)(2)
(2013).
423

Compare, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.770 (2013) (small claims appeals conducted informally) with FLA.
SM. CL. R. 7.230 (appeals governed by Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure).
424

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.770 (2013); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-10-41(b)(1) (2013); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.8427 (2012); Pa. R.C.P.D.J. No. 1007 (A); TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.3.
425

See WARNER, at 369-70.

426

See FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF THE SMALL CLAIMS PROCESS IN FLORIDA, S. REP. NO. 2009121, Interim Rep., at 10-11 (2011), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2009/Senate/reports/int
erim_reports/pdf/2009-121ju.pdf.
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Some states now include enforcement assistance as part of their small claims programs and make
a particular effort to provide information to parties about the collections process. 427 Judges may
be required to explain the enforcement process and advise the prevailing party that he or she is
entitled to an enforcement hearing upon request.428 In Massachusetts, for example, courts are
encouraged to hold enforcement hearings without requiring successful plaintiffs to bring a
separate action to monitor whether debtors are fulfilling judgment obligations in a timely
manner.429

427

See, e.g., N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1812(b) (Consol. 2013) (“[T]he judgment creditor shall be entitled to
commence an action against said judgment debtor for treble the amount of such unsatisfied judgment, together with
reasonable counsel fees, and the costs and disbursements of such action.”); MASS. UNIFORM SMALL CLAIMS RULE 9
(2013) (“[T]he court should take an active role in the enforcement of judgments.”).
428

FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF THE SMALL CLAIMS PROCESS IN FLORIDA, S. REP. NO. 2009121, Interim Rep., at 10-11 (2011), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2009/Senate/reports/int
erim_reports/pdf/2009-121ju.pdf. (“Judges also aid in judgment collection by attempting to curb the expectations of
pro se litigants who believe that they will automatically receive payment once the court enters the judgment order.
Upon entry of a judgment, judges may also explain that the plaintiff may be entitled to a hearing in aid of execution
of the judgment.”).
429

MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. STANDARDS § 9:00-:02, available at http://www mass.gov/courts/admin/legal/smclstandard
s2002.pdf.
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OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE MODELS AND APPROACHES

To appreciate the full range of possibilities for an alternative system to resolve small copyright
claims, in addition to state judicial processes, it is instructive to highlight additional models and
procedures that came to the attention of the Copyright Office during the course of its study.
These systems range from federal entities such as the CRB and Trademark Trials and Appeals
Board, to dispute resolution programs of nongovernment organizations, to solutions implemented
in foreign jurisdictions. While disparate in their approach, each facilitates the resolution of
specialized issues or smaller claims, or otherwise serves to mitigate the burdens of traditional
litigation.
A.

Copyright Royalty Board

The CRB comprises three full-time CRJs who are appointed by the Librarian of Congress upon
consultation with the Register of Copyrights.430 By statute, the chief CRJ is to be experienced in
adjudications; a second CRJ is to have significant background in copyright law; and the third
CRJ is to have significant experience in economics.431
Aided by two staff attorneys,432 the CRJs are responsible for determining applicable rates and
terms of various statutory licenses under the Copyright Act, including licenses for the use of
musical works and sound recordings, and for the retransmission of broadcast television content
by cable and satellite providers.433 The rates and terms adopted by the CRB apply on an
industry-wide basis and result in hundreds of millions of dollars in annual royalty payments.434
Because the royalties paid under the cable and satellite licenses are collected by the Copyright
Office, the CRB has the additional statutory duty to distribute those royalty pools equitably to
copyright owner claimants.435
Because of its limited, though significant, duties to determine statutory license rates and royalty
distributions, the CRB does not address the type of small copyright claims with which Congress

430

17 U.S.C. § 801.

431

Id. § 802(a)(1).

432

See id. § 802 (b) & (e)(2). Three full-time staff members support the Copyright Royalty Judges in performing
their functions. Although not mandated by the statute, in practice the first two staff members have been attorneys,
and the third provides administrative support.
433

Id. § 801; see also U.S. Copyright Royalty Board, Copyright Royalty Judges (Mar. 8, 2008), http://www.loc.gov/
crb/background/.

434

See U.S. Copyright Office, Licensing Division, Financial Statement (Nov. 2012), http://www.copyright.gov/licen
sing/FIN-11-2012.pdf (showing distributions for cable, satellite, jukebox, and digital audio recording technology
royalties); see also SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (“[B]illions of dollars and the fates of entire industries can ride on the Copyright Royalty Board’s
decisions.”).
435

17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b)(3), 803(d)(2)(C).
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is concerned. But its structure and responsibilities under the Copyright Act, and relationship to
the Copyright Office, make it of interest for purposes of this Report.436
Under the Copyright Act, the CRJs are afforded independence in rendering their rate and
distribution determinations,437 but may consult with the Register of Copyrights on matters other
than a question of fact,438 and are required to consult with the Register on any novel material
question of law.439 In addition, their decisions are subject to review by the Register for legal
error, and any conclusions of substantive law by the Register are binding as precedent upon the
CRB in subsequent proceedings.440
The CRB statute and related regulations set forth detailed procedures for the conduct and
determination of rate and distribution proceedings, including implementation of party
settlements.441 Proceedings may involve numerous interested parties and often take two years or
longer to complete.442
The CRB process allows for significant discovery, including document production and
depositions, though it is not as broad as discovery permitted under the Federal Rules.443 Trials
before the CRB, relatively formal in nature, typically involve multiple expert and nonexpert
witnesses and voluminous economic evidence, and can last several weeks.444 The rates and

436

As noted above, the appointment process for the CRJs recently was found to be unconstitutional under the
Appointments Clause – but was also cured – in a recent opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See supra
Part IV.D.
437

17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(A)(i).

438

Id.

439

Id. § 802(f)(1)(B).

440

Id. § 802(f)(1)(D).

441

See id. §§ 801-05 & 37 C.F.R. §§ 350-54.

442

See Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services,
76 Fed. Reg. 591 (Dec. 22, 2010) (announcing commencement of proceedings in Docket No. 2011–1 CRB
PSS/Satellite II); Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital
Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054 (Apr. 17, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 382) (“2013
Determination”) (completing entry of Final Rule over two years after commencement of proceedings were
announced in Docket No. 2011–1 CRB PSS/Satellite II); see also Distribution of the 2004 and 2005 Cable Royalty
Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,623 (July 15, 2008) (announcing commencement of Phase I proceedings in Docket No.
2007–3 CRB CD 2004–2005 to distribute cable royalty funds); Distribution of the 2004 and 2005 Cable Royalty
Funds, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,063 (Sept. 15, 2010) (distributing Phase I of 2004 and 2005 cable royalty funds in Docket
No. 2007–3 CRB CD 2004–2005 over two years later).
443

Compare 37 C.F.R. § 351.5(b)(1) (“A participant in a royalty rate proceeding may request of an opposing
participant nonprivileged documents that are directly related to the written direct statement or written rebuttal
statement of that participant.”), and 37 C.F.R. 351.6 (“In a distribution proceedings… parties may request of an
opposing party nonprivileged underlying documents related to the written exhibits and testimony.”), with FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense….”).
444

See, e.g., 2013 Determination at 23,054 (“In all, the Judges heard evidence and oral argument for a period of 19
days. The parties presented 32 fact and expert witnesses.”).
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terms for statutory licenses are determined in accordance with specific statutory criteria that vary
from license to license.445
Due to the possibility that an individual copyright owner claiming a very modest sum of royalties
from a particular royalty pool can hold up the CRB’s distribution of millions of dollars to others,
the CRB statute includes a “small claims” process for claims of $10,000 or less, which limits the
CRJs’ consideration of such a claim to an abbreviated paper process. 446 Claimants who assert an
inflated claim of more than $10,000 in bad faith for the purpose of avoiding the paper-based
determination are to be fined “in an amount not to exceed the difference between the actual
amount distributed and the amount asserted by the participant.”447
The rate and distribution determinations of the CRB are directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and are reviewable by that court to determine whether the decision
was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”448
B.

Patent Courts and Procedures
1. Patent Trial and Appeal Board

With the goal of a more efficient and streamlined patent system that limits litigation costs,449 the
2011 America Invents Act (“AIA”) established the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) in
the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), replacing the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.450 The PTAB, which became effective September 16, 2012, consists of the
Director of the PTO, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for
Trademarks, and administrative patent judges.451 Administrative patent judges are appointed by
the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Director of the PTO, and must have
“competent legal knowledge and scientific ability.”452 The PTAB is expected to have 225 judges
by the end of fiscal 2013, up from ninety-five at the beginning of 2012.453 Each proceeding

445

See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1).

446

Id. § 803(b)(4)(A).

447

Id. § 803(b)(4)(B).

448

5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see also 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(3) (“Jurisdiction of court. – Section 706 of title 5 shall apply with
respect to review by the court of appeals under this subsection.”); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty
Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (determining that challenges for lack of compliance with a statutory
provision are “evaluated under the familiar APA arbitrary and capricious standard”).
449

Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of Patent Trial and
Appeal Board Decisions, Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“PTAB Final Rule”).
450

America Invents Act of 2011, § 7, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (“AIA”).

451

35 U.S.C. § 6(a).

452

Id.

453

Gene Quinn, AIPLA 2012 Annual Meeting Begins, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2
012/10/25/aipla-2012-annual-meeting-begins/id=29280/.
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before the PTAB is heard by a panel of at least three members, as designated by the Director of
the PTO.454
The AIA also established four new trial proceedings to take place before the PTAB: inter partes
review; post grant review; a transitional program for covered business method patents
(“TPCBM”); and derivation proceedings. An inter partes or post grant review involves a
challenge by a third party to an issued patent, seeking to cancel that patent.455 A TPCBM
proceeding is similar to a post grant review, except a person may not file a petition for a TPCBM
proceeding unless that person has been charged with infringement under the patent.456 Lastly, a
derivation proceeding determines whether an inventor named in an earlier application derived the
claimed invention from an inventor named in the petitioner’s application and the earlier
application claiming such invention was filed without authorization.457 In a derivation
proceeding, the PTAB may correct the naming of the inventor in the patent at issue.458
Petitions for inter partes or post grant reviews must be filed with the appropriate fees and include
specified information.459 The patent owner has the right to file a preliminary response to such a
petition explaining why review should not be instituted.460 The Director of the PTO must then
determine whether to institute a review based on whether the petition and response show that (in
inter partes matters) “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”461 or that (in post grant matters) “it
is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”462
In 2012, the PTO issued regulations governing rules of practice for the PTAB proceedings
described above.463 These rules cover filing of documents, management of the record, motion
practice, testimony and production, oral argument, decision, settlement, and other matters.464 As
to representation by counsel, the regulations do not require it, but do require that if counsel is
involved, the party must designate a lead and a back-up counsel.465 The rules permit motion

454

35 U.S.C. § 6(c).

455

Id. §§ 311-319 (inter partes review); id. §§ 321-329 (post grant review).

456

AIA, § 18(a)(1)(B).

457

35 U.S.C. § 135(a).

458

Id. § 135(b).

459

Id. § 312 (inter partes review); id. § 322 (post grant review). The fee for filing an inter partes review petition
challenging up to twenty claims is $27,200, and the fee for the same number of challenged claims in a post grant
review petition is $35,800. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15.
460

35 U.S.C. § 313 (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 323 (post grant review).

461

Id. § 314(a).

462

Id. § 324(a). A petition for post grant review may also be authorized on a showing that the petition “raises a
novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.” Id. § 324(b).
463

PTAB Final Rule.

464

37 C.F.R. Part 42.

465

Id. at § 42.10.
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practice,466 compulsion of testimony and production,467 and depositions.468 Oral argument may
be requested by either party.469
A party dissatisfied with the final written decision of the PTAB following an inter partes or post
grant review may appeal the decision only to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.470
Because the AIA-instituted PTAB proceedings are so new, the available statistics do not tell us
much. Through July 2013 there have been 394 inter partes review petitions filed with the
PTAB.471 Out of these, 126 trials have been instituted, but none has proceeded to a final
decision.472 Only one post grant review petition has been filed, and that trial was terminated.473
2.

Specialized Federal Procedures

Because patent infringement cases can be particularly formidable for courts and litigants, some
federal courts have adopted special procedural rules for such actions. Courts that have taken this
approach include the Southern District of New York and the Western District of Pennsylvania,
both of which are participating in a pilot program established by Congress as the Patent Cases
Pilot Program.474 The modified patent rules adjust the Federal Rules to address the specific
complexities of patent litigation by altering procedures for case management conferences, initial
disclosures, and claim construction proceedings.475
Another court, the Eastern District of Texas, has adopted special patent rules that are notoriously
daunting but have shortened trial timelines such that the district has become a magnet for patent

466

Id. at §§ 42.20-42.25.

467

Id. at § 42.52. Note that the Federal Rules of Evidence generally apply. Id. at C.F.R. § 42.62.

468

Id. at. § 42.53.

469

Id. at § 42.70.

470

35 U.S.C. § 141(c).

471

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, AIA Proceeding Statistics, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/aia_trial
_proceedings.pdf.
472

Id.

473

Id.

474

Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, DISTRICT
COURTS SELECTED FOR PATENT PILOT PROGRAM (Jun. 7, 2011) http://www.uscourts.gov/news/newsview/11-0607/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx (selected districts included the Eastern District of New
York, Southern District of New York, Western District of Pennsylvania, District of New Jersey, District of
Maryland, Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of Florida, District of Nevada, Eastern District of Texas,
Northern District of Texas, Western District of Tennessee, Central District of California, Northern District of
California, and Southern District of California).
475

See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF TEX. LOCAL CIV. RULES, APP. M; E.D. TEX. P.R. 1-1 through 4-6;
S&E D.N.Y PATENT L.R. 2, 6-8,10-12; W.D. Pa. LPR 2.1, 2.3, 4.1-4.5.
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plaintiffs.476 Some have expressed concern that the Eastern District of Texas’s local patent rules
unfairly favor plaintiffs by compressing the time defendants have to respond, while plaintiffs
may have spent significant time preparing the case before filing it in court.477
In addition, as noted above, patent cases are appealed from the district courts to a specialized
federal tribunal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.478 Congress established the
Federal Circuit to handle patent appeals and certain other types of appeals in part to “increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law,” which was important because the “uncertainty
created by the lack of national law precedent was a significant problem, and … widespread
forum-shopping [was] particularly acute.”479
3.

Small Claims Review

The PTO, in conjunction with the ABA, currently is considering whether the United States
should develop a small claims process for patent disputes. In a December 2012 Federal Register
notice, the PTO solicited comments on a number of issues, including whether a small claims
alternative for patent enforcement is needed and what features a small patent claims process
might have.480 In addition, the PTO is reviewing a number of issues that parallel the issues
considered in this Report, including “subject matter jurisdiction, venue, case management,
appellate review, available remedies, and conformity with the U.S. constitutional framework
(e.g., Seventh Amendment).”481 The PTO indicated that it is continuing to evaluate comments of
the public and “will provide recommendations regarding the concept in due course …, in
consultation with the ABA, the Federal judiciary, and other stakeholders.”482
C.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) hears cases concerning the federal
registration of trademarks such as inter partes (third party) petitions for cancellation of marks,
476

See, e.g., E.D. TEX. P.R. 3-1 (ten days for service); P.R. 4-2 (twenty days for claim term exchange); Michael C.
Smith, Feature, Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent Cases, 69 TEX. B.J. 1045, 1046
(2006).
477

See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern
District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 219 (2007).
478

28 U.S.C. § 1295.

479

S. REP. NO. 275 at 5, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11.

480

Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830 (Dec. 18,
2012). Comments were due April 30, 2013. Extension of Comment Period for Request for Comments on a Patent
Small Claims Proceeding in the United States, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,515, 14,516 (Mar. 6, 2013). Twenty-two comments
were received. Office of Policy and External Affairs – Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/patents/index.jsp#heading-1.
481

Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830, 74,830
(Dec. 18, 2012).
482

U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, 2013 Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property
Enforcement 25 (Jun. 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipecjoint-strategic-plan.pdf.
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oppositions to registration, and concurrent use and interference proceedings.483 While the TTAB
relies largely upon the Federal Rules, it is not an Article III court, and certain procedures are
modified. Most notably, the TTAB offers an accelerated adjudication option that relies upon
party stipulations and abbreviated procedures.484
The TTAB, which is staffed by a total of twenty-three administrative trademark judges, 485 the
large majority of which have experience as trademark examining attorneys with the PTO,486 has
very limited jurisdiction: it only hears cases regarding whether the PTO should issue or cancel a
federal trademark registration. The TTAB is not able to “determine the right to use [a
trademark], nor may it decide broader questions of infringement or unfair competition.”487 Nor
may it “declare any portion of … any … act of Congress … unconstitutional.”488 Matters
litigated before the TTAB, however, also can be litigated in federal district court.489
Though the vast majority of TTAB proceedings do not address collateral issues, they sometimes
touch on other subjects necessary to reach a determination related to registration. For example,
the TTAB may consider whether a settlement agreement prevents a party from bringing a TTAB
action.490
The TTAB provides only limited remedies. Essentially, in inter partes cases, it only may order
cancellation of an existing federal trademark registration or prohibit the registration of a pending

483

The TTAB also hears ex parte cases concerning trademark examining attorneys’ rejections of applications for the
federal registration of marks. This report focuses on the TTAB’s treatment of inter partes cases, which involve a
two-party dispute regarding a trademark application or registration, because they are most similar to traditional
copyright infringement lawsuits.
484

U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Trademark Trial & Appeal Board Manual of
Procedure, § 528.05(a)(2) (3d ed. Rev. 1, June 2012) (“TBMP”).
485

The applicable statute does not provide for a set number of judges. See 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (“The Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board shall include … administrative trademark judges who are appointed by the Secretary of
Commerce, in consultation with the Director.”). As of 2012, there were twenty-three appointed judges. See John L.
Welch, The TTABlog: Keeping Tabs on the TTAB, “Updated Roster of TTAB Administrative Trademark Judges”
(Oct. 30, 2012), http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2012/10/updated-roster-of-ttab-administrative.html (“Welch”).
486

Of the administrative judges assigned to the TTAB as of 2012, eighteen (78%) were formerly trademark
examining attorneys, fourteen (61%) were TTAB interlocutory attorneys, and fourteen (61%) had experience in
private practice. Of the three TTAB judges who had no prior experience as an examining or interlocutory attorney,
one was formerly an arbitrator and judge pro tem and the other two were in private practice. See Welch.
487

TBMP § 102.01.

488

Id.

489

15 U.S.C. § 1119 (“In any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the right to registration,
order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the
register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action.”).
490

See Selva & Sons, Inc. v. Nina Footwear, Inc., 705 F.2d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[A]lthough other courts
would be the proper tribunals in which to litigate a cause of action for enforcement or breach of the contract here
involved, that is not sufficient reason for the board to decline to consider the agreement, its construction, or its
validity if necessary to decide the issues properly before it in this cancellation proceeding, including the issue of
estoppel.”).
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application.491 The TTAB cannot grant any monetary relief, including costs or attorneys’ fees.
Additionally, it cannot grant any injunctive relief to prevent a losing trademark applicant or
registrant from using the subject trademark.492
Each TTAB case is decided by a panel of three administrative law judges.493 In addition to the
judges, an interlocutory attorney is assigned to each case to help expedite its progress. The
interlocutory attorneys handle various logistical matters and are able to decide certain nondispositive motions, such as uncontested motions for extensions of time. They also may conduct
discovery conferences.494
In TTAB proceedings, a party may be represented by an attorney495 or may proceed pro se.496
The TTAB will not hold any person (including attorneys) in contempt or award expenses
(including attorneys’ fees) to any party,497 but other sanctions available under Rule 37(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules may be ordered.498
To initiate a case before the TTAB, a party must file either a notice of opposition499 or a petition
to cancel,500 serve the opposing party,501 and pay a filing fee.502 Pretrial practice includes
potentially extensive discovery – including depositions – and motion practice similar to that in
federal courts.503
Unlike typical federal court litigation, the TTAB does not have live trials. Instead, the parties
file written trial materials, which may include deposition and other testimony, official records,
and other evidence.504 Parties may provide trial briefs and can request oral argument, which can
be conducted in-person or via videoconference.505
491

15 U.S.C. § 1119.

492

See General Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1584, 1591 (TTAB 2011) (finding
that the Board does not have the power to grant injunctive relief).
493

See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.129(a) & 2.142(e)(1).

494

Id. at. § 2.120(a)(2).

495

Id. at § 2.11.

496

Id. at § 11.14 (e).

497

Id. at § 2.127(f).

498

Id. at § 2.120(g)(1).

499

Id. at. § 2.101.

500

Id. at § 2.111.

501

Id. at § 2.119(b) & (d) (setting forth appropriate service methods that include some options similar to the Federal
Rules, but with additional methods such as serving via overnight courier).
502

Id. at § 2.6(a) (16-18) (filing fee per petition to cancel or oppose, per class, is $300.00 and $100 for an ex parte
appeal).
503

Id. at §§ 2.120 (discovery), 2.127 (motions).

504

Id. at §§ 2.122 (matters in evidence), 2.123 (trial testimony in inter partes cases).

505

Id. at §§ 2.128 (briefs at final hearing), 2.129 (oral argument); TBMP, § 802.03 (“Oral hearings are almost
exclusively held at the offices of the Board. However, parties may request attendance at the hearings remotely via
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Since 2008, parties have been able to submit their cases to the TTAB’s Accelerated Case
Resolution (“ACR”) process as an alternative to a traditional TTAB hearing. ACR is designed to
be a more efficient and economical form of resolution for non-complex cases and approximates a
summary bench trial. Parties’ agreement to use the ACR procedure allows the TTAB “to resolve
issues of fact at summary judgment and to treat the parties’ summary judgment motion papers
and evidence as the final record and briefs on the merits of the case.”506 To facilitate the ACR
process, parties may stipulate to abbreviated procedures regarding discovery, testimony,
witnesses, and other matters.507
A party can appeal a TTAB’s inter partes decision directly to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit,508 or to any federal district court.509 TTAB decisions are reviewed under the
deferential “substantial evidence” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act for findings of
fact but de novo for findings of law.510
Notably, practitioners have voiced dissatisfaction over the length of time it takes for the TTAB to
come to a final decision in an inter partes proceeding.511 Statistics show that intervals between
the commencement of a proceeding and final decision have increased over time.512 Currently,
TTAB scheduling orders and rules typically mean that a non-ACR case will take at least 550
days to submit for decision, assuming there are no oral arguments, motions to extend, or
successful dispositive motions.513 This would seem to be as long as or longer than some federal
district court proceedings.

video conference. A video conference will be conducted in the same manner as if conducted entirely in the hearing
room.”).
506

TBMP, § 528.05(a)(2).

507

Id. at § 528.05(a)(2).

508

37 C.F.R. § 2.145.

509

15 § U.S.C. 1071(b)(1).

510

5 U.S.C. § 706; Glendale Int’l. Corp. v. USPTO, 374 F. Supp. 2d 479, 485 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“[D]ecisions of the
TTAB are reviewed de novo with respect to conclusions of law and for ‘substantial evidence’ with respect to
findings of fact.”); TBMP, § 906.01.
511

James R. Robinson & Kathleen E. McCarthy, An Introduction to the New Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
Rules, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1380, 1381 (2007).
512

A 2004 review of TTAB cases found that the median time between the start of an opposition or cancellation
proceeding until a final decision of the TTAB was approximately 38.4 months. John M. Murphy, Playing the
Numbers: A Quantitative Look at Section 2(d) Cases Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 800, 801 (2004). Delay in the TTAB has not significantly improved since 2004 as the median
total pendency for all trial cases before the TTAB in 2010, 2011, and 2012 were 46.8, 49.1, and 46.8 months
respectively. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TTAB NEW FILINGS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES (FISCAL YEAR
2013), http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/appeal/TTAB_New_Filings_and_Performance_Measures.jsp (last
visited Jul. 3, 2013, data on years prior to 2012 have since been removed from this page).
513

Robinson & McCarthy, at 1389.
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United States Tax Court

The United States Tax Court (“Tax Court”) is a court formed pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution and primarily is responsible for resolving taxpayer disputes concerning tax
delinquency determinations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Of particular note for
purposes of this report is that the Tax Court has developed special rules of procedure for small
tax cases.514
Today’s Tax Court has its roots in Congress’s 1925 creation of the Board of Tax Appeals515 in
response to perceived hardships for taxpayers in appealing tax assessments to federal district
courts.516 In 1969, Congress renamed this administrative body the United States Tax Court,
converted it to an Article I court, and added a small case component for taxpayers with lowvalue disputes.517
The Tax Court has the power to adjudicate tax deficiency cases,518 overpayment claims,519
declaratory judgment actions,520 disclosure actions,521 and a variety of other actions. This
responsibility to adjudicate tax disputes is not exclusive to the Tax Court, and is shared with the
Court of Federal Claims and the several federal district courts.522 Despite the shared jurisdiction,
the Tax Court hears the vast majority of tax cases in the United States.523 To invoke the Tax
Court’s small tax case procedures, the amount in dispute has to be $50,000 or less for the tax
year in question and must involve income, estate, gift, or certain excise taxes.524 The small case
limit has been raised several times by Congress from the initial cap of $1,000 in 1970.525

514

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7436(c), 7463 (small tax cases are cases before the Tax Court that involve a specialized set of
adjudicatory procedures which are only available for petitioners who have both certain kinds of tax disputes and also
involve claims of less than $50,000 at stake); T.C.R. PRAC. & P. 170-74.
515

See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).

516

S. REP. NO. 68-398 at 8-9 (1924).

517

The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).

518

26 U.S.C. §§ 6212-14.

519

Id. at § 6512(b).

520

Id. at §§ 7476 (retirement plans), 7477 (certain gifts), 7478 (certain governmental obligations), 7479 (installment
payments), & 7428 (status and classification of certain organizations).
521

Id. at § 6110.

522

28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1369 (jurisdiction of federal district courts, generally); 26 U.S.C. § 7402 (jurisdiction of
district courts specifically in tax cases, which is broader than the Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1509 (jurisdiction
of United States Court of Federal Claims, generally).
523

Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The Tax Litigation Process: Where It Is and Where It Is Going, 44 REC. ASS’N B.
CITY OF N.Y. 825, 827 (1989) (by 1989, the Tax Court heard 95% of tax cases).
524

26 U.S.C § 7463(a).

525

The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 957(a), 83 Stat. 487, 733 (1969) (law became effective Dec.
30, 1970).
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Tax Court judges are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,526
though they serve fifteen-year terms rather than life tenure.527 While the Tax Court relies to
some degree on the Federal Rules, its procedures are substantially different when a petitioner
elects to pursue his or her case on the small case track.528 Once a petitioner chooses the small
case path, proceedings are conducted by “special trial judges” appointed by the Tax Court’s
Chief Judge,529 and the standard procedural rules of the Tax Court are supplanted by the rules for
small tax cases, which are designed to be as informal as possible.530
The principal office of the Tax Court is in the District of Columbia, but by statute the Tax Court
or any of its field divisions may sit at any place within the United States.531 Currently, there are
field divisions in seventy-five different cities,532 fifteen of which hear only small tax cases.533
To commence a case in the Tax Court, a party must file a petition and pay a filing fee.534 The
petitioner can request that the case be heard in Washington, D.C. or in a more convenient
location.535 If the amount in dispute is $50,000 or less, a petitioner can request to use the small
tax case procedure, though a case may not be adjudicated as a small case if the decision “would
provide precedent for the disposition of a substantial number of cases, or if an appellate decision
is sought on a significant issue,”536 or if it turns out the amount in dispute is above the $50,000
statutory limit.537
The Internal Revenue Code gives the Tax Court wide latitude over the rules of procedure and
evidence and procedure to be employed in small tax cases, referred to as “S” cases.538 The
procedural rules state simply that trials are conducted as informally as possible and that “any

526

26 U.S.C. § 7443(a)-(b) (the Tax Court is comprised of nineteen judges).

527

Id. at § 7443(e).

528

The small tax case procedure is optional. T.C.R. PRAC. & P. 171(a) (“A petitioner who wishes to have the
proceedings in the case conducted as a small tax case may so request at the time the petition is filed.”).
529

26 U.S.C. § 7443A. Appointment of these special trial judges faced a constitutional challenge in the context of a
non-small claims proceeding, but was found to not be a violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
Freytag v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 892 (1991). Further discussion of the Appointments Clause is
found in section IV. D. at 42.

530

T.C.R. PRAC. & P. 174(b).

531

26 U.S.C. § 7445.

532

T.C.R. PRAC. & P. FORM 5.

533

Id.

534

Id. App. II. The fee, currently $60, can be waived in small tax cases if the petitioner is unable to pay. Id.
173(a)(2).

535

Id. Form 5.

536

26 U.S.C § 7463; T.C.R. PRAC. & P. 171.

537

26 U.S.C § 7463(d).

538

Id. at § 7463(a) (“proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of evidence, practice, and
procedure as the Tax Court may prescribe”).
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evidence deemed by the Court to have probative value shall be admissible.”539 Small case
petitions are submitted on a standardized form with checkboxes and limited areas to present
narratives.540 Neither briefs nor oral arguments are required in these cases “unless the Court
otherwise directs.”541
A petitioner in a small tax case may appear without representation or may be represented by any
person – including a non-attorney – admitted to practice before the court.542 A petitioner who
prevails in a tax case in federal court, including the Tax Court, potentially can recover attorneys’
fees and court costs if certain conditions are met,543 including the exhaustion of any
administrative remedies.544 The United States, however, may not recover fees or expenses.545
Decisions of the Tax Court are rendered either orally from the bench or as written opinions.546
Standard decisions can be appealed to the various U.S. courts of appeals, but small case
determinations are not appealable and may not be treated as precedent in any other
proceeding.547
E.

Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy

Several commenters suggested that the Office look to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) procedures governing domain name disputes as a potential model
for an alternative copyright small claims process.548 UDRP proceedings help trademark owners
enforce their rights against infringing domain names in a timelier, more cost-efficient manner
than they could through traditional infringement litigation.549 The UDRP is internationally

539

T.C.R. PRAC. & P. Form 174(b).

540

Id. 173(a) and Form 2 (Petition (Simplified Form)).

541

Id. 174(c).

542

Id. 24(a)(4-5) (the general rule for appearance and representation before the Tax Court allows non-attorneys to
practice, including law students who provide assistance with cases, and incorporates Rule 200, which allows for
non-attorneys to practice); id. 172 (“A petitioner in a small tax case may appear without representation or may be
represented by any person admitted to practice before the Court. As to representation, see Rule 24.”); id. 200(b)
(allowing for non-attorneys to practice if that person passes an examination performed by the Tax Court.).
543

26 U.S.C. § 7430.

544

Id. § 7430(b)(1).

545

See id. § 7430(b)(2).

546

Id. § 7459(b); T.C.R. PRAC. & P. 152 (allowing for non-precedential, oral findings of fact except in actions for
declaratory judgment or for disclosure).
547

26 U.S.C. § 7463(b) (“A decision entered in any case in which the proceedings are conducted under this section
shall not be reviewed in any other court and shall not be treated as a precedent for any other case.”).
548

ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 3; Copyright Alliance First Notice Comments at 5; Microsoft
Corp., Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 4 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“Microsoft First Notice
Comments”); Michael Traynor et al., Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 7 (Jan. 13,
2012) (“Traynor et al. First Notice Comments”); PACA, Comments Submitted to Second Notice of Inquiry at 7
(Oct. 18, 2012) (“PACA Second Notice Comments”).
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respected “as an expedient alternative to judicial opinions for resolving trademark disputes
arising across multiple national jurisdictions.”550
The UDRP was established in 1999 by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (“ICANN”), the non-profit entity created for the allocation and management of the
domain name system (“DNS”).551 The UDRP provides rules for handling domain name disputes,
but the disputes themselves are resolved by various nongovernmental organizations (“dispute
resolution providers”), including the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).552
ICANN approves dispute resolution providers that have “demonstrated [the] ability to handle
proceedings in an expedited, global, online context in an orderly and fair manner.”553 UDRP
proceedings are conducted in writing and presided over remotely by one to three panelists –
selected by the dispute resolution provider either alone or in conjunction with the parties554 –
who determine whether a domain name registrant has engaged in bad-faith registration of a
domain name (or “cybersquatting”) in violation of a third party’s trademark rights.
Dispute resolution panels hear only limited types of claims that they are empowered to resolve
by virtue of the contractual relationships between ICANN and the different domain name
registrars (the companies that offer domain name registration services), and, by extension, those
registrars’ contractual relationships with individual registrants. ICANN requires that domain
name registrars implement the UDRP for resolution of trademark-related disputes for generic
top-level domains.555 Registrars therefore include the UDRP in all of those domain name
549

Prior to implementation of the UDRP procedures, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
World Intellectual Property Institute, and the Department of Commerce all recognized that “[e]xisting mechanisms
for resolving conflicts between trademark owners and domain name holders are often viewed as expensive,
cumbersome, and ineffective.” World Intellectual Property Organization, The Management of Internet Names and
Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, ¶ 131 (Apr. 30,
1999), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-final1.pdf.
550

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Final GNSO Issue Report on the Current State of the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 12 (Oct. 3, 2011), http://gnso.icann.org/issues/udrp/udrp-final-issue-report03oct11-en.pdf.

551

When drafting the UDRP, ICANN relied heavily on a report by the World Intellectual Property Organization
report The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, Final Report of the WIPO
Internet Domain Name Process, 131 (Apr. 30, 1999), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/reportfinal1.pdf.
552

ICANN, List of Approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers, http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/provide
rs (dispute resolution providers include: the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre, Czech Arbitration
Court Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes, National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), WIPO, and starting on January
1st, 2014, the Arab Center for Domain Name Dispute Resolution).
553

ICANN, Information Concerning Approval Process for Dispute-Resolution Service Providers, http://www.icann.
org/en/help/dndr/udrp/provider-approval-process.
554

If the parties have a single-member panel, the dispute resolution provider chooses the panelist. If there is a threemember panel, each party proposes a list of potential panelists, with the dispute resolution provider selecting one
panelist from each of the complainant’s and respondent’s lists and picking the third panelist separately. ICANN,
Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy § 6 (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/
udrp/rules (“UDRP Rules”).
555

ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, 3.8 (May 21, 2009), http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/ra
a/ra-agreement-21may09-en.htm#3.
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registration agreements, which makes submission to an administrative proceeding mandatory for
disputes over registrations that are identical or confusingly similar to trademarks.556 Thus,
registrants of generic top-level domains must abide by the UDRP and are subject to UDRP
proceedings.557
UDRP panelists to which disputes are submitted are charged only with determining whether a
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a third party’s trademark, the registrant lacks
rights or legitimate interests in the name, and the name was registered and is being used in bad
faith.558 UDRP panels therefore do not generally consider issues collateral to the determination
of whether a registrant violated the UDRP. There are exceptions, however. A UDRP panel may
need to evaluate third-party rights, usually in the context of deciding whether to cancel a
registration as opposed to transferring a domain name.559 And panels have considered the
infringement of copyrighted works on a website as evidence of bad faith conduct.560
UDRP disputes are governed by several layers of substantive and procedural rules. First, the
UDRP itself provides general requirements, including the broad standard used to determine
whether a domain name was registered and used in bad faith.561 Panels thus base their decisions
on the UDRP standard and not any one country’s laws.562 All UDRP disputes also are subject to
the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “UDRP Rules”), which
556

ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, § 4 (Aug. 26, 1999), http://www.icann.org/en/help/
dndr/udrp/policy. While these proceedings are mandatory for registrants, a registrant also can invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to decide a domain name dispute. UDRP § 4(k) (“The mandatory administrative proceeding
requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to
a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative proceeding is
commenced or after such proceeding is concluded.”); If the registrant invokes the jurisdiction of a court before or
during a UDRP proceeding, the UDRP tribunal has “discretion to decide whether to suspend or terminate the
administrative proceeding, or to proceed to a decision.” UDRP Rules § 18(a).
557

ICANN, Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr (this includes all the
domain names that end in .aero, .asia, .biz, .cat, .com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, name, net, .org, .pro, .tel
and .travel).
558

UDRP § 4(a).

559

An example of this occurred when a UDRP panel refused to transfer a domain name containing both the
trademark of the claimant and its nonparty competitor because transferring the domain name to the claimant might
violate the nonparty competitor’s rights. See Lilly ICOS LLC v. Tudor Burden, Burden Mktg., Case No. D20040794 (WIPO Dec. 20, 2004) (the domain name at issue was cialis-viagra.info and Pfizer Inc. owns the trademark to
Viagra, but was not a party to the proceedings).
560

See, e.g, Wintershall Holding GMBH v. Tracey Morgan, Case No. D2011-1456 (WIPO Oct. 20, 2011) (while the
panel noted that “assessing copyright infringement is beyond the scope of the Policy,” citing prior decisions that
found copyright infringement to be evidence of bad faith, the panel still found that using the disputed domain name
to place an infringing copy of the advertising content found on the complainant’s website was evidence of bad faith).
561

UDRP § 4(a).

562

See, e.g., Anomaly Action Sports S.R.L. Con Sigla AAS S.r.l. v. Kruse, Case No. D2013-0276 at ¶ 6.22 (WIPO
March 15, 2013) (“[T]his Panel is of the opinion that the importation into the Policy of local law doctrines based
upon the location of the parties is both unwarranted and misconceived.”); M. Scott Donahey, 1 INTERNET L. &
PRACTICE § 16:6 (2013) (“While panelists’ approaches to choice of law are not consistent, the general practice is,
where both parties are from the same country, to apply the law of that country. Where parties are from different
countries, panelists tend to rely entirely on the UDRP and the Uniform Rules and do not apply any national law.”).
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provide procedural rules, including specific information as to what the parties must include in
their filings.563 In addition to these requirements, each dispute resolution provider has its own
procedural rules regarding logistics, including how to provide documents to the panels and word
or page limits for pleadings. 564 Dispute resolution providers request that parties use an
electronic submissions process, employing website forms and/or email.565
It is up to the complainant to propose the number of panelists that will hear a dispute but, if the
complainant requests a one-member panel, the respondent can request that the matter be heard
instead by a three-member panel.566 UDRP proceedings are conducted in writing; there are no
live or remotely conducted hearings other than for exceptional reasons.567 The papers involved
are the trademark owner’s complaint, the domain name registrant’s response, and, in some cases,
a limited ability for the trademark owner to reply.568 These pleadings contain all of the parties’
factual and legal arguments, and may include extensive exhibits and, in some cases, witness
declarations.569 UDRP proceedings do not afford any opportunity for discovery.570
The dispute resolution provider must assemble a panel within five days of the receipt of the
registrant’s response,571 and, barring exceptional circumstances, the panel must forward its
563

UDRP §§ 3-5 (“complaints” and “responses”).

564

WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution, § 11 (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/supplemental/eudrp/ (5,000 word limit);
Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes; CAC’s UDRP Supplemental Rules of the Czech Arbitration Court, § 13,
https://udrp.adr.eu/arbitration_platform/udrp_supplemental_rules.php (5,000 word limit); The Asian Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Centre, Supplemental Rules to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the Rules for the Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, art. 13.1 (Jul. 26, 2012), https://www.adndrc.org/doc/Supplemental_Rules_26-07-2012_en.pdf (3,000 word
limit); National Arbitration Forum, The National Arbitration Forum’s Supplemental Rules to ICANN’s Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, §§ 4(a), 5(a) (Mar. 1, 2010), http://domains.adrforum.com/users/icann/res
ources/UDRP%20Supplemental%20Rules%20eff%20March%201%202010.pdf (fifteen page limit).
565

See, e.g., WIPO, Online Complaint Filing Form Complaints under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP), www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/filing/udrp/eudrpcomplaint.jsp; National Arbitration
Forum, Online Filing for Uniform Domain Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) Cases, https://secure.arbforum.com/ddfiling/default.aspx?Ruleset=UDRP.
566

UDRP Rules §§ 3(b)(iv), 5(b)(iv)-(v), 6.

567

UDRP Rules § 13; Mary’s Futons, Inc. v. Texas Int’l Prop. Assocs., Claim Number FA0706001012059 (National
Arbitration Forum) (Aug. 13, 2007) (“In the thousands of cases which have now been determined by both WIPO
and NAF, there has been no occasion on which an in-person hearing has been ordered.”).
568

Typically most providers do not allow submission of additional documents. However, the National Arbitration
Forum allows for one additional written statement to be submitted within five days of a Response if it does not
amend the Complaint or Response. See The National Arbitration Forum’s Supplemental Rules to ICANN’s
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, § 7 (Mar. 1, 2010), http://domains.adrforum.com/users/icann/res
ources/UDRP%20Supplemental%20Rules%20eff%20March%201%202010.pdf. While submission of additional
documents is uncommon, dispute resolution providers may allow a trademark owner an additional submission in the
case of new evidence.
569

UDRP Rules §§ 3(b), 5(b).

570

Kristan B. Burch, Domain Name Disputes: Why Are So Many Disputes Resolved Administratively?, 59 FED.
LAWYER 20, 22 (2012) (“The parties in a UDRP proceeding cannot participate in discovery”).
571

UDRP Rules § 6.
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written decision to the provider within fourteen days of its appointment.572 The relief available
in a UDRP proceeding is very limited. Complainants can request only that the panel cancel or
transfer the relevant domain name(s); the panel cannot grant monetary relief or enjoin registrants
from registering additional infringing domain names in the future.573
Parties to a UDRP dispute do not need to be represented by attorneys, though complainants often
are.574 UDRP fees, which ordinarily are borne by the complainant,575 vary among the four
authorized dispute resolution providers and based upon the number of panelists and the number
of domain names at issue. Current fees to challenge a domain name range from about $670
(€500) to $1,500 for single-panelist consideration of a single domain name.576 Each party bears
its own attorneys’ fees.577
The UDRP rules do not contain provisions for appeals to a dispute resolution provider or to
ICANN itself, but either party can appeal a determination to a traditional government court.578 A
respondent has ten days after losing a UDRP proceeding to file a court case before the domain
name is transferred or canceled by the registrar with which the name is registered during the
dispute.579 Notably, in the United States, a claimant can also bring suit before, during, or after a
572

Id. § 15(b).

573

Id. § 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding before an Administrative Panel
shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the transfer of your domain name registration
to the complainant.”).

574

WIPO, Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/do
mains/guide/#b6 (“While the assistance of a lawyer may be helpful, there is no requirement that the Complaint be
prepared or submitted by a lawyer.”).
575

UDRP § 4(g). A respondent may, however, share the costs of the proceeding if the respondent participates in the
adjudicatory process and opts to have three panelists where the complainant has requested one.
576

See WIPO, Schedule of Fees under the UDRP (Dec. 1, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/fees/index.ht
ml. ($1,500 for single-panelist review of up to five domain names); National Arbitration Forum, The National
Arbitration Forum’s Supplemental Rules to ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, § 17 (Mar.
1, 2010), http://domains.adrforum.com/users/icann/resources/UDRP%20Supplemental%20Rules%20eff%20March
%201%202010.pdf ($1,300 for single-panelist review of up to two domain names); Arbitration Center for Internet
Disputes, Fees of the Czech Arbitration Court (CAC), https://udrp.adr.eu/arbitration_platform/fees.php (€500 for
single-panelist review of up to five domain names); Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre, Supplemental
Rules to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy and the Rules for the Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, art. 15 (Jul. 26, 2012), https://ww
w.adndrc.org/doc/Supplemental_Rules_26-07-2012_en.pdf ($1,300 for single-panelist review of up to two domain
names).
577

See UDRP § 4(i).

578

Id. § 4(k). The UDRP procedural rules, to which complainants agree by virtue of bringing a complaint and
registrants agree pursuant to the registration agreement with the registrar, mandate that the complainant “will
submit, with respect to any challenges to a decision in the administrative proceeding canceling or transferring the
domain name, to the jurisdiction of the courts in at least one specified Mutual Jurisdiction.” Id. § 3(xiii). A “Mutual
Jurisdiction” is “a court jurisdiction at the location of either (a) the principal office of the Registrar… or (b) the
domain-name holder’s address as shown for the registration of the domain name in Registrar’s WhoIs database at
the time the complaint is submitted to the Provider.” UDRP § 1. A “WhoIs” database reflects the registration
information of the domain name registrant and typically is publicly available on the registrar’s website as well as on
other websites.
579

UDRP § 4(k).
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dispute resolution provider’s UDRP decision under traditional trademark infringement theories
or under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, codified in the Lanham Act.580
F.

Federal Court Procedures
1.

The Federal Arbitration Act

The FAA581 enacted by Congress in 1925,582 provides a mechanism for the enforcement of
private arbitration decisions through state and federal courts. The statute provides that written
agreements to arbitrate are to be considered “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”583 Additionally,
reflecting a broad congressional policy favoring arbitral agreements,584 states cannot curtail the
FAA’s subject matter limitations or provisions limiting the revocability of arbitration
agreements.585 While parties may challenge an agreement to arbitrate under standard contract
law, as reviewed above, they can only challenge an arbitration decision resulting from a valid
arbitration agreement on limited procedural grounds such as fraud, evident partiality, or other
misconduct.586 Because the United States is a party to international conventions on arbitration,
valid arbitration awards also are recognized in many countries throughout the world.587
To enforce an arbitration award under the FAA, a party may file a motion to confirm the award
with the proper court, thereby reducing the award to a judgment.588 This court can be a state
court or a federal court as specified by the parties’ arbitration agreement; if no court is specified,
the award is enforceable by the U.S. district court for the district in which the award was
made.589 A motion to confirm an arbitration award in federal court must be accompanied by the
580

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (cause of action for trademark owners seeking transfer of the domain name against
the alleged cybersquatter); id. § 1125(d)(2) (cause of action for trademark owners against the domain name in rem
when the domain name owner cannot be located); 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (creating a civil cause of action for
domain name owners seeking to restore rights to a domain name when the domain name has been suspended,
disabled, or transferred under a policy prohibiting the registration of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly
similar to, or dilutive of another’s mark (for example, the UDRP)).
581

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.

582

The modern FAA derived from the United States Arbitration Act, which was in effect from 1925 until it was
replaced by the current FAA in 1947. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86 (repealed by FAA, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1947)).
583

9 U.S.C. § 2.

584

See Southland Co. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (noting “broad principle of enforceability” under FAA).

585

See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

586

9 U.S.C. § 10.

587

Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, S. TREATY DOC. No. 97-12
(1981); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I(3), June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517; 9 U.S.C. § 304.
588

9 U.S.C. § 9.

589

Id. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have provisions for the enforcement of arbitral awards. See
Susan Weins & Roger Haydock, Confirming Arbitration Awards: Taking the Mystery Out of a Summary
Proceeding, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1293, 1294 n.5 (2007) (listing all state arbitration laws).
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agreement to arbitrate and any time extensions, the arbitration award and each notice, affidavit,
or other paper used upon an application to confirm, modify, or correct the award,590 as well as
the applicable district court filing fee.591 Some federal district courts require additional
documentation, such as: an affidavit listing the facts underlying the arbitration award, hearing,
and arbitral agreement; a proposed order; and a memorandum of law in support of the request for
confirmation.592
A party to the arbitral proceeding has one year to apply to a court to confirm the award.593 A
party who seeks to set aside an award, however, must petition the court within three months of
its issuance.594 An award can be vacated only for the reasons specified in the FAA and parties
cannot expand these statutory grounds by contract.595
A party seeking to overturn an arbitral award bears a “heavy burden” under the standards
specified in the FAA.596 For example, to show that an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, “[i]t
is not even enough that the [arbitration] Panel may have failed to understand or apply the law ….
An arbitrator’s decision must be upheld unless it is ‘completely irrational,’ or it constitutes a
‘manifest disregard of law.’”597 If one of the statutory exceptions does not apply, a court is
obligated to confirm the award.598 Finally, if a party refuses to abide by a valid arbitral award
“in bad faith, vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons,” a court may award attorneys’ fees to the
party attempting to enforce the valid arbitral award.599

590

9 U.S.C. § 13.

591

This fee varies in federal district court. Compare United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/fees/dcfees.pdf (the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania categorizes the confirmation of arbitration awards as miscellaneous actions and charges a
fee of $46), with United States District Court Southern District of New York, District Court Fee Schedule and
Related Information, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/fees (Southern District of New York requires parties to pay the
full fee for a new civil action of $400 in order to confirm an arbitration award).
592

See Weins & Haydock, at 1305.

593

9 U.S.C. § 9.

594

Id. § 12.

595

Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).

596

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (referring to the “exceeded their powers”
standard specifically, but also noting generally that “[u]nder the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision
‘only in very unusual circumstances.’”) (citation omitted).
597

French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.1986) (citations omitted).

598

See Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 587 (“There is nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally
tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of the ‘prescribed’ exceptions applies.”); see also
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (“By its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise
of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to
arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”).
599

Int’l Union of Petrol. & Indus. Workers v. W. Indus. Maint., Inc., 707 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.1983) (employer
acted in bad faith in forcing union to go to court to enforce a valid arbitration award, and was forced to pay the
union’s attorneys’ fees) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)).
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Federal Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes

In recent decades, Congress has provided that various forms of ADR processes be made
available to federal court litigants in order to promote innovative ways of resolving disputes,
efficiently achieve settlements, and ease the backlog of federal cases.600
In 1988, Congress passed the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,601 which created
a pilot program allowing a limited number of federal district courts to create local procedural
rules to facilitate the voluntary or mandatory referral of civil actions to non-binding
arbitration.602 The pilot program had an initial five-year term, 603 which was extended for several
years604 before the program was supplanted by The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998
(“ADRA”).605 While the ADRA expanded the reach of federal ADR – adding mediation and
other potential options for litigants606 – it eliminated mandatorily imposed arbitration, which
some believed to be in tension with the Seventh Amendment.607 Accordingly, the ADRA
provides that district court rules should ensure that “(1) consent to arbitration is freely and
knowingly obtained; and (2) no party or attorney is prejudiced for refusing to participate in
arbitration.”608
The ADRA instructs each U.S. district court to authorize by local rule the use of ADR in all civil
actions, through processes such as early neutral evaluation, mediation, minitrial, and
arbitration.609 Local ADR rules also must require that litigants “consider” the use of ADR, and
may mandate the use of mediation or early neutral evaluation in “certain cases.”610 Particular

600

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 2, Pub. L. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2998.

601

Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 100-702, §§ 901-07, 102 Stat. 4642, 4659-64.

602

28 U.S.C. § 652 (a) (1988).

603

Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, § 906.

604

See A bill to extend arbitration under the provisions of chapter 44 of title 28, United States Code, and for other
purposes, Pub. L. 103-192, 107 Stat. 2292.
605

Pub. L. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2998. Prior to the ADRA was the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which required
federal district courts to consider several case management strategies, including ADR, as a means of cost and delay
reduction. Pursuant to this statute, many district courts implemented ADR procedures and hired ADR staff. DONNA
STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT 1-2 (2011), available
at http://www fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/adr2011.pdf/$file/adr2011.pdf.
606

28 U.S.C. § 651.

607

The ABA, for example, explained that while it “has long supported voluntary arbitration in the federal courts, it
strongly opposes mandatory arbitration programs, even if nonbinding, where involuntary participation is required
before litigants are allowed a trial before a jury or federal judge.” Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement
Encouragement Act; Federal Courts Improvement Act, and Need for Additional Federal District Court Judges:
Hearing on H.R. 2603 and H.R. 2294 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 59 (1997) (statement of
Mitchell F. Dolin).
608

28 U.S.C. § 654(b).

609

Id. at § 651.

610

Id. at § 652(a).
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cases or categories of cases may be excluded from referral to ADR as well.611 The ADRA
provides three instances where referral to arbitration must be barred, even if the parties otherwise
consent: (1) where the action concerns the violation of a constitutional right; (2) in civil rights
actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343; and (3) where $150,000 or more in money damages is
sought.612
Every district court has implemented some form of ADR, with more than a third authorizing
multiple forms of dispute resolution.613 The most popular form of ADR is mediation, with 67%
of the ninety-four district courts using it.614 Settlement conferences are used by 38.3% of courts,
and arbitration and early neutral evaluation are both employed by 24.5%.615 District court rules
vary as to how ADR referrals are handled. For example, while a judge may order mediation
without the parties’ consent in forty-six districts, eleven districts require consent by all parties
before mediation.616 In its 2011 review of ADR procedures the FJC garnered information on the
number of ADR referrals from forty-nine district courts, and found that, for the twelve-month
period ending June 30, 2011, mediation was preferred by an overwhelming amount (17,833
cases) over arbitration (2,799) and early neutral evaluation (1,320).617
One notable ADR program is that run by the Northern District of California, where appropriate
civil cases are presumptively referred to the “ADR Multi-Option Program,” under which the
parties may choose among mediation, non-binding arbitration, or early neutral evaluation, with
the additional options of private ADR or a settlement conference with a magistrate judge.618
According to statistics for 2006 through 2011, mediation is consistently the most used ADR
procedure in the Northern District of California, followed by settlement conferences, private
ADR, and early neutral evaluation.619 Arbitration typically represents less than 1% of
referrals.620

611

Id. at § 652(b) (“Each district court may exempt from the requirements of this section specific cases or
categories of cases in which use of alternative dispute resolution would not be appropriate.”).
612

Id. at § 654(a).

613

DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT 5 (2011),
available at http://www fjc.gov/public/pdf nsf/lookup/adr2011.pdf/$file/adr2011.pdf.

614

Id. at 7.

615

Id. But see id. at 6 (not every district court considers the settlement conference a form of ADR, and so not every
court included its usage in its ADR provisions).

616

STIENSTRA, at 9.

617

Id. at 15.

618

U.S. District Ct., N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 3. Note that private ADR proceedings are not subject to enforcement,
immunity, or other provisions of the local ADR rules. N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 3-4(b).
619

U.S. District Ct., N.D. Cal., Statistics: ADR Referrals of All Civil Cases by Calendar Year Filed (2011),
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/statistics.
620

Id.
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Programs to Assist Small Copyright Litigants

Recognizing the importance and value of legal advice, some organizations provide support to
unrepresented federal court litigants in the form of pro se education and pro bono representation.
Examples of such organizations that assist copyright litigants that were identified in the small
claims comments and hearings include California Lawyers for the Arts (“CLA”) in several
California locations, the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc. (“VLA”) in New York City, and
the Federal Legal Assistance Self Help Center at the San Jose Courthouse (“FLASH”).
CLA is an organization dedicated to serving the creative communities in San Francisco,
Sacramento, and Los Angeles that offers both a lawyer referral service and ADR services to
parties with copyright conflicts. CLA’s lawyer referral service allows a litigant to have a thirtyminute consultation with an attorney at a nominal cost.621 After the consultation, CLA provides
a referral to a paid attorney; or if the party qualifies, CLA will identify an attorney offering pro
bono services or an attorney participating in CLA’s modest means program.622 The modest
means program connects qualifying clients with smaller or boutique firms operating on pricing
tiers that are lower than those of standard copyright attorneys. Some attorneys may be willing to
give “behind the scenes” advice to clients who are proceeding pro se.
CLA also encourages the nonjudicial resolution of disputes through mediation, conciliation, or
arbitration. CLA’s ADR services (Arts Arbitration and Mediation Services, or AAMS) can be
made available in person or by phone, with a $25 case opening fee and further sliding-scale fees
based on the income of the individual or business ranging from $25 to $1,500.623
VLA, based in New York City, “provides pro bono legal representation to low-income artists and
nonprofit arts and cultural organizations as well as a range of other services (legal counseling,
educational programs, advocacy, and ADR services) to the entire arts community, and assists in
the training of lawyers.”624 From the time it was established in 1969, VLA has helped more than
265,000 low-income artists and nonprofit organizations.625
To access VLA’s pro bono placement service, a client first interviews with a VLA staff
attorney.626 Over 75% of cases are resolved through advice provided at this initial meeting, and
the remainder of the matters are identified in a bimonthly email list to potential volunteer
attorneys at law firms or elsewhere.627 Most cases are placed within six to twelve weeks.628
621

CLA, Certified Lawyer Referral Service, http://www.calawyersforthearts.org/Lawyer_Referral (the
administrative fee is $35 or $20 for CLA members).

622

Alma Robinson, Small Copyright Claimants Need Access to Justice (Feb. 20, 2013 1:06 PM), http://www.calawy
ersforthearts.org/california_arts_blog?mode=PostView&bmi=1213811.
623

CLA, A.A.M.S. Fees and Services, http://www.calawyersforthearts.org/AAMS_Fees (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).

624

VLA Third Notice Comments at 1.

625

Id.

626

VLA, Pro Bono Legal Services, http://www.vlany.org/legalservices/probono.php.

627

Id.

628

Id.
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VLA also operates the Art Law Line, where attorneys and other volunteers take over 150 calls
daily seeking legal advice.629
FLASH is a service of the San Jose division of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California that offers legal research and litigation guidance to qualified parties in civil
cases, including copyright cases.630 To receive assistance from FLASH, a party must be
proceeding pro se, but the service is free for those who qualify.631 FLASH does not represent
litigants but instead “provide[s] information about legal rights and responsibilities and about the
court procedures applicable to [the] civil case, limited-scope legal advice, help preparing simple
pleadings, and referrals to legal, social, and government services.”632 FLASH also makes
referrals to a panel consisting of experienced attorneys from large law firms who provide pro
bono legal research and litigation guidance, but not in-court representation, to pro se litigants.633
Statistics maintained by FLASH indicate that parties referred to the pro bono assistance program
have a success rate of 83%, as compared to the 39% rate of success for other pro se litigants.634
Intellectual property claims are the third most frequent type of claim handled by FLASH’s
attorneys.635
G.

International Models

A number of countries have specialized court procedures or government-sponsored ADR
programs to address copyright matters. While their usefulness as models may be limited by the
varying legal regimes and cultures that they serve, these international examples offer interesting
points of comparison.
1.

United Kingdom

In 1990, the UK established the Patents County Court (“PCC”) to serve the interests of small and
medium-sized enterprises by “providing an affordable forum for intellectual property litigation,”
including copyright, trademark, and patent cases.636 Over time, however, it became apparent that

629

Id.

630

N.D. Cal., FLASH, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/helpcentersj (“FLASH does not provide help with:
bankruptcy, habeas corpus, prisoner, appeals, state court, and/or criminal questions, or any question concerning a
case not pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California—San Jose division.”).
631

Id.

632

Id.

633

FLASH Third Notice Comments at 2, n.6.

634

Id. at 2 (note that this statistic is not limited to copyright cases).

635

Id. at 1.

636

JUDICIARY OF ENG. AND WALES INTELLECTUAL PROP. COURT USERS’ COMM., WORKING GROUP’S FINAL REPORT
ON PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT 6 (2009), available at

http://new.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/24E06162-8F8F-4117-92D23446CD75ECA1/0/report_wgf_reform_of_county_court.pdf.
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UK intellectual property holders continued to face significant cost barriers to enforcing their
rights, even in the PCC.637
In 2009 and 2011, successive reports by Lord Justice Rupert Jackson (“Jackson Report”) 638 and
Professor Ian Hargreaves (“Hargreaves Report”)639 focused attention on the problems facing UK
authors, further confirming that certain intellectual property claims are not pursued in the UK
due to prohibitively high litigation costs. The Jackson Report observed that because intellectual
property rights played a crucial role in the UK economy, it was critical for owners of such rights
to be able to “assert or defend them in the courts.”640 The Hargreaves Report found that
stakeholders “identified enforcement as the most serious weakness in the UK’s IP framework” 641
and noted Nokia’s submission that “even a ₤2,000 claim for copyright infringement … can run
up costs of ₤20-₤30k … which dissuades people from enforcing IP at low levels.”642 The two
reports agreed that small and medium enterprises lack a cost-effective legal environment for
resolving intellectual property disputes,643 and advocated for a small claims track for intellectual
property disputes within the PCC.644
The UK government concurred with many of the studies’ points regarding small intellectual
property claims, with the further observation that the lack of a cost-effective environment to
resolve such disputes affects parties’ decisions to settle or engage in ADR.645 New rules were
thus adopted in October 2012 to create a small claims track of the PCC.
The PCC small claims track has jurisdiction over claims concerning copyright, trademark,
passing off, and unregistered design rights646 in which the value of the claim does not exceed
₤10,000 (or about $15,000 U.S.).647 In addition to the jurisdictional monetary limit, the PCC
637

Id.

638

RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT
(2009), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A9356F09672EB6A/0/jacksonfinalreport140110.pdf (“Jackson Report”).

639

IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH (2011),
available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf (“Hargreaves Report”).

640

Jackson Report, at xx.

641

Hargreaves Report, at 67.

642

Id. at 83.

643

Jackson Report, at xx; Hargreaves Report, at 83.

644

Jackson Report, at xx; Hargreaves Report, at 85. Despite its name, the Patents County Court does not hear patent
cases in its small claims track, though it does on its multitrack.
645

HM GOV’T, THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE HARGREAVES REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GROWTH 12 (2011) (“access to the courts at a proportionate cost should act as an incentive to settle or arbitrate as
well as being a means of resolving less tractable but straightforward disputes”), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresponse-full.pdf.
646

See CPR 63.28.

647

Id. 63.27(1)(b). The original limit was ₤5,000, which increased to ₤10,000 with a proposed general increase in
2013. THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR EVIDENCE ON INTRODUCING A
SMALL CLAIMS TRACK INTO THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT 4 (2012), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-enforce-c4e-pcc-response.pdf (“IPO Response”). The limit could increase to
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does not assign cases to the small claims track if the case involves complex questions of fact,
law, or evidence.648 Within the realm of copyright cases, the UK Intellectual Property Office
suggested that copyright disputes may be best suited to the small claims track when they involve
instances of direct copying.649 If a matter is factually complex, requires significant oral
evidence, or the law or evidence is complicated, the case will not be allocated to the small claims
track but can still be heard by the PCC.650
To initiate a claim in the PCC small claims track, a plaintiff may submit a complaint with a
request that the case be allocated to that track.651 The court then sends the defendant
standardized forms and instructions on how to respond.652 If a defendant objects to using the
small claims track, the judge looks to the parties’ submissions to determine whether the case
should in fact be tried in that track regardless of the defendant’s wishes.653 If the plaintiff did not
request the small claims track, but the defendant made the request, the judge also has the
discretion to send it there.654 Without a request from either party, the case is automatically
assigned to a different track.655
Cases assigned to the PCC small claims track can proceed based on written evidence only,
without any live hearings.656 Though attorneys are permitted, the track is designed to keep costs
low by allowing a party to proceed pro se.657 The standard rules for discovery (or “disclosure
and inspection”) do not apply to the small claims track.658 But the small claims judge has the
power to issue “special directions” to parties, which may include provisions for discovery.659 If
a judge determines that a hearing is required, the hearing is conducted informally.660 Strict rules
₤15,000 after an evaluation of the increase to ₤10,000, equating the monetary limit to the limit for general civil
claims that may be eligible for other small claims procedures. Id. at 15.
648

CPR 26.8(c).

649

THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, INTRODUCING A SMALL CLAIMS TRACK INTO THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT 9
(2012), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-enforce-c4e-pcc.pdf.
650

HM COURTS & TRIBUNALS SERV., GUIDE TO THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT SMALL CLAIMS TRACK 3 (2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/patents-court/patents-court-small-claims.pdf (“PCC
Guide”).
651

Id. at 3.

652

Though the Jackson Report advocated using model pleadings, this recommendation was not adopted. Jackson
Report, at 254 (2009).

653

PCC Guide, at 3.

654

CPR 63.27(3)(b). One reason that the judge makes the ultimate decision on the appropriate track is that there was
a concern that well-funded defendants would “bully” claimants out of small claims and into the multi-track. IPO
Response, at 7.
655

PCC Guide, at 3.

656

CPR 27.10 (there is no hearing if parties agree).

657

CPR Practice Direction 27 ¶ 3.2; see also PCC Guide, at 4.

658

CPR 27.2(1)(b).

659

See id. 27.4(1)(b) (“After allocation the court will … give special directions ….”); id. 27.2(3) (“The court of its
own initiative may order a party to provide further information if it considers it appropriate to do so.”).
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of evidence do not apply; the court may limit cross-examination and the court need not take
evidence on oath.661 In cases where trial is not based on the written evidence alone, it will be
held in the judge’s chambers or sometimes in open court.662
In PCC small claims cases, the court can issue both monetary and final injunctive relief.663
Preliminary injunctions, however, are not available664 because “interim injunctions are often
complex and highly contentious matters which would significantly increase costs for
litigants.”665 The expectation is that the small claims track is sufficiently streamlined to alleviate
the need for preliminary relief.666
In the UK, the usual rule is that the unsuccessful party pays the legal costs – including the
attorneys’ fees – of the successful party.667 This presumption, however, is applied very
restrictively in the PCC small claims context.668 The small claims court may award the
successful party limited costs, for fixed sums, in relation to issuing the claim, court fees, and the
expenses related to attending the hearing.669 Reimbursement for legal fees is limited to cases
where a party is seeking an injunction or specific performance,670 and even then may not exceed
₤260 (about $411 U.S.).671
Appeals from a PCC decision in the small claims track can be lodged only with permission from
the judge who decided the case or a circuit judge sitting in the PCC.672 When an appeal is
permitted, the case proceeds first to the sitting circuit judge, then to the Court of Appeal, where it
is reviewed for errors of law or construction, or on points as to the application of the law to the
facts as found by the trial judge.673

660

Id. 27.8(2).

661

Id. 27.8.

662

PCC Guide, at 6.

663

CPR 27.3 (“The court may grant any final remedy in relation to a small claim which it could grant if the
proceedings were on the fast track or the multi-track.”).
664

Id. 63.27(4); PCC Guide, at 2.

665

THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, INTRODUCING A SMALL CLAIMS TRACK INTO THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT 10
(2012), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-enforce-c4e-pcc.pdf.
666

See id. at 10; see also IPO Response, at 19.

667

See PCC Guide, at 4.

668

CPR 27.14 (except under certain circumstances “the court may not order a party to pay a sum to another party in
respect of that other party’s costs, fees and expenses, including those relating to an appeal ….”).
669

See id.; PCC Guide, at 4.

670

CPR 27.14(2)(b).

671

Id. 27 ¶ 7.2.

672

PCC Guide, at 7.

673

PCC Guide, at 7; Email from Philip Horswill, Copyright and Enforcement Directorate, Intellectual Property
Office (U.K.), to John Riley (Sept. 23, 2013) (email on file with U.S. Copyright Office).
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Scotland

Although Scotland is part of the UK and UK substantive intellectual property law governs,
Scotland represents a separate jurisdiction with its own courts, court rules, procedures, and
judges. Since the same substantive laws apply, parties can choose to bring suit in England or
Scotland. Scottish intellectual property cases are heard in the Outer House of the Court of
Session and appealed to the Inner House of the Court of Session. The Supreme Court of the UK
hears appeals from the Inner House.674
Scottish procedural rules governing intellectual property cases underwent a major overhaul in
2012.675 Although the revisions did not create a small copyright claims track as in the UK PCC,
significant changes were made to facilitate the resolution of smaller intellectual property claims
in a more efficient fashion. These included enhanced judicial discretion to manage cases and
proceed quickly to a final hearing without unnecessary preliminary procedures.676 Judges may
require disclosure of key pleadings and facts and restrict counterclaims,677 and witness
statements and evidentiary submissions may be limited to written documents.678 In addition, an
overarching provision allows the judge to make any order he or she deems fit to promote a
speedy determination.679 The 2012 revisions also permit the judge to impose procedural and
monetary sanctions on disobedient parties.680
3.

Canada

Canada’s court system provides low-cost and simplified options for resolving intellectual
property disputes. These include summary proceedings for copyright and moral right
infringement actions.681 The Canadian Copyright Act explicitly states that “in the case of an
application, [the proceeding will] be heard and determined without delay and in a summary
way.”682 This opens the door for rights holders to take advantage of Canadian court rules
governing simplified proceedings with less drawn-out discovery. The main benefit of these
proceedings is that evidence is filed by affidavit.683 Affidavits are subject to cross674

Court of Session Act, 1998, § 40 (Scot.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/36/contents.

675

Act of Sederunt (Rules of Court of Session Amendment No. 5) (Miscellaneous) 2012 (Scot.), available at
http://origin-www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2012/275/pdfs/ssi_20120275_en.pdf.
676

Rules of the Court of Session 1994, § 55.2E(2)(b)(ix) (Scot.), available at
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/equality/chap55-causes-relating-to-intellectualproperty.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
677

Id. § 55.2E(2)(b) & § 55.2D(5)-(7) (Scot.).

678

Id. § 55.3(2)(e) & (g) (Scot.).

679

Id. § 55.2E(2)(e) (Scot.).

680

Id. § 55.5B (Scot.).

681

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (Can.), § 34(4)(a), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-42.pdf.

682

Id. § 34(4).

683

Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106 (Can.) §§ 306-307, available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-98106.pdf.
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examination,684 but live testimony generally is only authorized in special circumstances as
determined by the court.685
4.

Mexico

In Mexico, the National Institute for Copyrights (Instituto National del Derecho de Autor or
“INDAUTOR”) handles registration of copyrights and related rights in Mexico, and has the
administrative authority to resolve certain violations of copyright law. For example, the agency
can impose fines on violations of the moral rights of paternity and integrity, or sanction an
organization purporting to be a collecting society without the proper registration.686
INDAUTOR engages in both conciliation687 and arbitration proceedings. First, INDAUTOR
provides conciliation procedures as an alternative to judicial actions.688 Conciliation proceedings
take place at the request of either party and are conducted by the agency’s Legal Department of
Consultations.689
To initiate the conciliation proceeding, the complainant must file a written complaint690 that
includes a brief account of the cause of action.691 The fee for submitting a complaint is 363
Mexican pesos (about $28 U.S.). No evidence is required at this early stage, but INDAUTOR
recommends that it nonetheless be included with the complaint because there is no discovery
phase in the proceeding.692 INDAUTOR notifies the adverse party in person or by certified mail
of the complaint within ten days of its receipt, and the respondent has ten days to respond,
including in person at a hearing. INDAUTOR also schedules a confidential hearing, which must
be held within twenty days from when the complaint was filed. The hearing will be held even if

684

Id. § 308.

685

Id. § 316.

686

Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [LFDA] [Federal Law on Copyright], as amended, arts. 229-230, Diario
Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 27 de Enero de 2012 (Mex.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=254993 (“Mexico Federal Copyright Law”).
687

Conciliation is a method of alternative dispute resolution similar to mediation, but where the conciliator “plays a
relatively direct role in the actual resolution of a dispute and even advises the parties on certain solutions by making
proposals for settlement.” Alessandra Sgubini, Mara Prieditis, & Andrea Marighetto, Arbitration, Mediation and
Conciliation: differences and similarities from an International and Italian business perspective, MEDIATE.COM
(Aug. 2004) http://www mediate.com/articles/sgubinia2.cfm.
688

Mexico Federal Copyright Law, art. 217.

689

INDAUTOR, Legal Department Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.indautor.gob mx/ingles/preguntas/preguntas_juridica html.
690

Mexico Federal Copyright Law, art. 218(I).

691

Reglamento de la Ley Federal Del Derecho de Autor [Regulations under the Federal Copyright Law], as
amended, art. 139(IV), Diario Oficial del la Federacion, 22 de Mayo de 1998, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=255053 (“Mexico Copyright Regulations”).
692

INDAUTOR, Legal Department Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.indautor.gob mx/ingles/preguntas/preguntas_juridica html.
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the adverse party does not respond to the agency’s notification.693 If the parties do not attend the
hearing, they are subject to a fine.694
During the hearing, INDAUTOR mediates between the parties, but cannot make any
determination on the substantive issues of the case.695 If an agreement is reached, it is
considered binding and enforceable.696 If the parties do not reach an agreement, they are
encouraged to submit to arbitration proceedings.697
INDAUTOR receives several hundred conciliation requests a year. In 2012, 759 requests were
filed. One hundred twenty-three of the proceedings filed that year reached a settlement.698 From
2003 to 2008, the agency was successful in resolving between 25% and 41% of requests. The
percentage of resolved conciliations has dropped in recent years and currently ranges from 15%
to 16%.699
Additionally, INDAUTOR provides arbitration services when the parties have previously agreed
to arbitration through a contractual provision or agree after a dispute has arisen.700 The
proceeding is overseen by a board of three arbitrators who are selected from a list published each
year by INDAUTOR. The parties each pick one arbitrator from the list and the selected
arbitrators then decide on a third to act as chairman.701 The maximum arbitration proceeding
runs sixty days from when the parties choose their arbitrators,702 but the parties can choose to
extend the period.703 Evidence can be submitted and witnesses called.704 The proceeding ends
when either the board declares an award or the parties come to an agreement before the award
issues.705 The award is final, not appealable, binding, and enforceable.706 Arbitration expenses
are borne by both parties according to rates issued each year by INDAUTOR.707

693

Mexico Copyright Regulations, art. 140.

694

Mexico Federal Copyright Law, art. 218(III).

695

Id. 218(V).

696

Id. art. 218(IV).

697

Id. art. 218(VI).

698

INDAUTOR, Conciliation Statistics (2013),
http://www.indautor.gob mx/documentos_oficial/Graficasavenencias.pdf.
699

Id.

700

Mexico Federal Copyright Law, art. 220.

701

Id. art. 222.

702

Id. art. 224.

703

Mexico Copyright Regulations, art. 147.

704

Id. arts. 149, 153.

705

Mexico Federal Copyright Law, art. 225.

706

Id. art. 226.

707

Id. art. 228.
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Korea

Korea makes use of a governmental entity, the Korea Copyright Commission (“KCC”), to help
resolve copyright disputes through conciliation, mediation, and arbitration.708 The KCC
addresses disputes arising from rights protected under Korea’s Copyright Act, including disputes
over moral rights,709 economic rights,710 neighboring rights,711 compensation,712 and database
producers’ rights.713
Proceedings are initiated when an individual submits an application to the KCC, at which point a
conciliation division is designated and provided with the application.714 The designated division
prepares for a hearing (which must be held within three to four months) by reviewing the
application and the submitted documents and contacting the parties beforehand to discuss the
dispute.715 During the hearing, the parties can make written or oral statements and submit
additional evidence through witness testimony, documents, or expert opinions.716 The
proceedings are closed, and the participants’ statements cannot be quoted in litigation or
arbitration.717
The KCC conciliation proceeding is a relatively unstructured process where a neutral person
facilitates communication and assists in resolving disputes, and if a settlement is reached, it is
given the same weight as a court ruling.718
The KCC’s conciliation services have become more popular over the years. The most recent
conciliation statistics are from 2011, when ninety-seven applications were filed and twenty-eight
cases were resolved, representing a 28.9% settlement rate. But, while applications have risen

708

Copyright Act of 1957, Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, art. 112, amended by Act No. 9625, Apr. 22, 2009, available
at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=190144; Korea Copyright Comm’n, Service,
http://eng.copyright.or kr/ (follow “Service” hyperlink, then follow “Arbitration” hyperlink) (“Korea Copyright
Act”).
709

Id. arts. 11-13.

710

Id. arts. 16-22.

711

Id. arts. 66-74, 78-81, 84-85.

712

Id. arts. 75, 76, 76-2, 82, 83, 83-2

713

Id. art. 93.

714

Enforcement Decree of the Copyright Act, Presidential Decree No. 1482, Apr. 22, 1959, arts. 61(1) & (3) (S.
Kor.), amended by Presidential Decree No. 23928, July 2, 2012, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=281752.
715

MINISTRY OF CULTURE, SPORTS AND TOURISM AND KOREA COPYRIGHT COMM’N, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT ON
COPYRIGHT IN KOREA 73 (2010).
716

Id.

717

Korea Copyright Act, arts. 115-116.

718

Id. art. 117.
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over the past few years, the actual number of conciliation-aided settlements has remained
roughly the same.719
In addition to its conciliation service, the KCC offers free mediation services for copyrightrelated disputes. A single mediator is assigned after a party submits an application to the
commission.720 Proceedings may be suspended if the mediator determines that a resolution is
impossible or a conciliation application is submitted for the same dispute.721 Assuming an
agreement is reached, the letter of mediation has the same effect as a civil settlement, and failure
to comply must be addressed through litigation.722
Finally, the KCC provides arbitration services for copyright-related disputes. Disputes are
resolved by a group of one to three arbitrators, one of whom must be a specialist in copyright and
technology.723 The resolution has the same legal weight as a final judgment.724

719

Email from Soo Hyun Myung, Senior Deputy Director in Copyright Policy Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports
and Tourism, to Catherine Rowland (June 18, 2013) (email on file with U.S. Copyright Office) (containing
PowerPoint presentation by the Korea Copyright Comm’n, Conciliation of Copyright Disputes). In 2011, ninetyseven applications were submitted, and twenty-eight settlements reached. In 2010, sixty-two applications were
submitted, and twenty-three resolved. In 2009, fifty-five applications were submitted in 2009 and twenty-nine
resolved.
720

Korea Copyright Act, art. 113-2(1).

721

Id. art. 113-2(3)-(4).

722

MINISTRY OF CULTURE, SPORTS AND TOURISM AND KOREA COPYRIGHT COMM’N, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT ON
COPYRIGHT IN KOREA 72 (2010).
723

Korea Copyright Comm’n, Service, http://eng.copyright.or.kr/ (follow “Service” hyperlink, then follow
“Arbitration” hyperlink).
724

Id.
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KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of relevant constitutional and institutional considerations, the various models and
approaches reviewed by the Office, and the extensive and useful comments of those who shared
their views and experiences in the course of this study, the Office makes the following findings
and recommendations.
A.

Forum
1.

Federal Courts

In theory, the existing federal court system might be able to accommodate a streamlined process
for the resolution of small copyright claims. But while some commenting parties suggested
modification of federal court procedures to accommodate smaller copyright claims,725 most did
not dwell on restructuring Article III courts or processes as promising alternatives. There is no
precedent for either a small claims tier in the federal courts or specialized procedures for
copyright claims. A revamping of the district courts to establish a small claims process for
copyright cases therefore did not appear to be viewed as a particularly realistic option by most.
As one commenter explained it: “There has traditionally been resistance in the federal judiciary
to creating ‘specialized courts.’ While the copyright small claims procedure would not require a
‘specialized court’ within the existing federal system, it would require a specialized process.
Judges and legislators might fairly question why small copyright claims should have access to
such a process, while other small federal claims do not.”726
Interestingly, Congress and the federal judiciary have, by contrast, embraced a degree of special
treatment for patent cases, which are viewed as especially challenging for both courts and
litigants. Although they originate in the various district courts, patent cases are appealed to a
725

Perhaps the most ambitious suggestion for addressing the problem through the existing federal court system was
submitted by Professor David Nimmer of UCLA School of Law on behalf of APA. Professor Nimmer’s proposal
would implement a voluntary procedure where disputes valued at under $80,000 would by heard by a magistrate
judge. The rules of this proposal would require copyright owners and defendants to each make an offer of judgment
at the outset of litigation. If the parties’ offers diverged significantly, additional rounds of offers could take place to
attempt to reach a settlement. If no settlement were reached, the award of attorneys’ fees would depend upon a
combination of which party prevailed and the relationship of the judgment amount to the parties’ offers. APA First
Notice Comments at 4-7. Apart from its complexity, a problem with Professor Nimmer’s proposal is that in some
cases, small copyright owners who “bid” too high could end up paying attorneys’ fees to a defendant who was found
guilty of infringement yet assessed a damages award below the defendant’s offer. In the Office’s view, while wellintentioned, such a system could yield inequitable results.
726

Kernochan Second Notice Comments at 1; see also NPPA, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice
of Inquiry at 1 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“NPPA Second Notice Comments”) (“In a perfect world the NPPA would prefer a
new branch of Article III courts within the federal system . . . That said the NPPA recognizes the inherent political,
financial and practical difficulties in creating such a new Article III court system.”). Indeed, now might not be the
ideal time to burden the federal district court system with additional responsibilities such as implementation of a
small claims track for copyright cases. The judiciary is facing serious funding issues for the matters it already
addresses, leading one court of appeals judge recently to warn that “[t]he federal courts are going to fall apart if
[funding problems] continue[].” Inadequate court resources hurt access to justice, say nation’s top jurists, ABA
NEWS (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://www.abanow.org/2013/08/inadequate-court-resources-hurt-access-tojustice-say-nations-top-jurists/#.UgWXnB0_bkY.twitter.
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specialized court of appeals, the Federal Circuit, a court of national jurisdiction. This, of course,
differs from copyright cases (and most other types of cases, for that matter), which are appealed
to the court of appeals for the circuit encompassing the federal district of origin. In addition,
some district courts, such as the Eastern District of Texas, the Western District of Pennsylvania,
and the Southern District of New York, have adopted specialized rules of procedure for patent
cases. Such processes – which can impose challenging burdens on litigants – are, however,
aimed at improving courts’ efficiency and speed in addressing complex, high-stakes claims,
rather than at the expeditious resolution of low-value claims. Moreover, the acceleration of
patent cases under such rules often comes at the price of frenetic discovery and motion practice,
which can be intimidating and expensive.
To address the problem of small copyright claims through modification of federal court
procedures, it would seem that at least all district courts with a meaningful number of copyright
cases would have to be persuaded to adopt unprecedented, specialized rules for the streamlined
handling of such claims.727 If the treatment of patent cases is any indication, district courts
would vary in their approach – some adopting local rules and many making no adjustment at all
– which would result in no improvement for many litigants and possibly forum shopping by
others. Perhaps most daunting would be persuading courts to adopt such rules solely for
copyright cases, when such claims are but 1% of all matters before them.728
In a related vein, the federal judiciary might attempt to rely more heavily on referrals to
magistrate judges for small claims cases.729 But it is important to keep in mind that parties
cannot be sent to trial before a magistrate judge without their consent, and magistrate judges
follow the same Federal Rules as the district courts.730 Thus, absent a more general overhaul of
existing procedures, the use of magistrate judges does not in itself present an obvious solution. 731
727

See supra note 350 (listing states where most copyright cases are filed).

728

See supra note 28 (providing statistics on copyright claims as a percentage of all federal civil claims). Indeed,
other categories of claims arising under federal law – some of which result in more filings than copyright cases –
might also benefit from a federal small claims court. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DEC. 2012, TABLE C-2, CIVIL CASES COMMENCED,
BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2011
AND 2012, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2012/d
ecember/C02Dec12.pdf (citing some of the more common federal court cases as involving prisoner petitions (54,402
or 20% of the total caseload), civil rights (37,391 or 13.9%), personal injury/product liability (33,851 or
12.6%), contract actions (28,252 or 10.5%), labor laws (18,629 or 6.9%), or social security laws (18,261 or 6.8%)).
729

See, e.g., APA First Notice Comments at 4 (“Consenting parties can have their positions quickly evaluated by a
Magistrate Judge sitting in the appropriate United States District Court in which the case is pending.”); NPPA
Second Notice Comments at 4 (“Properly trained magistrates or staff attorneys could also be used effectively
depending on their existing caseloads.”).
730

See supra Part III.C.4 (discussing magistrate judges generally) and Part IV.B.3 (discussing the Federal
Magistrates Act).
731

Another idea to improve access to federal courts that was raised but only briefly discussed would be to further
empower organizations such as trade associations to litigate groups of smaller claims on behalf of their members.
Because an association can aggregate hundreds or thousands of individual infringement claims, such cases are not
“small” – either in procedural or economic terms – and therefore may be better suited to full-scale litigation in
federal court. For example, the Independent Film & Television Alliance (“IFTA”) urged that associations be
allowed to act as “channeling associations” to pursue claims on behalf of a number of copyright owners. IFTA,
Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 5 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“IFTA Second Notice
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The creation of a general small claims tier within the Article III courts is something that
Congress may wish to consider as a broader and longer term solution to the obstacles faced by
small claimants seeking to vindicate their rights through the federal system. Should the federal
judiciary become interested in a small claims solution for copyright (and perhaps other) cases,
the Office would be pleased to provide Congress with additional suggestions in furtherance of
that goal. In the meantime, the Office recommends focusing on a solution that could be more
readily implemented to address the enforcement challenges faced by small copyright claimants.
2.

State Courts

Another possible approach to provide small copyright claimants greater access to courts would
simply be to amend federal law, which currently restricts jurisdiction in copyright cases to the
federal judiciary,732 to provide state courts with concurrent jurisdiction in copyright disputes of
low economic value. The potential benefit of this approach lies in its apparent simplicity, at least
in certain respects: there would be no need to draft extensive statutory or regulatory language, or
to amend the Federal Rules. Moreover, as described above, state courts already have the
procedural mechanisms in place to handle smaller claims with less formality.

Comments”). The NPPA similarly supported the idea of allowing groups of copyright owners (either alone or
through an association) to bring claims against multiple alleged infringers in one proceeding. NPPA Second Notice
Comments at 13.
The propriety of associational standing in copyright cases owners currently is under review in the federal courts, and
recent cases have yielded mixed results. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has held that “an association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Adver. Com’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (summarizing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). In
the copyright context, associations have tended to limit their claims to injunctive relief, which does not require
individualized proof of damages. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(organization suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for copyright infringement on behalf of individual
members); Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same). But because ownership
of a copyright is an element of an infringement claim under the Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), courts have
diverged on the question of whether an association can seek to enforce its members’ copyrights. Compare Authors
Guild v. Google, 282 F.R.D. at 389, vacated on other grounds and remanded, 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013) (in case
involving mass digitization of copyrighted works, court upheld associational standing on ground that “the
associations’ claims of copyright infringement and requests for injunctive relief will not require the participation of
each individual association member”), with Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 452-54 (in another
case involving mass digitization of copyrighted works, associational standing denied based on standing requirements
of Copyright Act, which indicated to the court that “Congress did not intend for associations to enforce the rights of
their members”).
Separate and apart from an alternative small claims process, Congress may wish to consider amending the Copyright
Act to clarify the nature and scope of copyright claims that associations may bring on behalf of their members.
While such an amendment could be beneficial to many individual copyright owners, however, the Office does not
view the possibility of associational standing as a satisfying answer to the problem of small copyright claims
generally, if for no other reason than that many individual copyright owners do not belong to an association, and
even if they do, the association may lack the resources or will to pursue litigation.
732

28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
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Despite the surface appeal, however, state court systems likely are not the best option for small
copyright claimants. During the Office’s study, only a couple of commenting parties expressed
interest in allowing state courts to hear such claims, and most of that interest was due to concern
that other obstacles to alternative systems may be insurmountable.733 By contrast, a wide range
of stakeholders voiced significant opposition to state court jurisdiction, including the ABA IP
Section, AIPLA, APA, Authors Guild, GAG, Getty Images, Google Inc., NPPA, PACA, SGA,
NSAI and VLA.734
Commenter statements and the Office’s own research highlight several reasons why Congress
may not wish to empower state courts to hear small copyright claims. First and foremost,
perhaps, is that because cases arising under title 17 are the exclusive domain of the federal
courts, state courts – and state small claims courts in particular – lack experience in copyright
law.735 Federal courts have generated a wealth of copyright precedent, but it is sometimes
complex and perhaps not well-suited to cursory review by a judge who is looking at issues for
the first time in a state small claims court setting.736 State court inexperience with federal
733

See ASMP, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 5 (Oct. 16, 2012) (“ASMP Second
Notice Comments”); Atkinson & Atkinson, Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 3; see
also Tr. at 17:11-18 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Victor Perlman, ASMP) (noting that the “primary reasons” for ASMP’s
support of state court jurisdiction is that it would not require “significant congressional involvement and approval
and funding.”).
734

ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 9 (noting lack of state court experience in copyright claims);
AIPLA, Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 2 (Jan. 16, 2012) (“State courts … lack
expertise in adjudicating copyright matters, and state small claims courts have no experience whatsoever.”); Authors
Guild First Notice Comments at 4 (“Avoid delegating these proceedings to inexperienced state courts”); Google
Inc., Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 2-3 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“Google First Notice
Comments”) (noting state court’s inexperience with copyright claims); GAG First Notice Comments at 8 (“State
court judges don’t have extensive knowledge of copyright law or experience with copyright infringement cases.”);
PACA, Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 10 (Jan. 16, 2012) (“PACA First Notice
Comments”) (noting that the “amount of damages in a local small claims court is extremely limited,” the lack of
copyright expertise in state courts, and the concern that decisions would be inconsistent and arbitrary); SGA &
NSAI First Notice Comments at 2 (agreeing that state courts do not have the necessary experience); APA,
Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 7 (Oct. 16, 2012) (“APA Second Notice
Comments”) (“APA does not believe a small infringement claims system should leave the federal court system and
therefore does not believe a state court or a traditional small claims court should be incorporated.”); Getty Images,
Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 6 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“Getty Images Second Notice
Comments”) (“Pursuing small claims through state court is not an adequate solution, in part due to jurisdictional
issues.”); NPPA Second Notice Comments at 15 (“[S]tate courts – especially small claims courts – don’t have the
resources to thoroughly research complex copyright issues. The end result could lead to conflicting decisions on
important copyright issues. A copyright tribunal should have the required expertise and thus be able create
appropriate and consistent caselaw.”); Tr. at 67:15-68:16 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA) (noting the low
ceiling for monetary relief, unavailability of injunctive relief, and lack of expertise in state courts).
735

ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 9 (“As federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright
issues, the state courts have not had the opportunity to develop sufficient expertise to handle these cases.”); Getty
Images Second Notice Comments at 6 (“[S]tate courts do not have historical experience or expertise in copyright
law”).
736

Illustrators’ Partnership, Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 1 (Jan. 17, 2012)
(“Illustrators’ Partnership First Notice Comments”) (“Copyright is a federal law and a small claims court would
have to be administered on a local level. That means a) it’s unlikely that local judges would have the expertise to
properly administer the complexities of copyright law; and b) this would inevitably lead to hundreds or thousands of
contradictory rulings, all constituting different interpretations of the same federal law.”); IFTA, Comments
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copyright principles thus weighs heavily against the possibility of expanding copyright
jurisdiction to state courts.737
Second, state small claims systems vary significantly in both the monetary limits and subject
matter of the claims that they adjudicate. The range of monetary limits for claims that can be
heard in state small claim systems extends from $2,500 to $25,000; thus, depending upon the
size of the claim, copyright owners in some states would be denied the ability to take part in a
streamlined state process while similarly situated copyrighted owners in other states would be
able to move forward. As noted by one hearing participant, state small claims limits can be
“very, very low” and, in fact “lower than … most of the proposals being made [by commenters]
with respect to what the [proposed alternative] copyright tribunal threshold would be.”738
Additionally, some states restrict the types of claims that can be heard in small claims court –
limiting them to such matters as breach of contract, unpaid debts, and motor vehicle accident
disputes – and exclude more complicated matters. It would be up to the states to determine
whether small copyright claims qualified for small claims treatment. As a result, many copyright
owners who theoretically might avail themselves of a state small claims system could find
themselves in the same position that they are in now because they would be forced into a more
costly court of general jurisdiction.
Additionally, state small claims systems differ enormously in their procedural rules and the relief
they offer. While some go so far as to exclude attorneys739 – who might be helpful or even
necessary for some copyright plaintiffs – others incorporate jury trials, either at the small claims
level or on appeal.740 Equitable relief tends to be limited but is far from uniform across small
claims systems.741 The fact that state small claims courts are inconsistent in their procedures and
available relief weighs strongly against consigning them the responsibility to adjudicate
substantive federal rights, which should be worthy of similar treatment no matter where they are
decided.
While for these reasons state small claims systems do not appear to offer a sensible solution, a
question arises as to whether those seeking to pursue such claims might benefit if they could be
heard by state courts of general jurisdiction. No commenting party appeared to endorse such an
Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 4 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“IFTA First Notice Comments”) (“copyright
law is more complex than the types of cases on the docket of small claims courts”); New Media Rights First Notice
Comments at 18 (noting that copyright law is “notoriously complex” and that “[w]hile the state small claims courts
are well experienced in dealing with small disputes, they usually deal with contract and tort law which have clearer
established doctrines and are easier to simplify into matters of equity.”).
737

It should be noted, however, that federal expertise in copyright law does not extend to every district. See LEX
MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/ (last visited May 30, 2013) (some federal districts hear very few copyright cases
a year; for example, from 2000 to 2012, the Eastern District of Oklahoma averaged one copyright case a year, the
District of Wyoming averaged 1.2 cases, and the District of Vermont averaged 2.8 cases).
738

Tr. at 67:20-23 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA).

739

See Appendix D, at col. Attorney Representation.

740

See id. at col. Jury Trials.

741

See id. at col. Equitable Relief.
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approach, likely because of such courts’ perceived lack of expertise with copyright matters as
well as the expense of litigating in state courts of plenary jurisdiction.742 General state court
systems share many of the disadvantages of the federal court system. Litigants are required to
engage in sometimes lengthy discovery, motion practice, and a full trial on the merits – the same
elements that render federal court litigation long and costly. Thus, even apart from the lack of
state judicial experience with federal copyright matters, merely moving small copyright claims
from the federal system to state courts of general jurisdiction may not be very helpful to small
claimants.
3.

Administrative Tribunal

Because, at least under current conditions, there appears to be no clear path by which Congress
could reliably introduce a copyright small claims process into the existing federal or state court
systems, the Copyright Office proposes that Congress consider instead the creation of a
specialized administrative entity for this purpose. Many of the comments and suggestions
offered in the course of this small claims proceeding pointed – either implicitly or explicitly – to
such an alternative process and the possibility of locating it in the Copyright Office. The
Office’s observations and recommendations concerning such an administrative approach are
reviewed below.
B.

Nature of Tribunal
1.

Voluntary Versus Mandatory

While commenting parties expressed strong opinions concerning the type of tribunal they would
find most useful, ultimately the range of options is constrained by what is legally supportable.
For the reasons set forth above, constitutional considerations suggest that an alternative system to
determine small copyright claims should be voluntary, rather than mandatory, in nature. A
voluntary alternative will not impinge upon the continuing availability and authority of federal
district courts to decide copyright cases. And, because neither claimants nor respondents would
be required to participate in the small claims process – they could still proceed in federal court if
they chose – concerns about Article III would be diminished743 and the Seventh Amendment
would be honored.744

742

See, e.g., NWU First Notice Comments at 13 (noting that standard state court proceeding is “much more
expensive”).
743

As noted above, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of non-Article III courts has
shifted over time and undoubtedly will continue to evolve. See supra Part IV.B. A bankruptcy case currently
pending before the Court, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert
granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. Jun. 24, 2013) (No. 12-1200), which concerns litigants’ ability to consent to a nonArticle III forum, could impact Congress’s analysis of a voluntary alternative tribunal such as the one proposed here.
744

As discussed above, it is clear that litigants can waive both their personal right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment and to adjudication of a claim by an Article III court. See supra Part IV.A. At the same time,
administrative tribunals must be appropriately limited in their jurisdiction and functions to avoid structural
separation of powers issues under Article III, which are not personal in nature and cannot be waived. See supra Part
IV.B.
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Of course, a voluntary system carries its own set of challenges. By what mechanism would
parties consent (or decline to consent)? Would the system be able to accommodate default
judgments? And perhaps most important, what incentives would there be for responding parties
to participate, especially when they may believe that the odds of being pursued in district court
are low?
With respect to consent, the Office believes that Congress may wish to weigh the benefits and
drawbacks of both an opt-out and opt-in model of participation.745 Under an opt-out model, a
claimant would be required to serve the respondent as provided under Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules – that is, in the same manner as is prescribed for federal court – unless the respondent
agreed to a waiver of formal service, as is also permitted under that rule.746 Notice provided at
the time of service would advise the respondent of the nature of the action and claim and the
consequences of failing to opt out of the proceeding. A properly served respondent would have
sixty days to opt out of the small claims procedure by providing written notification to the small
claims tribunal. If the respondent did not opt out, he or she would be considered to have
consented to participate, and thus be bound by the result.
By contrast, the opt-in model would not require formal service of process but would require an
affirmative written response from the respondent that the respondent agreed to participate. Only
respondents who provided such notice after receiving information about the proceeding and
claim against them would be considered to have consented.
The opt-out model offers the significant advantage that parties could pursue claims against
uncooperative respondents. In the comments and at the hearings, copyright owners expressed
considerable frustration that their cease and desist notifications to infringers often were
ignored.747 Such experiences suggest that notification of a small claims proceeding might be
similarly disregarded. An opt-out system would address this concern, at least with respect to
infringers who could be located and served.748 Moreover, an opt-out system would permit
aggrieved parties to seek default determinations against nonresponsive parties based upon the
745

Of course, as suggested above, Congress may wish to keep an eye on the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency
case currently pending before the Supreme Court, as the Court’s opinion may provide additional direction
concerning the parameters of constitutionally valid consent to proceed before a non-Article III tribunal. See supra
Part IV.B.4.
746

Tr. at 204:13-206:01 (Nov, 26, 2012) (Carolyn Wright, Law Offices of Carolyn E. Wright) (attorney who
represents smaller photographer clients discussed use of Rule 4 and voiced a preference for a similar procedure in a
small claims court).
747

Tr. at 143:24-144:02 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Randy Taylor, CDL) (“The vast majority of the infringers ignore the
demand letters that are sent by the attorneys”); Tr. at 296:19-297:05 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU)
(“A common experience for us at the National Writers Union in working with our members who have grievances is
that the infringer won’t even talk to the victim, won’t respond to attempts to negotiate or discuss the infringement.
And they can do that now because they are confident that the infringer is impotent to sue because they aren’t rich
enough to sue. So they can with some confidence just literally ignore them.”); Tr. at 300:13-17 (Nov. 26, 2012)
(Michael Grecco, APA) (“I think the reality is no one takes you seriously until you file [a lawsuit]. … Every
defendant I know in my own copyright cases are like ‘Whatever.’”).
748

Tr. at 360:25-361:07 (Nov. 16, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA) (“[I]f the goal were to be to develop a body of
default judgments for this tribunal . . . you would have to make it a mandatory process, but allow for an opt-out”).
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submission of appropriate proof of infringement and damages.749 Because the claimant in a
default case would be required to file the default determination with a district court in order to
enforce it, the defaulting party would have an opportunity to set aside the default judgment
before an Article III judge upon a showing of excusable neglect.
From a due process perspective, the opt-out model may be somewhat more ambitious than an
opt-in model because consent would be premised not on a written agreement or affirmative
conduct, but instead on the failure to respond to a properly served notice (though a respondent
could subsequently demonstrate consent by participating in the proceeding). In a district court
action, however, a party served in accordance with Federal Rule 4 can be held accountable and
subject to a default judgment if he or she fails to respond.750 Likewise, a party sued in state court
on a claim that is also cognizable in federal court has a limited time to seek removal of the case
to the federal forum; if the party fails to file for removal in a timely fashion, he or she forfeits the
right to litigate in federal court.751 Significantly, as noted, the approach proposed by the Office
would provide a means to have the default determination reviewed and potentially set aside by
an Article III judge, thus providing an additional safeguard for defaulting respondents.
By contrast, an opt-in model, while perhaps more appealing as a means to obtain consent, would
fail to capture infringers who simply choose to ignore a claim of infringement. In some cases,
this would be at the recipient’s peril; a party who received notice of a proceeding and failed to
respond would be taking the risk that the claimant would subsequently pursue the action in
federal district court. The question is whether that risk would incentivize the named respondent
to participate in the process. While the fact that the claimant took the step of filing with the
small claims tribunal would presumably demonstrate some level of commitment on the
claimant’s part, undoubtedly in some cases this would not be enough to trigger an opt-in. On the
other hand, for more risk-averse parties who would be disinclined simply to ignore a plausible
claim of infringement, resolution of the matter through a small claims process might seem
considerably more attractive than the possibility of a federal court action. As discussed below,
however, the relative appeal of the small claims option probably would depend largely on how
the respondent viewed his or her damages exposure, and the benefits of a streamlined
adjudicative process, as compared to what might be expected in federal court.
2.

Decisionmakers

Throughout the Office’s review, commenting parties have emphasized the importance of
copyright expertise to an alternative small copyright claims system. Almost universally,
commenters and hearing participants voiced a preference for a tribunal or other system

749

FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b).

750

FED. R. CIV. P. 55.

751

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after
the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for
relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the
defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant,
whichever period is shorter.”).
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administered by lawyers or judges who were knowledgeable about copyright law.752 Copyright
law is perceived by some to be “amazingly complex”753 and “complicated”754; one hearing
participant observed that the requirement of copyright expertise was “critical” because copyright
“issues … can quickly get beyond the everyday knowledge of even the plaintiff to know what
rights they may or may not have.”755 The need for knowledgeable decisionmakers presumably
would be accentuated in a streamlined proceeding, which would not typically involve extensive
legal research or briefing by the parties. Moreover, the participants in such a proceeding –
particularly if acting pro se – might need guidance in focusing their claims and defenses, making
the adjudicators’ knowledge of applicable law that much more important.756
In light of this, the Office recommends that any alternative small claims system avail itself of
experienced copyright lawyers. The Office proposes that it be administered by a panel of three
attorneys, two of whom would be experienced in copyright infringement matters as attorneys or
adjudicators. In addition, these two panel members would have between them handled matters
involving both enforcement and permissible uses, and counseled clients in protecting their rights
as well as in defending against allegations of copyright infringement. Such qualifications could
help ensure a balanced system sensitive to both sides of infringement claims. In the Office’s
view, the panel also would benefit from an attorney with meaningful experience in mediation or
other forms of ADR.757 A panel that combined both copyright and ADR expertise should be able
752

ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 2 (“Parties could mutually elect or the Copyright Office may assign
an adjudicator from a roster of experts in copyright law, one who is knowledgeable about the types of works in
question.”); AVA, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 4 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“The
tribunal should be composed of individuals who are knowledgeable in this highly specialized area of the law and
also have familiarity of the industry from which the claim results.”); Getty Images Second Notice Comments at 3
(“the adjudicators could be administrative law judges or attorneys with specialized training and/or experience in
copyright law”); IFTA Second Notice Comments at 3 (the judges should be a “panel of experts in copyright law”);
NPPA Second Notice Comments at 4 (“The adjudicators should be attorneys well-versed in copyright law.”);
ASMP, Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Apr. 10, 2012) (“ASMP Third Notice
Comments”) (any adjudicator is “ideally… knowledgeable about copyright”); VLA Third Notice Comments at 2
(“VLA envisions regional administrative panels of attorneys with copyright expertise… administered by the
Copyright Office.”); Tr. at 25:19-26:08 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU).
753

Tr. at 51:10 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Jay Rosenthal, NMPA) (referring to music copyright issues)

754

Tr. at 97:08-11 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Michael Traynor, Cobalt LLP) (referring to fair use); see also 4 WEST’S FED.
ADMIN. PRAC. § 4001 (“Current United States copyright law is quite complex, and the general practitioner has in
essence two choices when confronted with all but the most basic and straight forward of copyright problems. He
can seek help from competent copyright counsel at the outset, or he can plan to devote a substantial number of hours
to reading through the 1976 Act, relevant portions of its legislative history, and cases interpreting the statutory
provisions so that an understanding of the various sections of the Act and their interrelation is obtained. Any lesser
effort exposes the practitioner to a minefield of hidden problems, and potentially exposes the client either to a loss of
rights or to liability.”).
755

Tr. at 24:15-21 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Timothy Cohan, Peermusic).

756

Tr. at 145:19-146:05 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Alicia Calzada, NPPA) (“If we have pro se plaintiffs, or maybe even pro
se defendants, and there are these complicated questions about fair use and other issues, you really need a panel –
one of the roles of attorneys is to educate the judges on the law. And if we don’t have attorneys educating judges on
the law, I think [the judges] need to be well versed [in copyright law].”).
757

This approach is similar to the CRB, which requires the separate judges to have experience in copyright law,
economics, or adjudications, arbitrations, or court trials. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a). Similarly, panelists in UDRP
proceedings usually have lengthy experience in intellectual property and related areas, rendering their somewhat
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to undertake a holistic analysis of infringement claims with an eye toward the resourceful
resolution of disputes.
Because the adjudicators in any such system would have significant responsibilities in
administering U.S. copyright law, the Office recommends that they be appointed and supervised
by a principal officer of the United States in a manner similar to the CRJs (following the changes
implemented by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Intercollegiate Broadcasting System
described above758). While the day-to-day administration of their offices would be overseen by
the Register of Copyrights, for constitutional purposes, they would be appointed and removable
at will, and ultimately supervised, by the Librarian of Congress.
A copyright small claims system also would benefit from the efforts of knowledgeable staff
attorneys who could both assist the adjudicators and provide information to parties concerning
logistical matters. Participants at the public hearings expressed support for this concept,
including for purposes of identifying faulty filings.759 For example, staff attorneys could explain
tribunal requirements and rules, assist with the completion of forms, and so forth. This is not a
novel idea but similar to existing models, including the FLASH program described above, which
provides support to pro se litigants in the San Jose courthouse in the Northern District of
California, and the practices of some state small claims courts, where individuals can seek help
from administrative staff.760 In addition to their public-facing duties, copyright small claims
attorneys also would act as law clerks to the adjudicators by providing legal research and
analysis and helping to keep cases on track.761 As in many adjudicative systems – including the
CRB – staff attorneys presumably would play a vital role in the operation of a copyright small
claims system.

brief review of sparse records more fruitful. For example, WIPO states that its panelists “come from different
regions of the world and are well-reputed for their impartiality, sound judgment and experience as decision-makers,
as well as their substantive experience in the areas of intellectual property law, electronic commerce and the
Internet.” WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, WIPO Domain Name Panelists,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/panel html.
758

See supra at Part IV.D.

759

Tr. at 126:10-20 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alma Robinson, CLA); Tr. at 131:10-15 (Nov. 26, 2012) (George Clinton,
musician) (raising possibility of Copyright Office-appointed attorney); Tr. at 41:02-43:04 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Art
Neill, New Media Rights) (describing benefits of FLASH system).
760

See N.D. Cal., FLASH, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/helpcentersj; see also S.D.N.Y., Role of the Pro Se Office,
http://www nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrules_prose.php?prose=office; DONNA STIENSTRA, ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR,
ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND
CHIEF JUDGES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/proseusdc.pdf/$file/proseusdc.pdf.
761

See Federal Judicial Center, “Who Does What, Chambers Staff: Judge’s Law Clerk and Judicial Assistant,
http://www fjc.gov/federal/courts nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&nav=menu5b&page=/federal/courts nsf/page/351?open
document (“Although the specific duties of judicial staff vary from judge to judge, the law clerks’ duties usually
include conducting legal research; preparing memoranda (including bench memos, which appellate judges use
during oral argument); preparing draft orders and opinions; proofreading the judges’ orders and opinions; and
verifying citations.”).
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Format and Location

While a number of suggestions were raised and discussed, a large number of commenters
expressed support for a centralized process relying primarily upon written submissions, without
the requirement of personal appearances.762 Under this model, proceedings would be conducted
remotely via the internet, with any hearings accomplished by video or teleconference.763 For
many, the Copyright Office appeared to be the obvious home for such a process. 764
The Office agrees that a centralized process made available by remote means probably represents
the most sensible and cost-effective approach. In a non-voluntary system, a centralized system
in a single location might raise concerns of personal jurisdiction. As a matter of due process, it
could be problematic to subject a responding party to the mandatory jurisdiction of a faraway
tribunal (though due process concerns might be substantially mitigated if all proceedings were
conducted remotely). As the proposal is for a voluntary process, however, personal jurisdiction
should not be an issue; parties would waive any objection to personal jurisdiction by agreeing to
participate.
As in UDRP proceedings, parties’ contentions and evidence would be submitted largely in
written form, with suggested formats provided by the system itself. Decisions would be based
primarily on documentary evidence. If necessary, the adjudicators could hold limited
conferences or hearings by telephone or videoconference to address case management issues and
enable the parties to elaborate on their arguments and evidence. The tribunal would be broadly
accessible without elaborate procedures or the necessity of travel.
A few suggested that the CRB might be tasked with adjudicating small copyright claims in
addition to its current duties.765 While the CRB plays a vital role in the administration of various
statutory copyright licenses, the Office does not believe it is well-suited to administer a small
copyright claims system. The industry-wide royalty rate and distribution determinations for
762

See, e.g., Authors Guild First Notice Comments at 4 (“The procedures, to the extent permissible within the
requirements of due process, should be conducted by mail and telephone conference. Small copyright infringement
claims can generally be adjudicated largely on documentary evidence – a submission of the plaintiffs [sic] registered
work and the alleged infringing work. Such procedures will allow parties to press and defend claims without
traveling to the court.”); ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 3 (suggesting a process using electronically
submitted documents, similar to the UDRP).
763

See AVA Second Notice Comments at 6-7 (suggesting use of “e-mail, teleconference, fax, online
videoconference platforms, or other virtual discussion forum”); Tr. at 204:03-08 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman,
VLA) (hearings should be available on a remote basis).
764

Authors Guild First Notice Comments at 4 (linking a small copyright claims court to the Copyright Office
“would help assure the competence of the court”); GAG First Notice Comments at 8 (“We would like to see this
[proposed] system kept close to the Copyright Office.”); SGA & NSAI First Notice comments at 2 (“[A] small
claims court affiliated with the Copyright Office would be the best alternative.”); ZipCourt, Comments Submitted in
Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 6 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“ZipCourt First Notice Comments”) (“[A] new online
copyright adjudication system] would welcome an association with the Office to assure competencies in terms of
quality control, user experience, and low cost.”).
765

PACA First Notice Comments at 10 (considering a new forum of decisionmakers or expanding the role of the
CRB); ASMP Second Notice Comments at 6 (considering the possibility of the CRB or an entity similar to the
CRB); IFTA Second Notice Comments at 4 (suggesting using the CRB as a model).
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which it is responsible – and its necessary focus on complicated economic evidence and expert
analysis – lie at the opposite end of the spectrum from small copyright claims. Moreover, at
least at present, the CRB is not equipped to operate remotely, but rather requires multiple inperson appearances by parties and witnesses over the course of multiyear proceedings and
typically lengthy trials. For these reasons, the Office believes that a small claims process would
be largely incompatible with, and could thus detract from, the essential operations of the CRB,
and that a separately constituted tribunal is advisable.
That said, the Office agrees with those who suggested that a small claims facility would be
logically situated at the Copyright Office, as such an entity would fit well within the Office’s
overall responsibility of administering the nation’s copyright system.
C.

Subject Matter and Remedies
1.

Eligible Claims

The written comments and public roundtables reflected a considerable amount of debate
concerning the types of claims and defenses that should be encompassed by an alternative small
copyright claims system. Participants espoused widely divergent views about these issues,
which are at the heart of any alternative system. Although there was agreement that a primary
purpose of such a small claims process obviously would be to hear smaller infringement cases, it
was unclear at first blush what other claims might be considered or what defenses should be
allowed.
As most copyright litigators know, copyright cases often involve multiple claims that can range
from straightforward infringement claims to more complex matters intertwined with contract or
trademark disputes or other issues. In federal court, these claims can be pursued in a single
lawsuit, which can make litigation more efficient because all related claims between the parties
are adjudicated at once. A unified proceeding makes sense in federal court, where there is
extensive discovery and motion practice and the parties expend significant resources and time.
The same rationale, however, may not hold true in an expedited process for small copyright
claims.
In a copyright small claims system, the parties likely will not have access to extensive discovery
and will instead be limited to presenting the most critical evidence. Cases will be developed
using abbreviated procedures, in shorter time frames, in order to simplify and speed the process.
Notably, other specialized tribunals, such as the UDRP and TTAB, typically refrain from
considering issues outside of their primary purpose or jurisdiction. Even when these tribunals do
review ancillary issues, such consideration is limited to that necessary to permit a judgment on
the primary matter within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Similarly, to preserve the limited scope of
their proceedings, the Tax Court and UK’s Patents County Court exclude complex claims. The
Office recommends that an alternative copyright small claims tribunal be similarly confined.
Most commenting parties generally concurred in this view. Groups as diverse as the American
Photographic Artists, Association of American Publishers, Picture Archive Council of America,
and the Independent Film and Television Association all agreed that tangential trademark, unfair
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competition, and similar claims do not belong in a small copyright claims setting.766 At the same
time, however, some observed that related contract and ownership claims should be considered
when relevant to the infringement proceeding.767 Others referenced the need for coverage for
DMCA claims regarding misrepresentations in takedown notices.768 Additionally, while not
discussed at length in the comments and at the hearings, the idea of including declaratory
judgment actions was positively received.769
The Office believes that the main focus of any small claims proceeding should be on
infringement matters arising under one or more of the exclusive rights set forth in section 106 of
the Copyright Act. In addition to damages determinations, a small claims system should have
the ability to render declaratory judgments pertaining to either the infringement or
noninfringement of a copyrighted work. In some cases, such a determination may entail
consideration of contract or ownership issues, but any such consideration should be limited to
that required to resolve the infringement claim at hand.
Additionally, the Office recommends that any small copyright claims system include the ability
to review claims of misrepresentation in DMCA takedown notices or counter notifications under
section 512(f) and that proceedings before it should qualify to prevent the reposting of removed
material pursuant to section 512(g). These infringement-related matters can be quite frustrating
for those involved and exceptionally uneconomical to litigate in federal court.770 The Office
therefore believes that the ability to address takedown-related disputes through a streamlined
proceeding would provide significant benefits for both copyright owners and online users.

766

APA First Notice Comments at 16 (where a complaint or counterclaim alleges something other than copyright
infringement, the case “fails to qualify as an eligible small infringement claim”); IFTA Second Notice Comments at
6 (“The proposed administrative agency should be available to all copyrighted works, but limited to infringement
claims ….”); Association of Am. Publishers (“AAP”), Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry
at 2-3 (Apr. 12, 2013) (“AAP Third Notice Comments”) (though suggesting contract and licensing analysis should
be retained as a defense to infringement); PACA, Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 3
(Apr. 12, 2013) (“PACA Third Notice Comments”) (though suggesting ownership claims could fall within the scope
of a small claims court for the purposes of determining whether a work was a work for hire).
767

AVA Second Notice Comments at 4 (favor including violations of a license or similar contractual matters); GAG
Second Notice Comments at 6 (favor including claims covering trademark infringement, contractual issues,
ownership, and material misrepresentations in violation of the DMCA); NPPA Second Notice Comments at 4 (favor
including contractual and DMCA claims).
768

Google First Notice Comments at 7; James Cannings, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of
Inquiry at 2 (“Cannings Second Notice Comments”); GAG Second Notice Comments at 6; IFTA Second Notice
Comments at 5; NPPA Second Notice Comments at 4; VLA Third Notice Comments at 5, n.2.
769

Tr. at 92:22-94:04 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Carolyn Wright, Law Offices of Carolyn E. Wright).

770

Commenting parties agreed that DMCA issues should not be overlooked in considering the problem of small
copyright claims. See, e.g., Google First Notice Comments at 7 (“An infringement action is not the only species of
action under the Copyright Act that is deterred in practice by high litigation costs. If the Office is concerned that the
cost of litigation is preventing people from vindicating their rights under the Act, then the small claims court should
also hear actions under Section 512(f).”); GAG First Notice Comments at 4 (“In some instances the ISP or host does
not respond to or comply with a DMCA take-down notice, or allows the image to be reposted again later.”); Eman
Hegazy, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 1 (relating a story where in response to a
DMCA takedown notice, a competitor issued allegedly fraudulent takedown notices against the author).
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This means that the Office proposes to exclude trademark, unfair competition, and other similar
claims from the purview of a small claims system, at least as an initial matter. To operate
efficiently and within the scope of its expertise, the Office believes that the tribunal must focus
on the copyright infringement claims – as well as defenses and related counterclaims, as
discussed below – that are essential to its purpose. While limiting claims in this manner may
prevent some small copyright claimants from pursuing every claim they might wish in an
alternative forum, it offers the benefit of a quicker and less expensive option to address their
chief concern. Such an approach is consistent with other specialized tribunals, such as state
small claims systems, the TTAB, and UDRP panels, all of which seek to minimize by varying
degrees the burden and costs of dispute resolution by limiting the scope of their jurisdiction.
Another issue is whether the Office should hear cases involving secondary liability under
theories of contributory or vicarious infringement. Unfortunately, there is not much record
evidence on this point,771 but the Office does not see a reason for blanket exclusion of all
secondary liability claims at this time. In some cases where a direct infringer is unknown or
unwilling to participate in the small claims process, the claimant may be limited to proceeding
against a secondary infringer who is profiting from or facilitating the infringement of the
claimant’s work. That said, many potential secondary liability claims involving online uses will
likely be barred by one of the DMCA safe harbors set forth in section 512. To ensure against
inappropriate actions, the Office therefore proposes that any claim potentially subject to a
DMCA safe harbor be excluded unless it is demonstrated that a DMCA takedown notice was
provided and was unsuccessful. And finally, as a more general matter, the tribunal should retain
the discretion to dismiss without prejudice any secondary liability (or other) claim that cannot
appropriately be adjudicated within the constraints of its streamlined process.
2.

Defenses and Counterclaims

Although the Office is proposing a streamlined approach to small copyright claims, alleged
infringers must be allowed to defend themselves vigorously. A respondent in a small claims
proceeding must therefore have access to all available defenses arising under the Copyright Act
or other relevant law.772 For example, the Office recommends that alleged infringers be able to
771

The evidence that was received noted that secondary liability can bring an additional level of complexity to a
small copyright claim. See Google First Notice Comments at 5 (suggesting that the judicial standards for secondary
liability are too vague); PACA Third Notice Comments at 4 (suggesting that these claims are complicated, and that
they could be added depending on how well a new system of litigating direct infringement works).
772

Many stakeholders agreed with this concept, especially in a voluntary system that would require a defendant’s
consent. See, e.g., ASMP Second Notice Comments at 7 (“All traditional defenses, such as fair use, should be
permitted. Similarly, a defense based on a DMCA safe harbor argument would have to be allowed in order to avoid
eviscerating the DMCA.”); Cannings Second Notice Comments at 3 (“All defenses available to large claims must be
allowed to small claims. Due Process must be the rule. In essence the Constitutional right of small claims must in
no way be compromised.”); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 3
(“I believe any defense that could be asserted in district court should be available in this court. There is a strong
possibility that the existence of this court will give right holders new opportunities to harass individuals.
Disallowing important defenses would make this problem even more severe.”); Getty Images Second Notice
Comments at 3 (“The defendant should have an opportunity to present its defenses, including fair use, independent
creation, non-infringement or any other statutory exception (including DMCA safe harbor).”); NPPA Second Notice
Comments at 6 (“NPPA proposes that defendants compelled to participate in small claims court would be entitled to
assert all defenses and counterclaims including fair use, independent creation or those claims arising under the
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assert that they in fact are owners of or have a valid contractual right to use of a work. Such a
defense, however, would only pertain to the claim of infringement before the tribunal. The
construction of a licensing agreement offered as a defense to infringement, for instance, should
not limit future consideration of that agreement in other contexts. Similarly, if the small claims
copyright tribunal found that a respondent had rightfully purchased the copyright in a work, that
finding would only lead to an order of noninfringement in that case, not a finding of ownership
that the defendant could use outside of the proceedings.
This approach also would apply to the defense of fair use, typically a fact-specific defense that
requires careful analysis and review. Some commenters argued that fair use is too complex to
include in a small claims system.773 Thus, some urged, a small claims system should not get
involved in fair use determinations. But at the same time, participants observed that “[f]air use
has to be the single biggest defense that we hear people make.”774 Because it is so frequently
invoked as a defense to infringement, to eliminate it from possible consideration likely would
rule out the adjudication of many meritorious claims, as many responding parties would
presumably decline to proceed with a voluntary process without the ability to have it considered.
As one hearing participant noted, “it is far too easy to raise a frivolous defense of fair use or even
a serious defense of fair use that would automatically take these claims out.”775 Accordingly, in
this participant’s view, “every defense that’s available in federal court, the contract defenses, fair
use defenses and so on, ought to be subject to this proceeding.”776 The Office agrees and
recommends that fair use be an available defense in a small claims proceeding. Apart from the
logistical concern of motivating participation in a voluntary system, the Office does not see how
claims of infringement can fairly be adjudicated without consideration of legitimate claims of
fair use.
In this regard, the Office believes that the proposed tribunal, which would include adjudicators,
with substantial experience in copyright matters, would possess the appropriate background to
review fair use claims. While fair use is fact-dependent, and requires close analysis, there is a
good amount of judicial precedent in this area, and most assertions of fair use should not be
DMCA.”); PACA Second Notice Comments at 5 (“The respondent should have the opportunity to present its
defenses, such as fair use, independent creation, non-infringement or any other statutory exception.”).
773

Google First Notice Comments at 4; NMPA, ASCAP, & SESAC, Comments Submitted in Response to First
Notice of Inquiry at 2 (“NMPA, ASCAP, & SESAC First Notice Comments”) (“We have great concern about
litigating fair use defenses in a small claims court setting.”); SGA & NSAI First Notice Comments at 3 (cases with
“credible and substantial” fair use arguments should be removed to federal court); AAP, Comment Submitted in
Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 5 (“AAP Second Notice Comments”) (“AAP is opposed to allowing …
potentially complex defenses such as fair use to be raised in small claims proceedings.”).
774

Tr. at 168:14-17 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Eugene Mopsik, ASMP); see also Tr. at 164:11-17 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Nancy
Wolff, PACA) (“So I don’t think I have ever had a case where someone hasn’t at least put in a defense of fair use,
whether it could be legitimate or not. So I think that that should not be sort of a threshold to avoid an alternative
resolution procedure that could be in place.”).
775

Tr. at 161:18-21 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA). Other stakeholders made similar statements. See,
e.g., Tr. at 168:04-10 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Lisa Shaftel, GAG) (“[W]e realize that we don’t think the defenses should
be limited because otherwise the defendants would be able to opt out of the alternative copyright court in a
substantial number of cases, and that would just weaken the effectiveness of the alternative court.”).
776

Tr. at 162:09-12 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA).
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beyond the reach of qualified decisionmakers – especially decisionmakers whose primary job it
is to evaluate claims of infringement and defenses thereto. In the unusual case where, due to the
streamlined process, the tribunal could not appropriately evaluate a claim of fair use – for
example, because of a lack of essential evidence – the case could be dismissed without prejudice
to be litigated in federal court.
Similarly, a responding party should be able to bring certain related and necessary counterclaims
in a small claims proceeding.777 Notably, such a practice is allowed in some state small claims
courts and in other specialized proceedings such as TTAB cases.778 Specifically, respondents in
copyright small claims cases should be allowed to bring counterclaims based on the same
transaction or occurrence as the original claim that either arises from an exclusive right set forth
in section 106 or under 512(f) of the Copyright Act, or from a related contract, such as a
licensing agreement, that could affect the relief the tribunal might award the claimant.
Additionally, counterclaims would have to fall within the damages limitations applicable to
claimants that are discussed below. But counterclaims would not be mandatory, and would be
preserved for future adjudication in a different forum if the respondent wished to pursue them
elsewhere.779
3.

Registration Requirement

Title 17 currently requires most copyright owners to register their works with (or receive a
refusal from) the Copyright Office before bringing an infringement lawsuit, and works must be
timely registered (generally within three months of publication) to be eligible for statutory
damages.780 In the small claims study and other contexts, many copyright owners have
expressed concern over the burden of registering works as a condition to bringing a lawsuit or
the ability to seek statutory damages for infringement.781

777

Although there was no unanimity, a number of participants were of the view that respondents should be able to
bring counterclaims. See ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 8 (“Counterclaims should be permitted, but
should not be compulsory, especially if they exceed the jurisdictional limit.”); NPPA Second Notice Comments at 6
(“NPPA proposes that defendants compelled to participate in small claims court would be entitled to assert all
defenses and counterclaims including fair use, independent creation or those claims arising under the DMCA.”).
778

See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.106(b)(2)(i) & 2.114(b)(2)(i) (defense attacking the validity of certain registrations
pleaded in the opposition (§ 2.106(b)(2)(i)) or petition for cancellation (§ 2.114(b)(2)(i)) is considered a compulsory
counterclaim).
779

See Tr. at 143:11-151:08 (Nov. 26, 2012) (various participants) (discussing that while voluntary counterclaims
pose less of a problem as they can be preserved for a trial in federal court, mandatory counterclaims that are over the
monetary limit of the small claims court pose a tension as the small claims forum may not be suited to best handle
these larger claims).
780

17 U.S.C. § 411(a). This requirement applies only to United States works. Timely registration is, however,
required for all works if the copyright owner wants to seek statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and/or costs. 17
U.S.C. § 412.
781

See, e.g., NPPA First Notice Comments at 8 (“Legal proceedings should be available to copyright holders
regardless of when they registered their work. Registration as a prerequisite to bringing a claim is acceptable, but
there should be no limits to a claim based on when that registration occurred.”).
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For example, photographers have pointed out that they create hundreds or thousands of works in
short periods of time, and often lack the resources to register all of the photographs to secure the
full protections of the Copyright Act.782 These frustrations are shared by graphic artists, writers,
and others, many of whom view the registration requirement as an obstacle to vindicating their
rights, even apart from the significant costs of litigation once one gets to court.783 At the same
time, registration is important to our copyright system because it enhances the public record,
encourages licensing opportunities, and provides baseline information for courts and others to
use in assessing a copyright owners’ claims.
How should the competing values be balanced in the context of a system for the resolution of
lower-value copyright claims? The Office recommends that registration be required, but that the
registration may be issued any time before the tribunal renders a determination. A copyright
owner who had not previously registered would need only demonstrate that he or she had filed an
application, deposit, and fee prior to commencing the action. This approach was suggested by
several stakeholders as a potential middle ground solution,784 and is similar to the practice
already followed in some federal jurisdictions.785 To help ensure against unwarranted claims, if
a registration certificate were not issued while the small claims proceeding remained pending

782

ASMP First Notice Comments at 5 (“[O]ne of the impediments to professional photographers’ access to the
current copyright enforcement system is the requirement of copyright registration before litigation can be instituted
(and earlier, for eligibility for an award of attorney fees and/or statutory damages).”); see also GAG First Notice
Comments at 4 (“Most visual works are not registered, and most of the business sector is aware of this.”); Tr. at
41:02-04 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (“When you have large amounts of images, it is difficult to
register, particularly when you have the published versus unpublished.”). Cf. Tr. at 186:21-187:03 (Nov. 15, 2012)
(Mickey Osterreicher, NPPA) (“[P]hotographers are probably the worst at registering their works. And I would
extend that to say that news photographers are probably the worst of all of the photographers just because the nature
of their business in terms of they barely have time to bill in terms of operating the small business.”).
783

APA First Notice Comments at 25 (“[T]he ideal solution to the issue of small claims would dispense with the
registration requirement [as a prerequisite to bring an infringement lawsuit].”); NWU First Notice Comments at 12
(“[T]he requirement for registration of copyright is entirely unnecessary and should be abolished. [The registration
requirement] creates a perverse disincentive for first publication in the U.S. ….”); Tr. at 155:08-157:22 (Nov. 26,
2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU) (summarizing various problems with the registration requirement); Tr. at 158:0709 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm) (“[The registration requirement is] primarily a way to …
generate fees and waste time.”).
784

GAG First Notice Comments at 7 (“To ensure timely access to the ACC, we recommend that U.S.
plaintiffs/rights holders be eligible to file their claims as soon as they have submitted application for copyright
registration, as is the practice in many jurisdictions in federal court, rather than requiring them to have an issued
copyright registration before filing. (Foreign authors would be exempt under Berne). There would be no prior
registration or timely registration bars to obtaining ACC statutory damages.”); Tr. at 184:04-09 (Nov. 15, 2012)
(Victor Perlman, ASMP) (“So how you cut that Gordian Knot, is to do what some of the federal circuits currently
do, which is to accept as the equivalent of a registration, proof of the filing of a petition for registration. And that
seems, to me, to be a reasonable compromise.”).
785

See Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. R.D. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir.1984) (“In order to bring suit for
copyright infringement, it is not necessary to prove possession of a registration certificate. One need only prove
payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration
application.”); see also Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)
(describing an argument that only an application had been filed, and there was thus no registration, as being
“frivolous”). The Office is not suggesting that the mere filing of an application be sufficient for existing federal
court litigation, which is much more formal than the small claims system envisioned in this Report.
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(that is, before a final determination), or were refused, the action would be dismissed without
prejudice.
In addition, it is clear from the record in this proceeding that individual creators are discouraged
from pursuing claims of infringement when they are unable to seek statutory damages. The
Office suggests that, within the small claims context, a copyright owner be allowed to pursue a
limited amount of statutory damages even if registration was not made within the time frame
prescribed by section 412. An ability to recover limited statutory damages without extensive
discovery into an infringer’s activities and profits would serve a small claims system by helping
to simplify and streamline the proceedings. At the same time, the system should not wholly
eliminate incentives to register within the time limits of section 412. As further discussed below,
under the Office’s suggested approach, while late-registered works would be eligible for
statutory damages (as well as actual damages up to the small claims limit), such works would be
entitled to only half of the statutory damages available to timely registrants through the small
claims system.
4.

Remedies
a.

Overall Damages Limitation

Perhaps the most obvious question to ask in connection with the possibility of creating an
alternative tribunal to resolve small copyright claims is what in fact constitutes a “small”
copyright claim. As might be predicted, participants in the Office’s study expressed a range of
opinions. Suggestions for what should be deemed “small” ranged from claims seeking damages
of under $10,000786 to those seeking a maximum of $80,000.787 Many comments, however,
suggested limits in the range of $20,000 to $30,000. For example: the ABA IP Section
recommended a $25-30,000 limit; ASMP suggested $25,000; Getty Images proposed $30,000;
the Kernochan Center argued for $20-30,000; GAG favored a $30,000 limit; the MPAA believed
$30,000 to be reasonable; and the NPPA suggested $10-25,000.788
It is important to consider carefully the proper claim amount because any voluntary process must
provide sufficient ability for claimants to redress typical infringements while also incentivizing
respondents to participate. Indeed, as one stakeholder explained, damages are “the largest thing
on the table” in considering how to persuade respondents to agree to alternative adjudication.789
The damages ceiling also should reflect and be proportionate to the limited discovery and
streamlined proceedings of a small claims process. The higher the limit, the less likely a
responding party will agree to forego a federal court proceeding with the full panoply of
discovery and pretrial proceedings. On the other hand, a carefully chosen lower limit should
encourage voluntary participation if it meaningfully reduces exposure for damages.
786

Cannings Second Notice Comments at 2.

787

APA First Notice Comments at 4.

788

ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 8; ASMP Second Notice Comments at 7; Getty Images Second
Notice Comments at 3 (“$30,000 at the most”); Kernochan Second Notice Comments at 4; GAG Second Notice
Comments at 6-7; MPAA Third Notice Comments at 3; NPPA Second Notice Comments at 5.
789

Tr. at 36:05-09 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Charles Sanders, SGA).
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Also to be considered in recommending an overall monetary cap is whether the available
damages will permit small copyright claimants to retain counsel to assist them in the process.
While based on a small sample size, the ABA IP Section submitted evidence that suggested most
lawyers are unlikely to take copyright cases with a value of under $60,000, and only a third will
take cases valued at under $30,000.790 While these findings reflect the current reality that
copyright cases must be pursued in federal court, they are nonetheless informative because they
indicate a breakdown in obtaining legal representation where the need for an alternative system
may be the highest – in cases valued at under $30,000.
In light of these factors, the Office suggests that, subject to future adjustment by Congress if
necessary, a copyright matter be considered “small” if its overall value is no more than $30,000.
Thus, parties could not pursue a case seeking more than that amount in the small claims venue.
If a claimant wished to bring multiple claims in a single proceeding, the Office proposes that the
$30,000 limit would apply to all claims together. As discussed below, in addition to this overall
damages cap, the Office recommends further limitations with respect to the recovery of statutory
damages.
A $30,000 cap for small claims proceedings corresponds to what many stakeholders proposed
and also coincides with the upper limit of statutory damages available under the Copyright Act in
cases of nonwillful infringement. At the same time, it is only one-fifth of the highest level of
statutory damages available for willful infringement, and thus should be attractive to potential
respondents.
b.

Actual and Statutory Damages

Copyright law allows copyright owners to seek different types of damages: actual damages and
a defendant’s profits, or statutory damages within certain limits.791 The Office recommends that
there be no limit on actual damages and profits available in a small claims system other than the
monetary cap applicable to the proceeding as a whole. Thus, where actual damages and profits
are established for the infringement of one or more works through in a small claims proceeding,
they should be recoverable up to the $30,000 limit.
Statutory damages, however, require more nuanced consideration. Under the Copyright Act,
permissible statutory damages range from $750 to $30,000 for the nonwillful infringement of a
work (with a reduction to as low as $200 for “innocent” infringement), and up to $150,000 in
cases where the defendant’s infringement is shown to have been willful.792 Throughout the
Office’s study, stakeholders debated both the availability and amount of statutory damages that
might be awarded by an alternative tribunal, with some taking the position that there should be
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ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 7. The same evidence indicated, however, that some cases being
tried resolved for between $50,000 and $100,000. Id. at 7-8.
791

17 U.S.C. § 504(a).

792

Id. § 504(c).
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none at all.793 Indeed, in recent years, statutory damages have been the subject of more general
debate in the copyright community, with potential large-scale infringers and others arguing that
the possibility for high awards has a chilling effect on innovation, and copyright owners
asserting that statutory damages are essential to deterring infringement.794 In the context of
small claims, some participants were concerned that statutory damages would dissuade potential
defendants from agreeing to participate in a voluntary system,795 while others emphasized the
importance of statutory damages in furthering settlement discussions.796 Others did not believe
there was much difference as to whether available damages were statutory or actual so long as
they fell within the applicable monetary cap.797
The Office suggests that a small claims system include the remedy of limited statutory damages,
in addition to the ability to recover actual damages and profits. In many cases, the availability of
statutory damages as an alternative to establishing actual damages and profits could serve to
reduce time-consuming and potentially costly wrangling over damage-related discovery issues
and calculations.798 In this way, statutory damages would further the objectives of a small claims
system.
At the same time, however, statutory damages would need to be appropriately tailored for such a
system, both to reflect the lesser value of “small” claims and also to ensure that they would not
deter – but rather would encourage – participation by those notified of a claim of infringement.
793

See Public Knowledge, Electronic Frontier Foundation, & Future of Music Coalition, Comments Submitted in
Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s Oct. 27, 2011 Notice of Inquiry at 7 (“Exposing defendants to [possibility of
punitive and excessive statutory damages awards] in an abbreviated proceeding is likely to jeopardize their due
process rights.”); AAP Second Notice Comments at 7 (removing statutory damages offers a “powerful incentive for
potential defendants to work within the system instead of opting for transfer to federal court.”).
794

See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[Defendant] Tenenbaum argues
that the award of $675,000 [for copyright infringement of thirty songs] violates due process because it is not tied to
the actual injury that he caused, which he estimates to be no more than $450, or the cost of 30 albums at $15 each.
But this argument asks us to disregard the deterrent effect of statutory damages, the inherent difficulty in proving
damages in a copyright suit, and [plaintiff] Sony’s evidence of the harm that it suffered from conduct such as
Tenenbaum’s.”); Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 908 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Congress no doubt was
aware of the serious problem posed by online copyright infringement, and the ‘numberless opportunities for
committing the offense,’ when it last revisited the Copyright Act in 1999. To provide a deterrent against such
infringement, Congress amended § 504(c) to increase [statutory damages].”). But see Pamela Samuelson & Tara
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. MARY L. REV. 439, 49596 (2009) (“Excessive copyright statutory damage awards are…likely to have other negative spillover effects, such
as chilling lawful…uses of copyrighted works, especially those that would promote…the development of innovative
new technologies and services.”).
795

Tr. at 151:23-152:22 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA); Tr. at 262:08-15 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Rachel Fertig,
AAP).
796

Tr. at 144:03-09 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Randy Taylor, CDL) (“[T]he statutory damage [award] is the primary tool by
which the infringer is likely settled. So if statutory damages are limited or removed from any type of alternative
process, the effectiveness is going to be dramatically reduced.”).
797

Tr. at 254:09-22 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA); Tr. at 256:14-257:04 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Victor Perlman,
ASMP).
798

See Tr. at 229:22-230:3 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU) (noting that statutory damages are relatively
simple, and without statutory damages, more discovery is needed); Tr. at 144:22-23 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Randy Taylor,
CDL) (asserting that the only reason infringers respond to demand letters is the threat of statutory damages).
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Accordingly, while recommending that statutory damages be available in the small claims
system, the Office further suggests that the available statutory damages be only half of the
$30,000 per-work maximum for nonwillful infringement applicable in federal court. Thus, for
works registered within the time frame prescribed in section 412, statutory damages would be
capped at $15,000 per work.799 Applying the overall $30,000 small claims limit, a claimant
could thus, for example, receive up to two $15,000 statutory damages awards or three $10,000
awards for related infringements of separate works in a single proceeding.
Additionally, in a significant departure from the rule applied in federal court, works registered
after the time period provided under section 412 also would be eligible for statutory damages in a
small claims proceeding. These damages, however, only would be recoverable at up to half of
the amount permitted for timely registered works within the small claims system – that is, up to
$7,500 per work – and with the additional caveat that no more than $15,000 in total statutory
damages could be awarded for all late-registered works in any one proceeding.
Another consideration is whether the small claims court should consider willful or innocent
conduct in making an award of statutory damages, as is permitted under section 504 of the
Copyright Act. While there seemed to be less concern about eliminating a potential downward
adjustment of awards based upon a finding of innocence,800 some participants in the study noted
that it could be difficult to establish the necessary factual predicate to support a finding of
willfulness in an expedited proceeding.801 Likewise, viewed from the opposite perspective,
respondents facing a claim of wilfullness might not have a full opportunity to rebut it. Picture
Archive Council of America, Inc. (“PACA”) made the additional observation that the willfulness
distinction could be a “distraction” in a small claims proceeding, and that willful infringers were
likely to end up in federal court anyway.802 Perhaps most significantly, with a per-work limit of
$15,000 and an overall cap of $30,000, any statutory damages would be below the per-work
maximum for nonwillful infringement, findings of willfulness would likely be superfluous. The
Office thus concludes that while it is reasonable to consider innocence in the context of a small
claim, willfulness should not be a consideration in establishing statutory damages in a small
claims proceeding.
c.

Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief

The Copyright Act provides for different of types of equitable relief upon a finding of
infringement, including injunctions803 and impoundment and destruction of infringing goods.804
799

Claimants with timely registrations who wished to seek higher amounts of statutory damages would, of course,
continue to have the option of proceeding in federal court.
800

VLA Third Notice Comments at 17 (“VLA sees no reason to eliminate an innocent infringer defense because it
would fall well below the cap proposed and would remove an incentive for defendants who might assert such
defense.”).
801

Tr. at 189:22-190:20 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm) (noting that including a finding of
willfulness requires submitting evidence of willfulness and that involves discovery and disclosure by the defendant,
all of which can be too cumbersome for a small claims tribunal).
802

PACA Third Notice Comments at 5.

803

17 U.S.C. § 502.
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For some small claimants, the primary objective of bringing an infringement action is not
recovery of damages but rather to halt the unauthorized use of a copyrighted work.
Unauthorized uses can dilute the value of a work, impact exclusive license relationships, or may
simply be objectionable to the owner. So long as the conduct continues, the claimant continues
to be harmed. As one hearing participant explained, “most of the time what artists want is … the
infringement to stop or they want to get some work back that has been taken from them.”805
Another creator emphasized that injunctive relief is “vital” as “injunctions are often essential to
protect the moral rights of the author” and “infringement is [frequently] continuing.”806
Unfortunately, however, injunctive relief is not as simple as it sounds. In the wake of the
Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision, copyright plaintiffs must demonstrate more than the mere
fact of infringement to obtain a final injunction. Rather, they must show: that they have suffered
an irreparable injury; that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.807
Preliminary injunctions must satisfy a similar multifactor test as well.808 Injunctions issued at
the beginning of a case involve independent briefing and, often, a separate hearing, to ensure that
the injunction is justified in light of the potential harm to the copyright and considerations of due
process. Some small claims hearing participants questioned the ability to establish the
appropriate evidentiary basis for injunctive relief in an abbreviated small claims proceeding.809
A related and significant concern identified by participants in the study is the potential impact of
injunctive relief in certain situations, especially those involving derivative works. If an infringer
simply is reproducing a work as a whole and selling it or distributing it by itself (for example, by
displaying a copyrighted image on a website or selling a product incorporating a copyrighted
design), it may be fairly straightforward to require the infringer to cease infringing conduct.810
804

Id. § 503.

805

Tr. at 31:12-18 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA); see also Tr. at 284:19-24 (Nov. 16, 2012) (David
Leichtman, VLA) (“But I think from the standpoint of indigent artists, the injunctive relief is absolutely critical.
And what we see more often than not is folks that come in to our offices who really just want their stuff back, or
taken down, or the infringement to stop.”); Tr. at 59:21-60:01 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Molly Knappen, designer and
developer) (“If you take injunctions out of the equation for the true small claims, you take the teeth out of it.”); Tr. at
49:05-06 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU) (“Injunctive relief is vital for our members ….”).
806

Tr. at 49:05-16 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU).

807

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (though this case involved patents, the Court
noted the same standard applies to copyright cases).
808

See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that eBay injunction test “applies with equal
force to preliminary injunctions issued on the basis of alleged copyright infringement”).
809

Google First Notice Comments at 6 (“In District Court, an injunction can only be obtained after a rigorous
evidentiary showing, but a small claims court will not have the ability to collect or hear such extensive evidence.”);
Tr. at 58:13-19 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm) (“[T]o have small claims courts issuing
preliminary injunctions … you are probably going to want to have only an injunction after you have had the mini
trial where you could have all of the evidence presented that justifies the injunction. And that is a substantial
showing here.”).
810

See, e.g., PACA First Notice Comments at 7 (“An injunction to prevent the continued infringement or to enforce
the removal of content online may be appropriate if a work is not so incorporated within another creative work that
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As discussed at the hearings, however, there are more complex situations in which the infringer
has incorporated the original work into another work and the financial consequences of requiring
a defendant to cease the infringing use outweigh the claimant’s damages claim – and perhaps the
monetary limits of the small claims forum as well.811 For example, to halt or delay the
distribution of a film incorporating another work (perhaps a screenplay or song) could cost the
distributor many thousands or, in some cases, even millions of dollars in marketing expenditures
and lost revenues.812 If the author of the song demands its removal from a film, the movie studio
may have to spend substantial resources to edit the movie, which may not be practicable
depending on timing. In such a scenario, the songwriter might be alleging damages of several
thousand dollars, but an injunction would cost the studio exponentially more money to
implement.
The Office believes that compromise is necessary on this point. A voluntary system needs the
participation of both parties, and alleged infringers will be less likely to consent if the
consequences include potentially prohibitive injunctive relief. Moreover, in many cases, the
expedited nature of the proceeding might make it difficult for the adjudicators to render the
factual findings necessary to support an injunction. Even if the tribunal determined that an
injunction was appropriate, the claimant could have difficulty securing compliance without the
enforcement powers of a federal district court.813 But if claimants had to apply to the district
court for review and enforcement of an injunction, as some participants suggested,814 it would
probably make more sense to bring the action there in the first place.
The Office is of the view that in some cases, respondents might have reason to consent to a
takedown of infringing material or cessation of infringing activity upon a finding of
infringement, either at the outset or during the course of the proceeding. The system could allow
adjudicators to reduce a damages award that might otherwise compensate for future use of the
infringed work in exchange for a respondent’s promise to cease the infringing behavior. Any
such agreement could, similar to a consent judgment, be memorialized in the tribunal’s final
it would cause disproportionate economic harm to a work containing the infringing was enjoined. For example if
the infringing work is merely displayed on a website, in addition to damages, it would be appropriate to enjoin
continued use of the infringing work by the defendant, to avoid multiple claims for the same use by a plaintiff
against the same party.”).
811

Tr. at 295:11-16 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (“[I]f images are displayed on a web site, there really
wouldn’t be any harm to make sure it wasn’t continued. But, for example, if there was one image that was in a
documentary film, it may cause a lot of harm to have someone redo an entire documentary film.”); Tr. at 56:1557:01 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm) (raising the example of the monetary damages of enjoining
the release of a motion picture exceeding the small claims forum limits).
812

See Tr. at 51:15-18 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Kim Tommaselli, IFTA) (“. . . to get an injunction to halt the production or
distribution of a film would cause great financial stress on that company through such a small claims procedure”).
813

FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (granting federal courts the authority to enforce injunctions); see Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on the
federal courts jurisdiction over ‘all suits … in equity.’”).

814

VLA Third Notice Comments at 16 (“[D]e novo review [of an injunction by a district court] would defeat the
purpose of the Small Claims Tribunal in the first place.”); Tr. at 338:18-339:17 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Rachel Fertig,
AAP) (explaining that if injunctions were allowed in this system with an appeal to district court, this would increase
the probability of appeals and would create a problem that we are trying to avoid in the first place).
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determination – which, in turn, as discussed below, could be filed with a federal court to secure
enforcement. In this way, claimants would not be wholly precluded from seeking to end to
infringing conduct, but the small claims tribunal would avoid the significant concerns inherent in
the power to order injunctive relief.
In addition to injunctions, the Copyright Act allows for the impoundment and destruction of
infringing goods. There was no groundswell of support for this option, which, even when
sought, is usually seen as a secondary remedy by copyright claimants. In any event, for many of
the same reasons as reviewed in connection with the availability of injunctions, the Office
believes these additional equitable remedies exceed what can be expected from an administrative
small claims process.
d.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Assuming attorneys are to participate in a copyright small claims process – a matter discussed
below – the question arises as to whether the system should permit recovery of attorneys’ fees.
The Copyright Act allows, but does not require, courts to award attorneys’ fees and costs to a
prevailing party.815 In federal court, as discussed above, such fees and costs can be considerable,
and can quickly overwhelm potential damages in a lower-value case.816 The possibility of
recovering (or, alternatively, having to pay) attorneys’ fees may therefore be a significant factor
in a plaintiff’s decision whether to pursue litigation, or a defendant’s evaluation of settlement
options. Although the allowance for fee-shifting under the Copyright Act is generally viewed as
a plaintiff-friendly rule, copyright claimants cannot be overly sanguine about recovering fees. In
some cases, courts award damages to successful defendants,817 and in many cases courts do not
award fees at all.818
As with other issues, commenters had differing views as to whether attorneys’ fees and costs
should be recoverable by prevailing parties in small claims actions. In a system that allows
parties to hire lawyers, there is logic to permitting recovery of attorneys’ fees – not only to
reimburse the winning party, but also to incentivize attorneys to take lower-value cases.819 Such
fees might be capped to reflect the smaller claims at issue and protect parties against deep-

815

17 U.S.C. § 505.

816

See supra at Part III.

817

See, e.g., Garcia-Goyco v. Law Envtl. Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding award of
attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendant); Tr. at 285:09-289:13 (Nov. 16, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA).
818

See, e.g., Thoroughbred Software Int’l, Inc. v. Dice Corp., 529 f. supp. 2d 800, 803 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (refusing
to award attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs because defendant’s “position at trial was not frivolous and was objectively
reasonable,” they did not “act with an improper motivation,” and did not profit from their activities, among other
things).
819

Tr. at 318:19-321:12 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Bruce Lehman, Former Asst. Sec’y of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents
& Trademarks) (discussing importance of incentivizing lawyers to represent clients in a small copyright claims
proceeding).
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pocketed adversaries.820 On one hand, the availability of fees might encourage attorneys to
amplify what could otherwise be more expeditious proceedings.
A number of stakeholders expressed concern about the impact of attorneys’ fees on parties’
participation in a small claims system. Responding parties might be put off by the increased risk
of a potential fee award.821 Claimants, too, might be deterred by the prospect of having to pay
fees should they lose.822 As one copyright owner representative noted, “[w]e clearly do not want
to scare off potential plaintiffs from using a system that’s been developed specifically for them to
be able to address small claims. But we do, of course, want to avoid harassment of defendants
by what amounts to something more than frivolous and bordering on fraudulent claims. That’s
not fair either.”823
A related issue is the question of what standard would apply if fee-shifting were permitted. An
absolute rule awarding fees to a prevailing party could be inequitable in close cases, for example,
where a responding party had a colorable but ultimately unsuccessful claim of fair use. On the
other hand, a rule allowing significant discretion – as is permitted to federal judges in copyright
actions under section 505 – could extend the proceeding and increase expenses by requiring
independent consideration of a fee award. Moreover, as in the federal courts today, a
discretionary system would offer no guarantee to a party for whom recovery of fees was
critical.824
820

See Tr. at 310:01-12 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Victor Perlman, ASMP) (“[M]y concern is that you may have a corporate
defendant who’s running up a significant legal bill. And I guess the way to deal with that situation is to use a sort of
system that [has] attorneys’ fees, but to cap the fees at some level so that, for instance, a photographer or an artist
isn’t faced with the prospect of a five figure award or more, legal bills being assessed against him if he loses.”); Tr.
at 311:09-12 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Mickey Osterreicher, NPPA) (suggesting a cap on attorneys’ fees “[s]o you don’t
have a corporate defendant coming in and having a fee request that dwarfs what’s looked for in terms of any
recovery”).
821

See Tr. at 151:03-152:22 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA) (noting that system would have to “mak[e]
sense financially from the standpoint of the defense side” and proposing damages cap with no attorneys’ fees); Tr. at
62:04-07 (Nov. 15, 2012); (Lisa Willmer, Getty Images) (defendants could be incentivized to submit to voluntary
process by limiting attorneys’ fees); see also Tr. at 150:09-13 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (“[O]nce the
attorneys’ fees have to get factored in the amount, … there’s always going to be a lot of work, and then the
settlement amount and demands become much higher.”).
822

Tr. at 288:21-289:13 (Nov. 16, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA) (“And we have lots of clients in these kinds of
situations where you have a close case, where there may be a fair use defense. And, you know, as a lawyer advising
the client, you have no idea how that’s going to come out, and yet you have to say to the client, ‘I can bring your
case in federal court for you, we have a 55 percent, 75 percent chance of winning the case, but what I have to tell
you is, you are at risk. You know, you are not even asking for money, you are just looking for an injunction to get
the infringement to stop, but you are at risk of – you don’t have to pay my fees because I am the pro bono lawyer,
but you are at risk of having to pay the other side’s attorneys’ fees.’”).
823

Tr. at 309:04-11 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Charles Sanders, SGA).

824

Comments submitted by APA suggested a rather novel fee-shifting system. To incentivize settlement, parties
would be required to exchange offers of judgment before trial. If the plaintiff won at trial and were awarded more
than his or her demand, the plaintiff would receive attorneys’ fees. But if the plaintiff, even though prevailing, were
awarded less than what the defendant had offered, the plaintiff would be required to pay attorneys’ fees to the
defendant. Conversely, a defendant who offered less than what the plaintiff received would be assessed fees. APA
First Notice Comments at 6-7 (comments submitted by David Nimmer on behalf of the APA). As suggested above,
such a system could yield a rather harsh result for a plaintiff who is injured by an infringer and forced to pursue an
action but who is overly optimistic about the ultimate award of damages. See supra note 725.
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On the whole, while there clearly are arguments to be made on both sides, because attorneys’
fees awards might upset the balance of incentives to participate in the system, and perhaps
increase the length and expense of proceedings, the Office recommends against a general fee and
cost-shifting provision at this time. The Office acknowledges, however, that if a small claims
tribunal were to become operational, the question of fee-shifting – including how fee awards
might be limited to reflect that environment – would benefit from further study.
That said, the Office does propose an exception to its general recommendation against feeshifting in cases where it is established that a party has pursued a claim or defense in bad faith, or
has summoned a respondent to the tribunal but failed to proceed with the case. In such a
situation, the offending party should pay fees and costs to those adversely affected by the
conduct in question. Such a rule will not only serve to compensate parties for unnecessary
expense, but also help to deter the pursuit of frivolous claims. Even so, in light of the modest
value of the proceedings, the Office believes that such an award should not be more than the total
sum of $5,000, or for parties appearing pro se, consist of costs only and not exceed $2,500.
5.

Eligible Works

Copyright owners with rights in all types of works may be interested in using an alternative
system to seek relief. Indeed, the Office received comments from numerous creators, including
photographers, graphic artists, songwriters, filmmakers, and writers, all of whom argued,
sometimes passionately, for an alternative system.825 In comments and at the public roundtables,
there was near universal agreement that all types of copyrighted works should be eligible for
protection through an alternative system, an approach that is endorsed by the Office. As one
hearing participant explained, “anything that is eligible for copyright ought to be” eligible for a
small claims system.826
The National Music Publishers’ Association (“NMPA”) and the Harry Fox Agency, Inc.
(“HFA”), however, joined by ASCAP, BMI, SESAC, the Recording Industry Association of
America (“RIAA”), and the American Association of Independent Music (“A2IM”), urged that
music should be excluded from any small claims system, at least in the near term.827 These
825

ASMP First Notice Comments at 9 (“[V]irtually everyone in the copyright world has long recognized that
photographers are uniquely disenfranchised from access to the copyright protections to which they are legally
entitled. Anything that the Copyright Office and Congress can do to help correct that situation would be of great
benefit to working photographers and greatly appreciated by them.”); GAG Second Notice Comments at 28 (in a
survey, it was estimated that over 80% of GAG members would use a small claims copyright tribunal); IFTA First
Notice Comments at 3; NWU First Notice Comments at 2 (calling the subject of this report a “vital copyright reform
initiative”); SGA, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of Inquiry at 1 (Oct. 19, 2012) (“[I]t would
be extremely important for individual songwriters to have an alternative to the current legal system through which
they could enforce their rights effectively and inexpensively when a small claim is involved.”).
826

Tr. 111:04-05 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA).

827

See ASCAP, A2IM, BMI, NMPA, RIAA, and SESAC, Comments Submitted in Response to Second Notice of
Inquiry. The RIAA’s position is notable because it pursued some 35,000 infringement cases against individual
defendants for unauthorized file-sharing during the mid-2000s in which it typically sought relatively modest
damages (at least at the pretrial stage). By the end of 2008, however, the RIAA had discontinued this litigation
strategy. See Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online,
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organizations asserted that because music matters can be complex and involve ownership and
contract disputes, and potentially frivolous claims of authorship,828 musical works and sound
recordings should not be included. NMPA and other music publisher organizations generally
asserted that because they represent songwriters’ interests in infringement matters, songwriters
did not need access to a small claims tribunal. They also expressed concern that songwriters
might invoke the small claims system to pursue breach of contract claims against their
constituents.829
By contrast, both the Songwriters Guild of America (“SGA”) and the Nashville Songwriters
Association International (“NSAI”) “strongly endorse the concept of establishing a forum in
which individual copyright owners could pursue infringement claims that have a relatively small
economic value.”830 Songwriters provided an impassioned response to the music publisher
organizations seeking to exclude musical works from a potential small claims forum. As one
songwriter advocate bluntly opined, the “blanket exclusion of music from the small claims
process would be grossly unfair to the creators of musical works.”831 This representative pointed
out that as songwriters reclaim their copyrights in musical works from music publishers under
the termination provisions of the Copyright Act,832 many more will be representing themselves
and may have a need for an accessible forum in which to vindicate their rights.
Indeed, there are numerous songwriters and musicians who are self-represented and do not rely
on music publishers or record labels to manage their rights.833 In fact, VLA, which provides pro
bono legal assistance to artists, reported that approximately 20% of the organization’s clients
seek music-related advice, including claims by both unrepresented songwriters and songwriters
hoping to enforce their rights after a publisher has declined to take action.834 Indeed, a music

Recording Industry Ass’n of America, (Sept. 8, 2003), http://riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=85183A9C-28F4-19CEBDE6-F48E206CE8A1; Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
19, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html.
828

For example, at the hearings, participants discussed instances of frivolous claims of ownership of iconic songs
like the Beatles’ “Hey Jude.” See Tr. at 88:03-12 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Christos Badavas, HFA) (“‘Hey, Jude’ was
written by Paul McCartney on his way to visit Julian Lennon shortly after the divorce of his father and his mother.
And based on the number of letters and claims I received in my years of working at EMI, which was a Beatles
distributor and now Harry Fox, related to, hey, who owns ‘Hey, Jude,’ there must have been several hundred people
riding in that car with Paul McCartney.”).
829

Tr. at 82:10-83:23 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Jay Rosenthal, NMPA) (discussing complexities of ownership claims
regarding publishers).
830

SGA & NSAI First Notice Comments at 1.

831

Tr. at 91:18-20 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Charles Sanders, SGA); see also Tr. at 60:08-61:01 (George Clinton, musician)
(agreeing that music owners should be able to participate in a small copyright claims procedure).
832

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (setting forth provisions allowing copyright owners to terminate grants).

833

Tr. at 73:11-20 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alma Robinson, CLA) (“Again, on behalf of California Lawyers for the Arts, I
just want to share the observation that many songwriters and musicians are now self-publishing and distributing
their own work and subject to the hazards of the internet. And I think that it would really be important to allow
those folks access … to whatever potential system we’re saying we’re thinking about.”).
834

VLA Third Notice Comments at 4.
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publisher representative at the Los Angeles hearing acknowledged that music publishers decline
to pursue songwriter claims that are not economically practical to litigate.835
The Office understands that each type of work has its own world of complexities, including
musical works and sound recordings. In some instances such works may benefit greatly from
litigation assistance provided by music publishers, performance rights organizations, or record
labels. But it is clear that this is not every case; indeed, it may well be the exception rather than
the rule when it comes to smaller claims of infringement. The fact that musical works and sound
recordings may be managed by intermediaries does not mean that songwriters or other musicians
should be deprived on a blanket basis of the opportunity to pursue an infringement matter in an
alternative small claims system if they should so choose.
That said, music publisher organizations and record companies may take comfort in the small
claims procedures being proposed. The system will not override private agreements, so such
organizations will remain free to structure their contractual relations as they wish, which of
course can address copyright enforcement responsibilities as between them and those they
represent. Moreover, as explained below, the Office recommends that any small claims
decisions – including with respect to ownership questions – be without preclusive effect in future
proceedings. But perhaps most significantly, because the system is voluntary, music publishers
and others who receive notice of a small claims action would be free to decide whether it is the
appropriate forum in which to address any particular claim.
Lastly, although the Office recommends that all types of works be covered by a small copyright
claims system, at least for now, it is possible that experience may show that certain types of
infringement claims are too complex for a small claims system. For example, claims that
involve in-depth analysis of computer software programs – should any be pursued as small
claims – could require a level of technical expertise that is beyond the capacity of a small claims
forum. For this reason, the Office recommends that the small claims body be allowed to dismiss
sua sponte claims that cannot be decided due to a lack of essential witnesses, evidence, or expert
analysis.
D.

Practice and Procedure
1.

Role of Attorneys

The question of whether attorneys should be allowed to participate in a small copyright claims
system generated considerable controversy among participating parties. Notably, some state
systems, including California, do not permit attorneys to appear on behalf of small claims
litigants.836 While stakeholders generally acknowledged that attorneys can be helpful to
copyright litigants, some expressed concern about the imbalance that could occur if individual
claimants appearing pro se had to face off against attorneys representing large corporate
interests.837 Others, however, pointed out that unsophisticated parties should not be deprived of
835

Tr. at 50:22-51:02 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Timothy Cohan, Peermusic).

836

Small Claims Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530.

837

Tr. 302:11-303:09 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Lisa Shaftel, GAG).
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the opportunity to be represented by counsel, as they are the ones who may be most in need of
legal counsel.838 Because aspects of copyright law can be complicated, many viewed the role of
attorneys as potentially more important in copyright cases than in typical small claims-type
disputes involving nonpayment or basic contract issues.839
On balance, the Office believes that, even if an alternative system is designed to enable pro se
participation, it is preferable for parties to have access to attorneys to represent them if they wish.
In the United States, there is a strong tradition – buttressed by considerations of due process – of
allowing parties to be assisted by counsel if they so choose. Less sophisticated parties may need
assistance in navigating copyright law and litigation procedure, and attorneys may be useful in
screening out nonmeritorious claims and defenses.840 Additionally, notwithstanding the practice
in certain state small claims courts, the general default rule is that corporations and other types of
business entities may only appear in court through an attorney.841 Corporate respondents may be
dissuaded from participating in an alternative system if they are deprived of representation of the
attorneys who ordinarily perform this role. Finally, as a practical matter, even if attorneys were
to be banned from the proceedings, it would be difficult to prevent them from preparing the
written submissions that likely will be decisive in many cases.
2.

Assistance to Litigants

A small claims process will be of little value if its procedures and requirements are not easily
understood by the average litigant. During the small copyright claims study, participants
exchanged ideas concerning how to make the system accessible to litigants, and especially to
unrepresented parties. There was general consensus that any such tribunal should provide
comprehensive information, in plain language, as to what is required of both claimants and
respondents.842 Such guidance might include forms with spaces to add simple narrative,
838

Tr. at 305:24-306:03 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Bruce Lehman, Former Asst. Sec’y of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents
& Trademarks); Tr. at 310:19-24 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Mickey Osterreicher, NPPA) (noting importance of right to
counsel). Cf. VLA Third Notice Comments at 16-17 (“VLA sees no reason to bar attorneys from the small claims
process. VLA and other similar organizations throughout the country routinely provide access to either pro bono
legal services or referrals to low cost legal representation, which VLA feels will only be encouraged with the
addition of a streamlined, expedited small claims process.”).
839

IFTA First Notice Comments at 4 (“While small claims courts typically do not allow parties to be represented by
counsel, copyright law is more complex than the types of cases on the docket of small claims courts so the parties
should be entitled to be represented by counsel.”); New Media Rights First Notice Comments at 18 (“If copyright
law is full of issues that even fully trained attorneys struggle with, how will the average small-time plaintiff or
defendant successfully represent themselves?”).
840

Tr. at 233:19-25 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (noting danger of frivolous claims by unrepresented
parties).
841

See 9A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
4463, (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2013) (“Generally, a corporation cannot appear in person, and hence it must appear
through an attorney admitted to practice in the jurisdiction in which the action is pending.”).
842

Tr. at 214:12-19 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Jay Rosenthal, NMPA) (stressing importance of making “instructions up front
as clean and clear as possible”); Tr. at 133:10-16 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alma Robinson, CLA) (suggesting “self-help
guides in some of the more esoteric things we have talked about today, additional media, Copyright Act, or peer use,
and so forth”).
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document templates, and similar aids for those seeking to pursue and defend claims.843 Good
examples of such user-friendly materials include California’s extensive handbook for small
claims litigants844 and WIPO’s model forms setting forth basic templates for the complaint and
response in UDRP proceedings.845
In addition, as noted above, staff attorneys could be made available to answer procedural
questions and assist with the completion of forms. Outside organizations, too, such as California
Lawyers for the Arts and Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, presumably would become familiar
with the process over time and might be available to help litigants either by representing them on
a pro bono basis or offering behind-the-scenes advice.
3.

Initiation of Proceeding

In any system of adjudication, due process requires that defending parties receive fair notice of
the claims against them. This is no less true in a small claims setting, especially one in which the
respondent must decide whether to participate.
As discussed above, the Office recommends that Congress consider the relative merits of both an
opt-out process and opt-in process to initiate a proceeding. An opt-out process would require
more robust notice to the responding party, who would be considered subject to the proceeding
unless he or she opted out. Under this approach, service of process probably should follow a
procedure analogous to that prescribed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules. Absent a defendant’s
waiver of formal service, this rule generally requires personal service of a defendant by a nonparty over the age of eighteen by delivering a copy of notice of the action and claim to the
individual personally; leaving a copy at the respondent’s place of abode with a suitable resident;
delivering a copy to an agent authorized to receive service; or, in the case of a corporation or
other entity, serving the corporation through an officer, registered agent, or by other acceptable
means.846 The respondent would then have a period of time – for example, sixty days – in which
to file an opt-out notice with the tribunal, or be bound by the result.

843

See, e.g., IFTA First Notice Comments at 5 (“Basic information as to the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the
Specialized Court as well as sample forms, including a complaint and a notice of complaint to be served on
defendant, should be publicly available for ease of claim filing.”); Barry Rosen, Comments in Response to First
Notice of Inquiry at 2 (“The court could function by using Magistrates specially designated to deal specifically with
copyright issues and filings could be done via a set of easy to use streamlined forms that could be done by any
layman.”); ABA IP Section Second Notice Comments at 3 (“Sample claim forms and responses would be useful in
creating a more streamlined process.”); Tr. at 133:19-134:09 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alicia Calzada, NPPA).
844

See Cal. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, The Small Claims Court A Guide to Its Practical Use, available at
http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small_claims/; see also Plaintiff’s Claim and Order to Go to Small Claims
Court, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/sc100.pdf.
845

See WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, eUDRP Model Complaint and Filing Guidelines, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/complainant/; WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Model Response and
Filing Guidelines, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/respondent/.
846

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
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Alternatively, under an opt-in system, the responding party could be notified less formally, but
would need to submit written consent to the tribunal before he or she was considered to be
participating.
Many commenters suggested that claimants be required to provide prima facie evidence of a
claim before the respondent is forced to respond to notice of a proceeding.847 The Office
generally concurs with this approach and recommends that, to commence a proceeding, the
complaining party be required to set forth the nature of the claim and the material facts that
support it. In addition, the claimant should certify the facts alleged. As some pointed out, a
certification requirement will signal to the claimant that the claim is a serious matter and should
help to deter unfounded submissions.848 Additionally, as discussed above, the Office believes
that a copyright small claims system could benefit from a process whereby staff attorneys review
incoming claims to ensure that they meet certain minimum requirements – for example, that they
set forth basic ownership information and the nature of the infringement alleged.
Finally, the small claims tribunal should require filing fees. Although such fees will not cover
the costs of the proceedings, they will offset some of these costs and serve to discourage spurious
claims. As one commenter explained, “the filing fee is very important for staving off some of
the meritless suits that would potentially be brought if this is a very streamlined time and cost
efficient and easier process for bringing these small claims.”849
4.

Multiple Claims and Parties

A small copyright claims system should promote the efficient resolution of disputes. To this
end, some stakeholders believe that a small claims system should allow multiple claims and/or
parties in a single proceeding.850 This is typical in federal court litigation, which in some
circumstances requires parties to assert any related claims or join indispensable parties in one
847

Google First Notice Comments at 4 (agreeing that copyright owner should provide a prima facie case before a
defendant must appear); FLASH Third Notice Comments (agreeing “that defendants should not have to engage in
litigation or even submit an answer until the plaintiff has proven their prima facie case.”); VLA Third Notice
Comments at 5-6; Tr. at 197:22-198:12 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Lisa Willmer, Getty Images); Tr. at 198:13-199:04 (Nov.
15, 2012) (Rachel Fertig, AAP).
848

Tr. at 231:19-232:16 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Rachel Fertig, AAP).

849

Tr. at 194:19-23 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Rachel Fertig, AAP); see also Microsoft First Notice Comments at 3 (“Some
mechanisms that may help ensure the right incentives are in place include … meaningful filing fees that help fund
the system and discourage nuisance claims but reasonable enough for copyright owners with legitimate disputes.”);
AAP Third Notice Comments, at 2 (calling filing fees a “safeguard”); NMPA, HFA, CMPA, ASCAP, BMI, &
SESAC, Comments Submitted in Response to Third Notice of Inquiry at 9 (not including a filing fee “would
encourage parties to bring questionable claims in a cheaper small claims court process ….”); Tr. at 186:14-16 (Nov.
25, 2012) (Alma Robinson, CLA) (“[P]eople have to have some skin in the game. It eliminates some frivolous
claims if there is a filing fee.”).
850

NPPA Second Notice Comments at 5 (“It should be the plaintiff’s sole prerogative whether to pursue multiple
claims against the same defendant in one proceeding.”), 13 (“[W]e support permitting multiple copyright owners or
entities acting on behalf of groups of copyright holders to pursue multiple claims against one or more defendants.”);
Tr. at 178:03-07 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Lisa Shaftel, GAG) (“We do think that multiple copyright owners should be
allowed to act together to pursue multiple infringement claims if their work was infringed by the same user for the
same use.”).
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action.851 The failure to do so can constitute a waiver of the right to litigate the foregone claim
or sue the additional party.852
In a less formal proceeding before a voluntary tribunal, however, mandatory related claims or
joinder of parties would be procedurally challenging, and in some cases, not possible.
Nonetheless, in some circumstances, co-owners of an infringed work might seek to bring a claim
jointly. Likewise, where multiple parties are involved in the same infringing activity or course
of conduct, it could be logical to pursue them together. Finally, in a situation where the same
party or parties have committed a series of related infringements, it could make sense to
adjudicate the claims together.
The Office sees no reason why one or more parties should not be allowed to pursue one or more
claims against one or more respondents in a small claims setting, assuming all of the parties and
claims are tied to the same allegedly infringing activity or a continuous course of alleged
infringement.853 In such a case, the same evidence would be at issue and the parties would be
able to resolve their dispute in one proceeding. But to keep the matter small, the Office
recommends that the overall monetary cap of $30,000 be maintained across all claims and
parties. That is, the total damages sought by all claimants for all of the claims together should
not exceed $30,000. Accordingly, if a party attempted to bring three $15,000 claims against an
alleged infringer for the infringing use of three photographs on a single web page, the claims
could not proceed because the aggregate amount would exceed the Office’s proposed $30,000
limit.
5.

Unknown Infringers

As was pointed out by participants in the small copyright claims study, in some cases – in
particular, cases of online infringement – a claimant may not know the identity or location of an
infringing party. Website owners can, and often do, choose to operate anonymously, and their
identities may be difficult or impossible for the average citizen to ascertain. This is a vexing
problem for copyright owners and others who wish to take action against online conduct. In a
federal court case, upon an appropriate showing, a plaintiff may be able to obtain a subpoena
against an online service provider to disclose the identity and address of a website operator.854
As noted above, however, courts sometimes decline to order the production of such information
by a third party.
851

FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (“A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that–at the time of its service–the
pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim; and (B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.”); id. 19 (Required Joinder of Parties).
852

See generally, id. 12(b)(7) & 19; Escamilla v. M2 Tech., Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14385 (5th Cir. 2013).

853

These counterclaims are similar to those required by Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although
they would not be mandatory and, as discussed below, omitting them would not have any preclusive effect on future
litigation.
854

See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-27, 584 F.Supp. 2d 240, 247 (D. Me. 2008) (denying a motion to quash a
subpoena seeking to discover the identity of unknown online infringers as the “DMCA specifically sanctions the
disclosure of anonymous internet users’ identities”).
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The Office believes that the question of whether a small claims court should provide a
mechanism to permit identification of unknown online infringers is one that should await another
day. While some sort of subpoena process might be beneficial, the current record does not
provide much insight as to how it would be practically implemented in an administrative setting.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the statutory provisions governing the CRB provide for the
issuance of subpoenas but the CRJs have never exercised this authority.855
Needless to say, any such procedure to determine the identity of unknown infringers would
require careful analysis as to the mechanism to be employed, including the appropriate
procedural safeguards to protect against unwarranted requests for disclosure. The Office
therefore recommends further consideration of this issue if an alternative small claims system is
adopted.
6.

Discovery

Any system to adjudicate small claims must grapple with the nature and amount of discovery to
be permitted. As suggested above, the broad availability of discovery and related frustration of
discovery-related disputes are significant factors in the timing and expense of federal litigation.
At the same time, it is difficult to resolve a dispute fairly without access to relevant information.
In considering the question of whether and what discovery should be permitted in an alternative
system, there is no obvious model to emulate. Discovery varies enormously across different
forums – from none at all in UDRP proceedings to district court-like procedures in the TTAB.
State small claims courts allow differing degrees of discovery, ranging from none to discovery in
limited circumstances, usually for good cause shown.856
Most stakeholders offering opinions seemed to favor a middle ground with respect to
discovery.857 As one hearing participant explained, “there is definitely going to be a need for the
availability of limited discovery, but … the process would benefit from having an adjudicator put
limits on [it] because one of the huge obstacles and expenses in litigation is … the discovery
process.”858 Discovery can be critical to actual damages claims because “overwhelmingly the
855

See 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(6)(C)(ix); see also Copyright Royalty Judges’ Authority to Subpoena a Nonparticipant to
Appear and Give Testimony or to Produce and Permit Inspection of Documents or Tangible Things, 75 Fed. Reg.
13,306 (Mar. 19, 2010) (noting in a Final Order that the issue of whether the CRJs can issue a non-party subpoena
has not been determined in prior decisions, determinations, or rulings).
856

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-102(a) (“Discovery … excluding physical and mental examinations … may
be taken in all civil cases pending in the courts of general sessions in the discretion of the court after motion
showing both good cause and exceptional circumstances and pursuant to an order describing the extent and
conditions of such discovery.”); see also Appendix D.
857

See, e.g., AAP Second Notice Comments at 7 (including “(1) limit discovery to 90 days; (2) allow only written
discovery; (3) limit interrogatories, requests for admission and document requests; and (4) allow good faith
discovery motions, but require resolution through phone conference”); Getty Images Second Notice Comments at 4
(“Limited discovery should be permitted in the form of written depositions and interrogatories to allow the plaintiff
to establish its infringement claim and to allow the defendant to establish its defense(s).”); IFTA Second Notice
Comments at 5; Kernochan Second Notice Comments at 2 (“Discovery should be permitted to allow for those cases
in which critical information resides with the opposing party, but it should be very limited in time and scope.”).
858

Tr. at 228:06-11 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alicia Calzada, NPPA).
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evidence of actual damages and their amount will be in the possession of the defendant.”859
Many commenters, however, believed that only certain types of discovery should be allowed,
proposing written discovery860 with no depositions.861
The Office agrees that litigants should be able to pursue some amount of discovery in small
claims actions, including production of documents, interrogatory responses, and written
admissions. The Office does not believe that depositions – which are typically conducted in
person, can be intimidating for litigants, and require costly transcription services – should be
necessary in a small claims system. Commenting parties tended to agree that depositions would
be inconsistent with the goal of achieving inexpensive and streamlined resolution of cases.862
The ability to learn about the other side’s case may be critical to support a defense or damages
claim, or help to facilitate a settlement. But any such discovery should be narrowly focused on
the issues in dispute and far more modest than what is permitted under the Federal Rules (which
allow for up to twenty-five interrogatories per party and unlimited requests for production of
documents and admissions).863 Nonetheless, to ensure some flexibility in the system, the tribunal
should retain the authority to allow limited additional discovery if it will advance the ultimate
goal of resolving a case expeditiously.
7.

Motion Practice

In theory, a small claims system could provide the parties with the option to file both procedural
and substantive motions, as do some of the models reviewed above. A dispositive motion, such
as for summary judgment, can shorten a case if it is successful – but by the same token can
extend the proceedings and waste valuable resources if it is not. Moreover, formal motion
practice requires a familiarity with applicable procedural and substantive law that may be beyond
the reach of most pro se litigants.
Recognizing these concerns, some stakeholders suggested that any small claims process
“strongly limit … motion practice.”864 The Office agrees that formal motion practice would be
inconsistent with the objectives of the alternative small claims system it is proposing. Any such
859

Tr. at 229:15-19 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU).

860

See, e.g., NPPA Second Notice Comments at 10 (“Discovery should be limited and could include interrogatories,
requests for admissions, and limited requests for production of documents relevant to the issue of liability and
damages. Testimony should be in affidavit form unless a hearing is granted, in which case oral sworn testimony
could be allowed.”).
861

See Tr. at 211:22-24 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA) (“We don’t think except in maybe very rare
circumstances that depositions would be appropriate.”); Tr. at 235:07-09 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Carolyn Wright, Law
Offices of Carolyn E. Wright) (“I think that no depositions likely would be allowed without leave of court.”).
862

See, e.g., Tr. at 235:01-09 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Carolyn Wright, Law Offices of Carolyn E. Wright) (suggesting no
depositions without leave of court); Tr. at 232:20-22 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm) (suggesting
discovery should be limited and noting that “[o]ftentimes depositions just become a way to torture one of the parties
in wasting time taking endless depositions that go nowhere”).
863

FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (interrogatories), 34 (requests for production of documents), & 36 (requests for admissions).

864

Tr. at 233:14-234:03 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm).
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small claims process should focus on allowing the parties to present their respective evidence
and arguments in an informal yet fair manner to permit the ultimate decision on the merits. But
this does not mean the parties should be altogether precluded from raising a matter that is
obstructing resolution. The Office recommends that parties be allowed to make informal
requests to the adjudicators during the course of the proceeding to address case management and
discovery issues. In addition, should the adjudicators believe that they need more information
from the parties to reach a result, they should be able request specific submissions from the
parties.
8.

Evidence

As in any adjudicatory system, the parties will need to submit evidence to support their positions.
At the roundtables and in comments, parties suggested that any evidence should be offered in
written form.865 The Office agrees and recommends that, as a general matter, all evidence,
including testimony, be submitted electronically in documentary form. Moreover, as in many
small claims settings, formal rules of evidence should not apply; the adjudicators should have the
discretion to consider evidentiary submissions according to their worth.
One specific point of contention during the study was whether to allow expert testimony.866
When a court is addressing a complex topic – for example, the marketplace impact of a statutory
copyright license – subject matter experts may help to identify and make sense of complicated
evidence. A drawback, however, of using experts is that they are expensive and must typically
be retained by both sides in a litigation to ensure that the court has a balanced view of the issue.
The Office believes that in the vast majority of cases, a copyright claim that is amenable to small
claims treatment should not require the presentation of expert evidence. A default rule
precluding expert witnesses is consistent with the procedures of the recently established
copyright small claims court of the UK867 At the same time, however, in the rare case where it
were shown that expert evidence could be fairly introduced and would aid the tribunal in
resolving a matter, the tribunal should have the discretion to consider it.

865

See, e.g., Authors Guild First Notice Comments at 4 (“Small copyright infringement claims can generally be
adjudicated largely on documentary evidence – a submission of the plaintiffs [sic] registered work and the alleged
infringing work.”); Getty Images Second Notice Comments at 3 (“In many cases, the parties could submit their
positions and evidence in writing, without need for personal appearance.”); Tr. at 217:19-20 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Lisa
Willmer, Getty Images) (start with presumption that proceedings are based on submitted papers).
866

Illustrators’ Partnership First Notice Comments at 2 (opposing limitation of expert witnesses); Getty Images
Second Notice Comments at 4 (“Expert witnesses should not be permitted due to the expense and complexity of
assessing their expert role. If an expert is required, the matter is not suitable for the small claims process.”);
Cannings Second Notice Comments at 4 (supporting inclusion of expert witnesses); Tr. at 89:20-22 (Nov. 15, 2012)
(Christos Badavas, HFA) (relating reliance on expert witnesses); Tr. at 168:19-25 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Eugene Mopsik,
ASMP) (concerned that expert witnesses will drive up the cost); Tr. at 174:22-175:06 (Nov. 15, 2012) (David
Leichtman, VLA) (advocating for limited use of experts for fair use determinations); Tr. at 207:08-11 (Nov. 15,
2012) (Lisa Shaftel, GAG) (advocating for limited use of expert witnesses, at least to determine customary license
fees).
867

CPR 27.5 (In the small claims track, “[n]o expert may give evidence, whether written or oral, at a hearing without
the permission of the court.”).
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Frivolous Claims

Throughout the small claims study, stakeholders voiced concern about the potential filing of
frivolous or harassing claims and the resulting nuisance for those required to respond. More
specifically, there was a view that an alternative system would invite unfounded claims by
offering cheaper and easier access than federal court. As one commenter explained, “[i]f the
process for filing a complaint amounts to writing a short letter, the court will be overwhelmed
with claims and many defendants will have to respond to frivolous complaints.”868 At the same
time, however, it was acknowledged that not all such claims would necessarily be malicious; in
some cases, a copyright owner might sincerely but mistakenly believe he or she had a legitimate
claim when in fact it was barred by the statute of limitations or was based on a misunderstanding
of the law.869
To this end, the Office proposes several strategies to guard against frivolous claims. First, as
described above, the tribunal and staff attorneys should provide ample information to the public
about the rules and requirements of the system. Second, a staff attorney experienced in
copyright law should review incoming claims to ensure that they satisfy certain basic legal
requirements. For example, a claim should identify the work at issue, the claimant’s interest in
the work, and the nature of the alleged infringement. If a claim failed to meet these minimal
requirements, it could be returned to the claimant for amendment if possible. If the claimant
were ultimately unable to provide a sufficient basis to move forward, the claim would be
dismissed without prejudice. Such an approach is consistent with many stakeholder comments
and presumably would screen out many unwarranted filings.
In addition, however, as discussed above, the Office suggests that, upon a proper showing, the
tribunal be authorized to award aggrieved parties reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs – up to a
total amount of $5,000 – when a litigant has pursued a claim or defense for a harassing or
improper purpose, or without a reasonable basis in fact or law.870 A fee-shifting award could
also be made in the case of a claimant who summoned a respondent to the tribunal but failed to
move forward with the case. Pro se litigants would be eligible for such reimbursement, but for
costs only of up to $2,500. Such amounts would be in addition to, and not count against, the
applicable damages cap for small claims proceedings.

868

Google First Notice Comments at 4.

869

Tr. at 277:20-278:05 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alma Robinson, CLA) (“[W]e do get a number of frivolous inquiries in
our office, people who wrote all of Michael Jackson’s music or et cetera, wrote the latest blockbuster movies, the
scripts. And so I think having some sort of screening, we discussed legal advisers at the front door that would help
people self-evaluate and decide that they didn’t really have the evidence to pursue this would be helpful.”).
870

Such an approach, for example, was proposed by NPPA. Tr. 266:12-267:01 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alicia Calzada,
NPPA) (suggesting capped fee awards for “truly, truly frivolous claims”).
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Enforcement

A small claims tribunal will not mean much if its decisions can simply be ignored. As one
stakeholder put it, “[i]t would be of little use to obtain a judgment in a small copyright claim
forum if there was no effective means to enforce the judgment.”871
Because a non-Article III administrative tribunal would lack the inherent powers to enforce its
determinations, claimants would need a mechanism to turn an award of relief into a courtenforceable judgment. The Office believes that the FAA provides a valuable model in this
regard.872 Under the FAA, parties who have obtained an award through private arbitration may
file the award with a federal district court to have it confirmed and reduced to a judgment.873 As
discussed in more detail above, such awards are presumptively confirmed absent a showing that
they were obtained by fraud or misconduct, exceed the powers of the deciding body, or fail to
make a final and definite award.874 Under the Office’s proposal, relief awarded through a
voluntary small copyright claims process could similarly be confirmed by a district court. A
party who was having difficulty collecting damages or securing other relief awarded by the small
claims tribunal would thus have the option of obtaining a federal court judgment.
While it seems that many small claims respondents who agreed to participate in the process
would pay up if damages were imposed, undoubtedly there would be those who would not, even
if the claimant took the step of filing the determination in district court. The problem of
collecting on judgments is, of course, not unique to copyright, but a perennial concern for
prevailing litigants, particularly in the small claims context.875 A successful copyright small
claims litigant who had his or her judgment confirmed by a district court would, for better or
worse, then need to rely on general processes for enforcement of a federal court judgment.
These typically would include filing the judgment with a federal or state court in the
respondent’s jurisdiction and possibly seeking garnishment or similar court-sanctioned relief.876

871

PACA Third Notice Comments at 6.

872

ZipCourt First Notice Comments at 3, 6 (suggesting that a small copyright claims tribunal would benefit from
being an arbitration, because it would be covered by the FAA); VLA Third Notice Comments at 16 (suggesting use
of the FAA to both affirm awards and as a standard for overturning awards).
873

9 U.S.C. § 9.

874

Id. If the enforcement of the arbitration was agreed to by the parties and was timely, “the court must grant such
an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.”); see
also Denver & Rio Grande W. R.. Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 868 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (D. Kan. 1994) (“If an
arbitration award cannot be vacated pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10, or modified pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 11, it must be
confirmed pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 9.”).
875

Tr. at 53:21-23 (Nov. 15, 2012) (Joseph DiMona, BMI) (“[Collecting a judgment] costs money, and it is not
always the easiest thing to do either ….”); Tr. at 348:20-350:09 (Nov. 16, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA)
(discussing the problems that plaintiffs in small claims proceedings have collecting judgments); Tr. at 358:08-21
(Nov. 16, 2012) (Lisa Willmer, Getty Images) (suggesting that the enforcement issue is not unique to small claims
proceedings, and enforcement challenges may be lessened that if the small claims copyright tribunal were
voluntary).
876

FED. R. CIV. P. 64 (allowing garnishment as a remedy).
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Review

While presumably the outcome of a small claims proceeding should be subject to some form of
review, the benefits of a streamlined system would quickly evaporate if decisions could be
extensively reconsidered, especially by an Article III court. Losing parties with substantial
resources could essentially seek to relitigate the matter in federal court. Taking the examples of
the bankruptcy courts and CRB, such Article III review could be either de novo at the district
court level or by direct appeal to a federal court of appeals. Like district court litigation, federal
appellate review can be procedurally complex, time-consuming and costly.877 In either case, a
litigant who could not afford the burden or expense of federal court and was forced to litigate an
appeal would be back at square one. As one hearing participant predicted, “[i]f [the award] is
appealable afterwards, [a] large corporation is going to take it. And if they don’t like the ruling,
they are going to appeal it ….”878 Another commenting party observed that if appeals were not
sufficiently limited, the small claims process could become “an exercise in futility for indigent
plaintiffs or small plaintiffs who prevail and then are subjected to an appellate process.”879
At the same time, as a matter of basic fairness, a litigant before a small claims tribunal should
have some ability to challenge and correct a faulty determination. As a middle ground, the
Office therefore proposes that the system provide for review of decisions in a limited manner
that will not defeat the purpose of the small claims system. First, as is common in many
adjudicatory settings, parties should be able to seek reconsideration by the decisionmakers based
on a material error or technical mistake.880 If reconsideration is denied, upon payment of an
additional fee, a party should be permitted to appeal the denial to the Register of Copyrights,
who would be empowered to remand the case for further proceedings if she believed the denial
of reconsideration was erroneous.881 Finally, regardless of whether an aggrieved party exercised
his or her right to appeal to the Register, the party could challenge the enforceability of the
decision in a manner analogous to that permitted under the FAA – that is, the party could seek to
have the decision set aside for fraud, misconduct, or on similar grounds.882 Parties subject to a
877

See Tr. at 347:05-12 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Nancy Wolff, PACA) (“I think the idea of giving a pro se party the federal
rules to look at and to wind their way through the appeals, and even the fonts they have to do, the amount of
footnotes and the page limits, the requirements to cite would just – I can’t even begin to imagine how hard that
would be for – particularly for a creative person.”).
878

Tr. at 242:04-07 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Michael Grecco, APA).

879

Tr. at 325:25-326:06 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Charles Sanders, SGA).

880

17 U.S.C. § 803(c)(4) (“The Copyright Royalty Judges may issue an amendment to a written determination to
correct any technical or clerical errors in the determination or to modify the terms, but not the rates, of royalty
payments in response to unforeseen circumstances that would frustrate the proper implementation of such
determination.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (allowing motions to alter or amend judgments).
881

Some stakeholders supported creating appeals procedures within the Copyright Office itself. IFTA Second
Notice Comments at 4 (supporting the right to a limited appeal to the Register similar to the rules governing the
CRB); Tr. at 328:17-329:02 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Lisa Shaftel, GAG) (proposing an en banc style of appeal within the
small claims copyright court); Tr. at 339:18-340:03 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Rachel Fertig, AAP) (suggesting an internal
appeals system for motions to reconsider).
882

9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (grounds for vacation); see also, Tr. at 331:03-05 (Nov. 16, 2012) (David Leichtman, VLA)
(suggesting that any challenges to awards granted by the small copyright claims tribunal could be judged by the
same the standards found under the FAA).
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default judgment or subject to a fee award could also seek review by the district court to have the
award set aside upon a showing of excusable neglect.
12.

Effect of Decisions

A critical question with respect to any alternative adjudication process is what effect its decisions
should have. Commenting parties were near universal in their opinion that decisions of an
alternative small claims tribunal should not be preclusive, or serve as precedent, in future
proceedings.883 As one stakeholder explained it: “The goals of a small claims court . . . should
not include influencing the direction of copyright law: decisions of the court will often be made
quickly, based on a superficial record, without the benefit of briefing by counsel.”884 Another
noted that “the decisions should not have any precedential effect beyond the immediate dispute
which should lessen any impact on what decisional law the tribunal should follow.”885
The Office strongly concurs. Because the small claims tribunal would rely on abbreviated
procedures, including limited discovery and argument, it would be inappropriate for its decisions
to be binding beyond the particular parties and disputes it adjudicates. Any specific factual or
legal issue addressed in a determination – for example, a question of copyright ownership or fair
use – should be of no future effect. Similarly, the determinations of a streamlined small claims
tribunal should not carry precedential weight, either in federal court or in future matters before it.
Notably, this approach is similar to that in UDRP proceedings, which do not accord previous
panel decisions any persuasive weight.
Although nonbinding and nonprecedential in effect, however, in the interest of the transparency
and maintenance of a public record, the Office believes that the decisions of any alternative small
claims process should be publicly available, consistent with the general rules applicable to
government proceedings.886
883

ASCAP & SESAC, Comments Submitted in Response to First Notice of Inquiry at 6 (“[T]he Office should
ensure that decisions and opinions of any such adjudication body be limited to that case and not serve as precedent
for any other action, including specifically for any action brought in a federal or state court.”); Microsoft First
Notice Comments at 3 (“[A]ny findings or opinions that result from a system should be limited to the works at issue,
and non-precedential except as between the parties, particularly on fact-specific issues involved in the dispute, such
as application of fair use or other exemption.”); PACA First Notice Comments at 11 (“[D]ecisions would… have no
precedential value in future cases.”); Traynor et al. First Notice Comments at 8 (“[Decisions] should not have
precedential or stare decisis effects in other or future cases.”); AAP Second Notice Comments at 9 (“[W]e oppose
giving the decisions any precedential value.”); GAG Second Notice Comments at 11 (“A decision of the small
claims tribunal should not be published and/or carry any precedential weight.”); Getty Images Second Notice
Comments at 5 (“[Decisions of the tribunal] should not be precedential, other than as between the same parties with
respect to the same alleged infringement.”); MPAA Third Notice Comments at 5 (“In a system where quick, cheap
resolution of claims is the primary goal, judges’ main goal should be to do justice – perhaps even rough justice – for
the parties before them” and “[s]mall claims decisions should also have no precedential effect.”). But see Cannings
Second Notice Comments at 5 (“The decision should be published, and carry precedential weight.”).
884

Google First Notice Comments at 4.

885

PACA Third Notice Comments at 4.

886

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 554(a) (the Administrative Procedure Act, for example, applies “in every case of adjudication
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”); see also Tr. at 352:2125 (Nov. 16, 2012) (Randy Taylor, CDL) (“Another possibility has been discussed about whether or not these
outcomes should be disclosed publicly or not. That might be an interesting deterrent, that if you refuse to pay in a
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Settlement and Alternative Dispute Resolution

Most stakeholders emphasized the need for a system that could render binding decisions and
were not enthusiastic about mediation or other forms of ADR as a viable solution to the problem
of small claims. To quote one participant on this subject: “I think the reality is no one takes you
seriously until you file …. Every defendant I know in my own copyright cases are [sic] like
‘Whatever.’”887 Asked about the possibility of requiring parties to submit to a mediation process
before seeking an adjudicative decision, some expressed concern that it would simply increase
the time and expense necessary to resolve a claim.888 In addition to the difficulties of reaching a
resolution through mediation, parties also noted the considerable costs of traditional arbitration,
where parties are typically required to pay the arbitrators’ fees.889 In light of these reactions, it
appears that, at least at this time, stakeholders are most interested in an adjudicative process that
results in binding decisions rather than one that relies on ADR.
But the Office does not believe that the possibility of mediation or other ADR procedures should
be abandoned completely. Mediation can be effective when all parties are committed to
resolving a dispute.890 At the very least, any small claims process should encourage settlement
when possible. For example, participants should have the ability to request a supervised
settlement conference if they believe it would be helpful. For these reasons, as discussed above,
the Office believes that an alternative small claims process could benefit substantially from a
decisionmaker who has meaningful background and experience in ADR. If a small claims
process is adopted, further consideration should be given to the question of whether it should
also offer mediation or similar services in addition to performing its adjudicative functions.
And finally, to alleviate some of the burdens on federal district courts, the Office suggests that
any small claims tribunal be expressly designated as a qualified ADR process under the ADRA
certain period of time, that outcome would become public.”); Tr. at 263:7-20 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alicia Calzada,
NPPA) (in support of a public record); Tr. at 264:8-12 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU) (“Especially
given whatever kinds of limitations on damages, the naming and shaming are an important function of this tribunal.
And that can’t be carried out if its decisions aren’t a public record.”). But see GAG Second Notice Comments at 11
(“A decision of the small claims tribunal should not be published and/or carry any precedential weight.”).
887

Tr. at 300:13-17 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Michael Grecco, APA); see also Tr. at 305:19-306:02 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Kim
Tommaselli, IFTA) (“[W]e wouldn’t find mediation particularly helpful because it is important for [our members] to
get something enforceable, an award, quickly in order to preserve their rights and stop any damage that has already
occurred.”); Tr. at 297:16-298:03 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Edward Hasbrouck, NWU) (“The[se cases] would settle if and
only if infringers have come to learn that they’re actually going to lose and it is actually going to be costly to them if
they pursue these matters to a small claims adjudication.”).
888

See, e.g., Tr. at 307:16-21 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Lorin Brennan, Linde Law Firm) (“I don’t think that any sort of
mandatory prefiling procedures for mediation, et cetera, would have it benefit. It only increases costs and increases
the glue and the procedural hurdles you have to jump through to go through a case.”); Tr. at 296:03-17 (Nov. 26,
2012) (Alicia Calzada, NPPA) (“We do support making mediation a part of the process. But, again, we just want to
make sure that it doesn’t become a burdensome part of the process.”).
889

Tr. at 284:01-288:02 (Nov. 26, 2012) (various participants).

890

Tr. at 295:19-22 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alma Robinson, CLA) (“[Mediation] can be effective. Again, if people are
there in good faith, if they really want to resolve it, if they want to explore other options, then it can be effective.”).
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so that eligible cases can be referred to the tribunal for streamlined resolution upon parties’
consent.891
E.

Implementation and Additional Study

In their written comments and at the hearings, stakeholders expressed the view that any small
claims process would need to be evaluated and potentially adjusted after it had been in effect for
a period of time. As with any unprecedented program, it is difficult to predict all of the
contingencies that might arise once it becomes operational. Commentators noted in different
ways that “a pilot program is probably a good idea.”892
For these reasons, the Office believes that much of the fine-tuning of any such system should be
accomplished through regulation, rather than attempted by legislation. While the forum, subject
matter, jurisdiction, available remedies, and other fundamental features of the process should be
prescribed by statute, the details should be left to the rulemaking capabilities of the Copyright
Office. To this end, Congress should ensure that the Office has the regulatory authority to
implement the small claims system within the statutory parameters. In addition, after three years
of operation, the Office should report to Congress on the efficacy of the system, including in
relation to eligible works and claims, damages limitations, fee-shifting authority, identification of
unknown infringers, and possible inclusion of mediation or similar ADR services.

891

See 28 U.S.C. § 651(b).

892

Tr. at 137:21-22 (Nov. 27, 2012) (Art Neil, New Media Rights); see also Tr. at 225:13-16 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Alma
Robinson, CLA) (“I would think that we have heard the idea of a pilot project to test some of these concepts. And if
it’s available to everybody around the country, I think it would [be] more useful.”); Tr. at 413:02-04 (Nov. 16, 2012)
(Nancy Wolff, PACA) (“So I think even if it was just a pilot program, I think get it started very quickly, that would
be helpful.”).
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

Based on the above findings and recommendations, the Copyright Office has prepared a draft of
proposed legislation to implement a small claims system, as well as a section-by-section analysis
of the proposal, both of which are set forth below. The draft legislation includes alternative
provisions to implement the system on either an opt-out or opt-in basis.
A.

Discussion Draft

§ 1401 – Copyright Claims Board and Staff
a) Copyright Claims Board. – There shall be established within the U.S. Copyright Office a
Copyright Claims Board, which shall serve as an alternative forum in which parties may
voluntarily seek to resolve certain copyright claims, as further provided in this chapter.
b) Officers and Staff. –
1) Copyright Claims Officers. – Upon consultation with the Register of Copyrights, who
shall recommend qualified candidates, the Librarian of Congress shall appoint 3 full-time
Copyright Claims Officers to serve on the Copyright Claims Board.
2) Copyright Claims Attorneys. – The Register of Copyrights shall appoint no fewer than 2
full-time Copyright Claims Attorneys to assist in the administration of the Copyright
Claims Board.
3) Qualifications. –
A) Copyright Claims Officers. – Each Copyright Claims Officer shall be an attorney
with no less than 7 years of legal experience. Two of the Copyright Claims Officers
shall have substantial experience in the evaluation, litigation or adjudication of
copyright infringement claims and, between them, shall have represented or presided
over a diversity of copyright interests, including those of both owners and users of
copyrighted works. The third Copyright Claims Officer shall have substantial
experience in the field of alternative dispute resolution, including the resolution of
litigation matters through such means.
B) Copyright Claims Attorneys. – Each Copyright Claims Attorney shall be an attorney
with no less than 3 years of substantial experience in the field of copyright law.
4) Compensation. – Each Copyright Claims Officer shall be compensated at not less than
the basic minimum and not more than the basic maximum rate of pay for SL employees
(or the equivalent) of the federal government. Each Copyright Claims Attorney shall be
compensated at not more than the basic rate of pay for level 10 of GS-15 of the General
Schedule (or the equivalent).
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5) Term. – Copyright Claims Officers shall serve for 6-year terms that are automatically
renewable by the Librarian of Congress upon consultation with the Register of
Copyrights; provided, however, that the terms for the initial Copyright Claims Officers
appointed hereunder shall be as follows: one Copyright Claims Officer shall be
appointed for 4 years; the second shall be appointed for 5 years; and the third shall be
appointed for 6 years.
6) Vacancies and Incapacity. –
A) Vacancy. – If a vacancy shall occur in the position of Copyright Claims Officer, the
Librarian of Congress shall, upon consultation with the Register of Copyrights who
shall recommend qualified candidates, act expeditiously to appoint a Copyright
Claims Officer for that position. An individual appointed to fill a vacancy occurring
before the expiration of the term for which his or her predecessor was appointed shall
be appointed to serve for a 6-year term.
B) Incapacity. – If a Copyright Claims Officer is temporarily unable to perform his or
her duties, the Librarian of Congress shall, upon consultation with the Register of
Copyrights who shall recommend qualified candidates, act expeditiously to appoint
an interim Copyright Claims Officer to perform such duties during the period of such
incapacity.
7) Supervision and Removal. – Subject to section 1402(b), the Copyright Claims Officers
and Copyright Claims Attorneys shall be supervised and removable by the Librarian of
Congress.
8) Administrative Support. – The Register of Copyrights shall provide the Copyright Claims
Officers and Copyright Claims Attorneys with necessary administrative support,
including technological facilities, to carry out their duties under this chapter.
9) Location in Copyright Office. – The offices of the Copyright Claims Officers and
Copyright Claims Attorneys shall be located at the Copyright Office.
§ 1402 – Authority and Responsibilities of the Copyright Claims Board
a) Functions. –
1) Copyright Claims Officers. – Subject to the provisions of this chapter and applicable
regulations, the functions of the Copyright Claims Officers shall be as follows:
A) To render determinations on such civil copyright claims, counterclaims and defenses
as are permitted to be brought before them under this chapter, and to certify such
determinations for confirmation by the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia;
B) To ensure that claims and counterclaims are properly filed and otherwise appropriate
for resolution by the Copyright Claims Board;
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C) To manage the proceedings before them and render rulings pertaining to the
consideration of claims, including scheduling, discovery, evidentiary, and other
matters;
D) To request the production of information and documents relevant to the resolution of
a claim, defense, or counterclaim from participants in a proceeding and from
nonparticipants;
E) To conduct hearings and conferences;
F) To facilitate parties’ settlement of claims and counterclaims;
G) To include in its determinations a requirement of cessation or mitigation of infringing
activity, including takedown or destruction of infringing materials, where the party to
undertake such measures has so agreed;
H) To provide information to the public concerning the procedures and requirements of
the Copyright Claims Board;
I) To maintain records of the proceedings before them and make public the
determinations in individual proceedings;
J) To carry out such other duties as are prescribed in this chapter; and
K) When not engaged in performing their duties as prescribed in this chapter, to perform
such other duties as may be assigned by the Register of Copyrights.
2) Copyright Claims Attorneys. – Subject to the provisions of this chapter and applicable
regulations, the functions of the Copyright Claims Attorneys shall be as follows:
A) To provide assistance to the Copyright Claims Officers in the administration of their
duties under this chapter;
B) To provide assistance to members of the public with respect to the procedures and
requirements of the Copyright Claims Board; and
C) When not engaged in performing their duties as prescribed in this chapter, to perform
such other duties as may be assigned by the Register of Copyrights.
b) Independence in Determinations. – The Copyright Claims Officers shall render their
determinations in individual proceedings independently on the basis of the records in the
proceedings before them and in accordance with the provisions of this title, judicial precedent
and applicable regulations of the Register of Copyrights. The Copyright Claims Officers and
Copyright Claims Attorneys may consult with the Register of Copyrights on general issues of
law, but, subject to section 1405(w), not with respect to the facts of any particular matter
pending before them or the application of law thereto. Notwithstanding any other provision
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of law or any regulation or policy of the Library of Congress or Register of Copyrights, no
performance appraisal of a Copyright Claims Officer or Copyright Claims Attorney shall
consider the substantive result of any individual determination reached by the Copyright
Claims Board as a basis for appraisal except insofar as it may relate to an actual or alleged
violation of an ethical standard of conduct.
c) Direction by Register. – Subject to subsection (b), the Copyright Claims Officers and
Copyright Claims Attorneys shall be generally directed in the administration of their duties
by the Register of Copyrights.
d) Inconsistent Duties Barred. – No Copyright Claims Officer or Copyright Claims Attorney
may undertake duties that conflict with his or her duties or responsibilities in connection with
the Copyright Claims Board.
e) Recusal. – A Copyright Claims Officer shall recuse himself or herself from participation in
any proceeding with respect to which the Copyright Claims Officer has reason to believe that
he or she has a conflict of interest.
f) Ex Parte Communications. – Except as may otherwise be permitted by applicable law, any
party to a proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board shall refrain from ex parte
communications with the Copyright Claims Officers concerning the substance of any
proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board; provided, however, that Copyright Claims
Attorneys may provide information and assistance to parties concerning the procedures and
requirements of the Copyright Claims Board.
g) Judicial Review. – Actions of the Copyright Claims Officers and Register of Copyrights
under this chapter in connection with the rendering of individual determinations are subject
to judicial review as provided under section 1407(c) and not under chapter 7 of title 5.
§ 1403 – Nature of Proceedings
a) Voluntary Participation. – Participation in a Copyright Claims Board proceeding shall be on
a voluntary basis in accordance with this chapter, and the right of any party to instead pursue
a claim, counterclaim or defense in a United States district court or any other court, and to
seek a jury trial, shall be preserved.
b) Statute of Limitations. –
1) In General. – No proceeding shall be maintained before the Copyright Claims Board
unless it is commenced before the Copyright Claims Board within three years after the
claim that is the basis for the proceeding accrued.
2) Tolling. – Subject to section 1406(a), a proceeding commenced before the Copyright
Claims Board shall toll the time permitted under section 507(b) of this title for
commencement of an action on the same claim in a federal district court during the time
it remains pending.
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c) Permissible Claims, Counterclaims and Defenses. – The Copyright Claims Officers may
render determinations with respect to the following claims, counterclaims and defenses,
subject to such further limitations and requirements, including with respect to particular
classes of works, as may be set forth in regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights:
1) A claim for infringement or a declaration of infringement of an exclusive right of
copyright provided under section 106 of this title asserted by the legal or beneficial owner
of such exclusive right at the time of infringement pursuant to which the claimant seeks
damages, if any, within the limitations set forth in subsection (d)(1).
2) A claim for a declaration of noninfringement of an exclusive right of copyright provided
under section 106 of this title pursuant to which the claimant seeks damages, if any,
within the limitations set forth in subsection (d)(1), where an actual controversy exists as
evidenced by a documented threat of legal action against the claimant.
3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a claim pursuant to 512(f) for
misrepresentation in connection with a notification of claimed infringement or a counter
notification seeking to replace removed or disabled material; provided, however, that any
remedies in such a proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board shall be limited to
those available under this chapter.
Note: A conforming amendment to section 512(f) may be advisable.
4) A counterclaim asserted solely against the claimant or claimants in a proceeding pursuant
to which the counterclaimant or counterclaimants seek damages, if any, within the
limitations set forth in subsection (d)(1), and that –
A) Arises under section 106 or section 512(f) of this title and out of the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject of a claim of infringement brought under
paragraph (1) or a claim of misrepresentation under paragraph (3); or
B) Arises under an agreement pertaining to the same transaction or occurrence that is
the subject of a claim of infringement brought under paragraph (1) and could affect
the relief awarded to the claimant.
5) A legal or equitable defense, pursuant to this title or otherwise available under law, in
response to a claim or counterclaim asserted under this subsection.
6) A single claim or multiple claims permitted under paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) by one or
more claimants against one or more respondents; provided, however, that all claims
asserted in any one proceeding arise out of the same allegedly infringing activity or a
continuous course of alleged infringement and do not in the aggregate result in a claim
for damages in excess of the limitation provided in subsection (d)(1)(D).
7) Excluded Claims. – The following claims and counterclaims are not subject to
determination by the Copyright Claims Board:
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A) A claim or counterclaim that is not a permissible claim or counterclaim under
subsection (c);
B) A claim or counterclaim already pending before, or finally adjudicated by, a court of
competent jurisdiction;
C) A claim or counterclaim by or against a federal or state government entity;
D) A claim or counterclaim asserted against a person or entity residing outside of the
United States; and
E) A claim or counterclaim dismissed by the Copyright Claims Board pursuant to
section 1405(f)(3).
d) Permissible Remedies.
1) Damages for Infringement. –
A) Actual and Limited Statutory Damages. – Subject to the limitation on total damages
set forth in subparagraph (D), with respect to a claim or counterclaim for
infringement of copyright, the Copyright Claims Board may award –
(i) Actual damages and profits of the infringing party determined in accordance with
section 504(b) of this title, which determination shall include in appropriate cases
consideration of whether the infringing party has agreed to cease or mitigate the
infringing activity as provided in subsection (d)(2); or
(ii) Limited statutory damages, which shall be determined in accordance with section
504(c) of this title, subject to the following conditions:
(I)

With respect to works timely registered under section 412 of this title such
that they are eligible for an award of statutory damages under that section,
such limited statutory damages shall not exceed $15,000 per work infringed;

(II) With respect to works not timely registered under section 412 of this title
but eligible for an award of statutory damages under section 1404(b),
limited statutory damages shall not exceed $7,500 per work infringed, or
a total of $15,000 in any one proceeding;
(III) The Copyright Claims Board shall not make any finding or consider
whether the infringement was committed willfully in making an award of
limited statutory damages; and
(IV) The Copyright Claims Board may consider as an additional factor in
awarding limited statutory damages whether the infringer has agreed to
cease or mitigate the infringing activity as provided in subsection (d)(2).
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B) Election of Damages. – With respect to a claim or counterclaim of infringement, the
claimant or counterclaimant shall after the close of discovery and in accordance with
the schedule adopted by the Copyright Claims Board pursuant to section 1405(j)
elect to pursue either actual damages and profits or limited statutory damages as
provided in subparagraph (A).
C) Other Damages. – Damages for claims and counterclaims other than infringement
claims shall be awarded in accordance with applicable law and shall be subject to the
limitation set forth in subparagraph (D).
D) Limitation on Total Damages. – Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a party
who pursues any one or more claims or counterclaims in any single proceeding
before the Copyright Claims Board may not seek or recover in such proceeding total
damages of whatever type that exceed the sum of $30,000, exclusive of any
attorneys’ fees and costs that may be awarded under section 1405(x)(2).
2) Requirement to Cease Infringing Activity. – In any proceeding where a party agrees to
cease activity that is found to be infringing, including by removal or disabling of access
to, or destruction of, infringing materials, and such agreement is reflected in the record,
the Copyright Claims Board shall include in its determination a requirement that such
party, if found to have infringed, cease his or her infringing conduct to the extent agreed.
3) Costs and Attorneys’ Fees. – Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except in the
case of bad faith conduct as provided in section 1405(x)(2), the parties to proceedings
before the Copyright Claims Board shall bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees.
§ 1404 – Registration Requirement
a) No claim or counterclaim alleging infringement of an exclusive right of copyright may be
asserted before the Copyright Claims Board unless the owner of the copyright has first
delivered a completed application, deposit and the required fee for registration to the
Copyright Office and either a registration certificate has been issued or has not been refused.
b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a claimant or counterclaimant in a proceeding
before the Copyright Claims Board shall be eligible to recover actual damages and profits or
limited statutory damages for infringement of a copyrighted work under this chapter if the
requirements of subsection (a) have been met; provided, however, that –
1) The Copyright Claims Board shall not render a determination in the proceeding until a
registration certificate has been issued by the Copyright Office, submitted to the
Copyright Claims Board and made available to the other parties to the proceeding, and
the other parties have been provided an opportunity to address it;
2) If a proceeding cannot proceed further due to an outstanding registration certificate, it
shall be held in abeyance pending submission of the certificate to the Copyright Claims
Board; but if held in abeyance for more than 6 months, the Copyright Claims Board may,
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upon providing written notice to the parties’ and 30 days to respond, dismiss the
proceeding without prejudice; and
3) If the Copyright Claims Board receives notice that registration has been refused by the
Copyright Office, the proceeding shall be dismissed without prejudice.
c) Where a certificate shows that registration of a work was made before or within five years of
its first publication, the presumption set forth in section 410(c) of this title shall apply in a
proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board.
§ 1405 – Conduct of Proceedings
a) In General. – Proceedings of the Copyright Claims Board shall be conducted in accordance
with this chapter and regulations as implemented by the Register of Copyrights.
b) Record. – The Copyright Claims Board shall maintain records documenting the proceedings
before it.
c) Centralized Process. – Proceedings before the Copyright Claims Board shall be conducted
without the requirement of personal appearances by parties or others at the offices of the
Copyright Claims Board, and shall take place by means of written submissions and through
hearings and conferences accomplished via internet-based applications and other
telecommunications facilities; provided, however, that in cases where physical or other
nontestimonial evidence material to a proceeding cannot be furnished to the Copyright
Claims Board through available telecommunications facilities, the Copyright Claims Board
shall have the discretion to make alternative arrangements for the submission of such
evidence that do not prejudice another party to the proceeding.
d) Representation. – A party to a proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board may but is not
required to be represented by an attorney.
e) Commencement of Proceeding. – To commence a proceeding, a claimant shall, subject to
such additional requirements as may be prescribed in regulations adopted by the Register of
Copyrights, file a claim with the Copyright Claims Board, that –
1) Includes a statement of material facts in support of the claim;
2) Is certified in accordance with section 1405(x)(1);
3) Is accompanied by a filing fee in such amount as may be prescribed in regulations
adopted by the Register of Copyrights, which amount shall be at least $100, shall not
exceed the cost of filing an action in federal district court, and shall be established to
further the goals of the Copyright Claims Board.
Note: A conforming amendment to section 708 may be advisable.
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f) Review of Claims and Counterclaims. –
1) Claims. – Upon filing, a claim shall be reviewed by a Copyright Claims Attorney to
ensure that it complies with the provisions of this chapter and applicable regulations. If
the claim –
A) Is found to comply, the claimant shall be so notified and instructed to proceed with
service of the claim as provided in subsection (g).
B) Is found not to comply, the claimant shall be notified that the claim is deficient and
permitted to file an amended claim within 30 days of the date of such notice without
the requirement of an additional filing fee. If the claimant files a compliant claim
within that period, he or she shall be so notified and instructed to proceed with
service of the claim. If the claim is refiled within the 30-day period but still fails to
comply, the claimant will again be notified that the claim is deficient and provided a
second opportunity to amend it within 30 days without the requirement of an
additional filing fee. If the claim is refiled again within the second 30-day period
and is compliant, the claimant shall be so notified and instructed to proceed with
service, but if the claim still fails to comply, upon confirmation of its noncompliance
by a Copyright Claims Officer, the proceeding shall be dismissed without prejudice.
The Copyright Claims Board shall also dismiss without prejudice any proceeding in
which a compliant claim is not filed within the applicable 30-day time period.
C) For purposes of this paragraph, a claim against an online service provider for
infringement by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material residing
on a system or network controlled or operated by the service provider that may be
subject to the provisions of 512(c) of this title, or by reason of the service provider
referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material that
may be subject to the provisions of section 512(d) of this title, shall be considered
noncompliant unless the claimant affirms in the statement required under subsection
(e)(1) that he or she has previously notified the service provider of the claimed
infringement in accordance with section 512(c)(3) of this title and the service
provider failed to remove or disable access to the material within 5 business days of
the date of provision of such notice; provided, however, that if a claim is found to be
noncompliant under this subparagraph, the Copyright Claims Board shall provide the
claimant with information concerning the service of a notice pursuant to section
512(c)(3) of this title.
2) Counterclaims. – Upon filing and service of a counterclaim, the counterclaim shall be
reviewed by a Copyright Claims Attorney to ensure that it complies with the provisions
of this chapter and applicable regulations. If the counterclaim is found not to comply, the
counterclaimant and other parties shall be notified that it is deficient and the
counterclaimant permitted to file and serve an amended counterclaim within 30 days of
the date of such notice. If the counterclaimant files and serves a compliant counterclaim
within that period, the counterclaimant and other parties shall be so notified. If the
counterclaim is refiled and served within the 30-day period but still fails to comply, the
counterclaimant and other parties will again be notified that it is deficient and the
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counterclaimant provided a second opportunity to amend it within 30 days. If the
counterclaim is refiled and served again within the second 30-day period and is
compliant, the counterclaimant and parties shall be so notified, but if the counterclaim
still fails to comply, upon confirmation of its noncompliance by a Copyright Claims
Officer, the counterclaim, but not the proceeding, shall be dismissed without prejudice.
3) Dismissal for Good Cause. – If upon reviewing a claim or counterclaim in a particular
proceeding the Copyright Claims Board concludes that it is unsuitable for determination
by the Copyright Claims Board due to the failure to join a necessary party, the lack of an
essential witness, evidence or expert testimony, or for other good cause, the Copyright
Claims Board shall dismiss the proceeding without prejudice.
_______
Opt-Out Alternative:
g) Service of Notice and Claims. – To proceed with a claim against a respondent, a claimant
must within 90 days of receiving notification to proceed with service file proof of service on
the respondent with the Copyright Claims Board. To effectuate service on a respondent, the
claimant must cause notice of the proceeding and a copy of the claim to be served on the
respondent, either by personal service or pursuant to a waiver of personal service, as
prescribed in regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights. Such regulations shall
include the following requirements and conditions:
1) The notice of the proceeding shall adhere to a prescribed form and shall set forth the
nature of the Copyright Claims Board and proceeding, the respondent’s right to opt out,
and the consequences of opting out and not opting out.
2) The copy of the claim served on the respondent shall be as it was filed with the Copyright
Claims Board.
3) Personal service of a notice and claim may be effected by an individual who is not a party
to the proceeding and is over the age of 18.
4) An individual, other than a minor or incompetent individual, may be served by:
A) Following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general
jurisdiction in the state where service is made; or
B) Doing any of the following:
(i)

Delivering a copy of the notice and claim to the individual personally;

(ii)

Leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with
someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or
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(iii) Delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
5) A corporation, partnership or unincorporated association that is subject to suit in courts of
general jurisdiction under a common name may be served by:
A) Following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general
jurisdiction in the state where service is made; or
B) Delivering a copy of the notice and claim to an officer, a managing or general agent
or any other agency authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction and, if the agent is one
authorized by statute and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of each to
the respondent.
6) To request a waiver of personal service, the claimant may notify a respondent by firstclass mail or other reliable means that a proceeding has been commenced, as follows:
A) Any such request shall be in writing and addressed to the individual respondent, and
be accompanied by the prescribed notice and as-filed copy of the claim, as well as by
two copies of a prescribed form for waiver of personal service, and a prepaid or
costless means of returning the form; and
B) The request shall state the date it was sent and provide the respondent 30 days to
return one copy of the signed waiver form, which signed waiver shall constitute
proof of service for purposes of filing under this subsection.
7) A respondent’s waiver of personal service shall not constitute a waiver of the
respondent’s right to opt out of the proceeding; provided, however, that a respondent who
waives personal service and does not opt out shall be allowed an additional 30 days
beyond the amount of time normally permitted under the applicable procedures of the
Copyright Claims Board to submit a substantive response to the claim, including any
defenses and counterclaims.
8) A minor or an incompetent individual may only be served by following state law for
serving a summons or like process on such an individual in an action brought in the
courts of general jurisdiction of the state where service is made; and
9) Service of a claim and waiver of personal service may only be effected within the United
States.
h) Opt-Out Procedure. – Upon receipt of a properly served notice and claim the respondent shall
have 60 days from the date of service in which to provide written notice to the Copyright
Claims Board, in accordance with regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights, of his
or her desire to opt out of the Copyright Claims Board proceeding. If proof of service has
been filed by the claimant and the respondent does not submit an opt-out notice to the
Copyright Claims Board within 60 days of service, the proceeding shall be deemed an active
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proceeding and the respondent shall be bound by the result to the extent provided under
section 1406(a). If the respondent opts out during that period, the proceeding shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
_______
Opt-In Alternative:
g) Service of Notice and Claims. – To proceed with a claim against a respondent, a claimant
must within 60 days of receiving notification to proceed with service file proof of service on
the respondent with the Copyright Claims Board. To effectuate service on a respondent, the
claimant must provide notice of the proceeding and a copy of the claim to the respondent in a
manner prescribed in regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights. The notice of the
proceeding shall adhere to a prescribed form and shall set forth the nature of the Copyright
Claims Board and proceeding, the respondent’s right to choose not to opt in and the
consequences of opting in and not opting in.
h) Opt-In Procedure. – Upon receipt of a notice and claim the respondent shall have 60 days
from the date of service in which to provide written notice to the Copyright Claims Board, as
prescribed in regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights, that he or she chooses to opt
in to and participate in the proceeding. If proof of service has been filed by the claimant and
the respondent submits an opt-in notice to the Copyright Claims Board during the 60-day
period, the proceeding shall be deemed an active proceeding and the respondent shall be
bound by the result to the extent provided in section 1406(a). If the respondent fails to
provide a written opt-in notice during that period, the proceeding shall be dismissed without
prejudice.
_______
i) Service of Other Documents. – Other documents submitted or relied upon in the proceeding
shall be served as provided in regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights.
j) Scheduling. – Upon confirmation that a proceeding has become an active proceeding, the
Copyright Claims Board shall issue a schedule for future conduct of the proceeding. A
schedule issued by the Copyright Claims Board may be amended by the Copyright Claims
Board for good cause.
k) Conferences. – One or more Copyright Claims Officers may hold a conference to address
case management or discovery issues in a proceeding; provided, however, that such
conference shall not be addressed to ultimate issues of fact or law. Any such conference
shall be noted upon the record of the proceeding and may be recorded or transcribed.
l) Party Submissions. – There shall be no formal motion practice in a Copyright Claims Board
proceeding; provided, however, that, subject to applicable regulations and the procedures of
the Copyright Claims Board –
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1) The parties to a proceeding shall be permitted to make requests to the Copyright Claims
Board to address case management and discovery matters, and responses thereto; and
2) The Copyright Claims Board may request or permit parties to make submissions
addressing relevant questions of fact or law, or other matters, and offer responses thereto.
m) Discovery. – Discovery shall be limited to the production of relevant information and
documents, written interrogatories, and written requests for admission, as further provided in
regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights; provided, however –
1) That upon request of a party, and for good cause shown, the Copyright Claims Board
shall have the discretion to approve additional limited discovery in particular matters, and
may request specific information and documents from participants and nonparticipants in
the proceeding; and
2) After providing notice and an opportunity to respond, and upon good cause shown, the
Copyright Claims Board may apply an adverse inference with respect to disputed facts
against a party who has failed timely to provide discovery materials in response to a
proper request for materials that could be relevant to such facts.
n) Evidence. – The Copyright Claims Board may consider the following types of evidence,
which may be admitted without application of formal rules of evidence:
1) Documentary and other nontestimonial evidence that is relevant to the claims,
counterlaims or defenses in a proceeding; and
2) Testimonial evidence, submitted under penalty of perjury and in accordance with
subsection (o), limited to written statements of the parties and nonexpert witnesses, that is
relevant to the claims, counterclaims and defenses in a proceeding; provided, however,
that in exceptional cases expert witness testimony or other forms of testimony may be
permitted by the Copyright Claims Board for good cause shown.
o) Hearings. – The Copyright Claims Board may conduct a hearing to receive oral presentations
on issues of fact or law from parties and witnesses to a proceeding, provided that –
1) Any such hearing shall be attended by at least two of the Copyright Claims Officers;
2) The hearing shall be noted upon the record of the proceeding and may be recorded or
transcribed; and
3) A recording or transcript of the hearing shall be made available to a Copyright Claims
Officer who is not in attendance.

145

United States Copyright Office

Copyright Small Claims

p) Voluntary Dismissal. –
1) By Claimant. – Upon written request of a claimant received prior to a respondent’s filing
of a response to a claim, the Copyright Board shall dismiss the proceeding, or a claim or
respondent, as requested, such dismissal to be without prejudice.
2) By Counterclaimant. – Upon written request of a counterclaimant received prior to a
claimant’s filing of a response to a counterclaim, the Copyright Board shall dismiss the
counterclaim, such dismissal to be without prejudice.
q) Settlement. – At any time in an active proceeding some or all of the parties may –
1) Jointly request a conference with a Copyright Claims Officer for the purpose of
facilitating settlement discussions; or
2) Submit to the Copyright Claims Board an agreement providing for settlement and
dismissal of some or all of the claims and counterclaims in the proceeding, which
submission may also include a request that the Copyright Claims Board adopt some or all
of the terms of the parties’ settlement in a final determination.
r) Factual Findings. – Subject to subsection (m)(2), the Copyright Claims Board shall make
factual findings based upon a preponderance of the evidence.
s) Determinations. –
1) Nature and contents. – A determination rendered by the Copyright Claims Board in a
proceeding shall –
A) Be reached by a majority of the Copyright Claims Board;
B) Be in writing, and include an explanation of the factual and legal basis of the
decision therein;
C) Pursuant to section 1403(d)(2), set forth any terms of by which a respondent or
counterclaim respondent has agreed to cease infringing activity;
D) Pursuant to subsection (q)(2) and to the extent agreed by the parties, set forth the
terms of any settlement to the extent requested by the parties; and
E) Include a clear statement of all damages and other relief awarded, including pursuant
to paragraphs C and D.
2) Dissent. – A Copyright Claims Officer who dissents from a decision contained in a
determination may append a statement setting forth the grounds for his or her dissent.
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3) Publication. – Final determinations of the Copyright Claims Board shall be made
available on a website maintained by the Copyright Claims Board that is publicly
accessible.
_______
Opt-Out Alternative:
t) Respondent’s Default. – Where a proceeding has been deemed an active proceeding but the
respondent has failed to appear or has ceased participating in the proceeding, as demonstrated
by his or her failing to meet one or more deadlines or requirements set forth in the schedule
adopted by the Copyright Claims Board pursuant to subsection (j) without justifiable cause,
the Copyright Claims Board may enter a default determination, as follows and in accordance
with such other requirements as the Register of Copyrights may prescribe by regulation:
1) The Copyright Claims Board shall require the claimant to submit relevant evidence and
other information in support of his or her claim and any asserted damages and, upon
review of such evidence and any other requested submissions from the claimant, shall
determine whether the materials so submitted are sufficient to support a finding in favor
of the claimant under applicable law and, if so, the appropriate relief and damages, if any,
to be awarded;
2) If the claimant has met his or her burden under paragraph (1), the Copyright Claims
Board shall prepare a proposed default determination and provide written notice to the
respondent at all addresses, including email addresses, reflected in the records of the
Copyright Claims Board, concerning the pendency of a default determination by the
Copyright Claims Board and the legal significance of such determination. Such notice
shall be accompanied by the proposed default determination and provide that the
respondent has 30 days from the date of the notice to submit any evidence and other
information in opposition to the proposed default determination;
3) If the respondent responds to the notice provided under paragraph (2) within the 30-day
period, the Copyright Claims Board shall consider respondent’s submissions and, after
allowing the other parties to address such submissions, maintain or amend its
determination as appropriate, and the resulting determination shall not be a default
determination; and
4) If the respondent fails to respond to the notice provided under paragraph (2), the
Copyright Claims Board shall proceed to issue the default determination as a final
determination. Thereafter, a respondent may only challenge such determination to the
extent permitted under section 1407(c).
u) Claimant’s Failure to Proceed. –
1) Failure to Complete Service. – If a claimant fails to complete service on a respondent
within the 90-day period as prescribed in subsection (g), that respondent shall be
dismissed from the proceeding without prejudice; and if a claimant fails to complete

147

United States Copyright Office

Copyright Small Claims

service on all respondents within the 90-day period, the proceeding shall be dismissed by
the Copyright Claims Board without prejudice.
2) Failure to Prosecute. – If a claimant fails to proceed in an active proceeding, as
demonstrated by his or her failing to meet one or more deadlines or requirements set forth
in the schedule adopted by the Copyright Claims Board pursuant to subsection (j) without
justifiable cause, the Copyright Claims Board may, upon providing written notice to the
claimant and 30 days to respond, issue a determination dismissing the claimants’ claims,
which shall include an award of attorneys’ fees and costs if appropriate under subsection
1405(x)(2).
_______
Opt-In Alternative:
t) Respondent’s Default. – Where the proceeding has been deemed an active proceeding but the
respondent has ceased participating in the proceeding, as demonstrated by his or her failing
to meet one or more deadlines or requirements set forth in the schedule adopted by the
Copyright Claims Board pursuant to section 1405(j) without justifiable cause, the Copyright
Claims Board may enter a default determination, as follows and in accordance with such
other requirements as the Register of Copyrights may prescribe by regulation:
1) The Copyright Claims Board shall require the claimant to submit relevant evidence and
other information in support of his or her claim and any asserted damages and, upon
review of such evidence and any other requested submissions from the claimant, shall
determine whether the materials so submitted are sufficient to support a finding in favor
of claimant under applicable law and, if so, the appropriate relief and damages, if any, to
be awarded;
2) If the claimant has met his or her burden under paragraph (1), the Copyright Claims
Board shall prepare a proposed default determination and provide written notice to the
respondent at all addresses, including email addresses, reflected in the records of the
Copyright Claims Board, concerning the pendency of a default determination by the
Copyright Claims Board and the legal significance of such determination. Such notice
shall be accompanied by the proposed default determination and provide that the
respondent has 30 days from the date of the notice to submit any evidence and other
information in opposition to the proposed default determination;
3) If the respondent responds to the notice provided under paragraph (2) within the 30-day
period, the Copyright Claims Board shall consider respondent’s submissions and, after
allowing the other parties to address such submissions, maintain or amend its
determination as appropriate, and the resulting determination shall not be a default
determination; and
4) If the respondent fails to respond to the notice provided under paragraph (2), the
Copyright Claims Board shall proceed to issue the default determination as a final
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determination. Thereafter, a respondent may only challenge such determination to the
extent permitted under section 1407(c).
u) Claimant’s Failure to Proceed. –
1) Failure to Complete Service. – If a claimant fails to complete service on a respondent
within the 60-day period as prescribed in subsection (g), that respondent shall be
dismissed from the proceeding without prejudice; and if a claimant fails to complete
service on all respondents within the 60-day period, the proceeding shall be dismissed by
the Copyright Claims Board without prejudice.
2) Failure to Prosecute. – If a claimant fails to proceed in an active proceeding, as
demonstrated by his or her failing to meet one or more deadlines or requirements set forth
in the schedule adopted by the Copyright Claims Board pursuant to subsection (j) without
justifiable cause, the Copyright Claims Board may, upon providing written notice to the
claimant and 30 days to respond, issue a determination dismissing the claimants’ claims,
which shall include an award of attorneys’ fees and costs if appropriate under subsection
(x)(2). Thereafter, the claimant may only challenge such determination to the extent
permitted under section 1407(c).
_______
v) Reconsideration. – A party may, within 14 days of the date of issuance of a final
determination by the Copyright Claims Board, submit a written request for reconsideration
of, or an amendment to, such determination if the party identifies a clear error of law or fact
material to the outcome, or a technical mistake. After providing the other parties an
opportunity to address such request, the Copyright Claims Board shall respond by denying
the request or issuing an amended final determination.
w) Review by Register. – A party who has been denied reconsideration by the Copyright Claims
Board may, within 14 days of the date of such denial, request review by the Register of
Copyrights in accordance with regulations adopted by the Register of Copyrights, which
regulations shall provide for a reasonable filing fee. The Register’s review shall be limited to
consideration of whether the Copyright Claims Board abused its discretion in denying
reconsideration. After providing the other parties an opportunity to address the request, the
Register shall respond by denying the request or remanding the proceeding to the Copyright
Claims Board for reconsideration of identified issues and issuance of an amended final
determination, which amended final determination shall not be subject to further
consideration or review other than pursuant to section 1407(c).
Note: A conforming amendment to section 708 may be advisable.
x) Conduct of Parties and Attorneys. –
1) Certification. – The Register of Copyrights shall adopt regulations concerning
certification of the accuracy and truthfulness of statements made by participants in
proceedings before the Copyright Claims Board.
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2) Bad Faith Conduct. – Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any proceeding in
which a determination is rendered and –
A) It is established that a party pursued a claim, counterclaim or defense for a harassing
or other improper purpose, or without reasonable basis in law or fact; or
B) The claimant’s claim is dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to subsection
(u)(2),
unless inconsistent with the interests of justice, the Copyright Claim Board shall in such
determination award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to any adversely affected party
or parties in a total amount not to exceed $5,000; provided, however, that if an adversely
affected party appeared pro se in the proceeding, the award to that party shall be of costs
only and no more than $2,500.
§ 1406 – Effect of Proceeding
a) Determination. – Subject to the reconsideration and review processes afforded by section
1405(v) and (w) and section 1407(c), the rendering of a final determination by the Copyright
Claims Board in a proceeding, including a default determination or determination based on
failure to prosecute, shall, solely with respect to the parties to such determination, preclude
relitigation before any court or tribunal, or before the Copyright Claims Board, of the claims
and counterclaims asserted and finally determined by such determination, and may be cited
or relied upon in a future action or proceeding for such purpose; provided, however, that –
1) A determination of the Copyright Claims Board shall not preclude litigation or
relitigation as between the same or different parties before any court or tribunal, or the
Copyright Claims Board, of the same or similar issues of fact or law in connection with
different claims or counterclaims not asserted and finally determined by the
determination of the Copyright Claims Board;
2) A determination of ownership of a copyrighted work for purposes of resolving a matter
before the Copyright Claims Board shall not be relied upon, and shall have no preclusive
effect, in any other action or proceeding before any other court or tribunal, including the
Copyright Claims Board; and
3) Except to the extent permitted in this subsection and section 1407, no determination of
the Copyright Claims Board shall be cited or relied upon as legal precedent in any other
action or proceeding before any court or tribunal, including the Copyright Claims Board.
b) Other Materials in Proceeding. – Except as permitted under this section and section 1407, a
submission or statement of a party or witness made in connection with a proceeding before
the Copyright Claims Board, including a proceeding that is dismissed, shall not be cited or
relied upon in, or serve as the basis of, any action or proceeding before any court or tribunal,
including the Copyright Claims Board.
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c) With Respect to Section 512(g) of Title 17. – Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the commencement of a proceeding by a claimant before the Copyright Claims Board against
a subscriber of a service provider that seeks a declaration of infringement concerning
material that has been removed or to which access has been disabled by the service provider
in response to a notification of claimed infringement by the claimant pursuant to section
512(c)(1)(C) of this title shall be a basis to preclude the replacement of such material by the
service provider pursuant to section 512(g) of this title if notice of the commencement of the
Copyright Claims Board proceeding is provided by the claimant to the service provider’s
designated agent not less than 10 nor more than 14 business days following receipt of a
counter notification by the service provider pursuant that subsection.
Note: A conforming amendment to section 512(g)(2)(C) may be advisable.
d) Stay of District Court Proceedings. – A federal district court shall order a stay of proceedings
or such other relief as it deems appropriate with respect to any claim brought before it that is
already the subject of a pending active proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board.
e) Failure to Assert Counterclaim. – The failure or inability to assert a counterclaim in a
proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board shall not preclude its assertion in a
subsequent court action or proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board.
_______
Opt-Out Alternative:
f) Opt-Out or Dismissal of Party. – If a party has timely opted out of a proceeding under section
1405(h) or is dismissed from a proceeding prior to the issuance of a final determination by
the Copyright Claims Board, the determination shall not be binding upon and shall have no
preclusive effect with respect to that party.
_______
Opt-In Alternative:
f) Failure to Opt In or Dismissal of Party. – If a party declines to opt in or is dismissed from a
proceeding prior to the issuance of a final determination by the Copyright Claims Board, the
determination shall not be binding upon and shall have no preclusive effect with respect to
that party.
_______
§ 1407 – Review and Confirmation by District Court
a) In General. – In any proceeding in which a party has failed to pay damages or otherwise
comply with the relief awarded in a final determination of the Copyright Claims Board,
including a default determination or a determination based on failure to prosecute, the
aggrieved party may, within one year of the issuance of such final determination or
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resolution of any reconsideration by the Copyright Claims Board or review by the Register of
Copyrights, apply to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for an order
confirming the relief awarded and reducing such relief to judgment. The court shall grant
such order and direct entry of judgment unless the determination is vacated, modified or
corrected as permitted under subsection (c). Such judgment shall be docketed as if it were
rendered in an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and
shall be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, and of the same force and effect as if
it had been rendered in, an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
b) Filing Procedures. –
1) Notice of the application for confirmation of a determination of the Copyright Claims
Board and entry of judgment shall be provided to all parties to the proceeding before the
Copyright Claims Board, in accordance with the procedures applicable to service of a
motion in United States District Court for the District of Columbia. If a party to be
served is a nonresident, then notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of
any district within which such party may be found in the same manner as other process of
the court.
2) The application shall include a certified copy of the final determination of the Copyright
Claims Board that is to be confirmed and rendered to judgment as reflected in the records
of the Copyright Claims Board following any process of reconsideration or review by the
Register of Copyrights, as well as a declaration by the applicant under penalty of perjury
that it is a true and correct copy of such determination and the date it was issued.
c) Challenges to the Determination. –
1) Bases for Challenge. – Upon application of a party to the Copyright Claims Board
proceeding within 90 days of the issuance of a final determination by the Copyright
Claims Board, the United States Court for the District of Columbia may issue an order
vacating, modifying or correcting a determination of the Copyright Claims Board in the
following cases:
A) Where the determination was issued or as a result of fraud, corruption, or undue
means, or as a result of misconduct;
B) Where the Copyright Claims Board exceeded its authority or so imperfectly executed
its duties that a final and definite determination concerning the subject matter at issue
was not made; or
C) In the case of a default determination or determination based on failure to prosecute,
where it is established that the default or failure was due to excusable neglect.
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2) Procedure to Challenge. –
A) Notice of the application to challenge a determination of the Copyright Claims Board
shall be provided to all parties to the proceeding before the Copyright Claims Board,
in accordance with the procedures applicable to service of a motion in United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. If a party to be served is a nonresident,
then notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of any district within
which such party may be found in the same manner as other process of the court.
B) The application shall include a certified copy of the final determination of the
Copyright Claims Board that is the subject of the application as reflected in the
records of the Copyright Claims Board following any process of reconsideration or
review by the Register of Copyrights, as well as a declaration by the applicant under
penalty of perjury that it is a true and correct copy of such determination, the date it
was issued, and the basis for challenge under subsection (c)(1). For the purposes of
the application any judge who might make an order to stay the proceedings in an
action brought in the same court may make an order, to be served with the notice of
application, staying proceedings to enforce the award.
§ 1408 – Referral of Cases by District Courts
The Copyright Claims Board shall qualify as an alternative dispute resolution process under
section 651 of title 28 for purposes of referral of eligible cases upon consent of the parties by
United States district courts.
§ 1409 – Implementation by Copyright Office
a) Regulations. – The Register of Copyrights shall adopt regulations to implement the
Copyright Claims Board as contemplated by this chapter.
b) Necessary Facilities. – Subject to applicable law, the Register of Copyrights may retain
outside vendors to establish internet-based, teleconferencing and other facilities required to
operate the Copyright Claims Board.
c) Study. – Not later than 3 years after the issuance of the first determination by the Copyright
Claims Board, the Register of Copyrights shall deliver a study to Congress that addresses –
1) The use and efficacy of the Copyright Claims Board in resolving copyright claims;
2) Whether adjustments to the authority of the Copyright Claims Board, including eligible
claims and works and applicable damages limitations, are necessary or advisable;
3) Whether greater allowance should be made to permit awards of attorneys’ fees and costs
to prevailing parties, including potential limitations on such awards;
4) Potential mechanisms to assist copyright owners with small claims in ascertaining the
identity and location of unknown online infringers;
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5) Whether the Copyright Claims Board should be expanded to offer mediation or other
nonbinding alternative dispute resolution services to interested parties; and
6) Such other matters as the Register of Copyrights believes may be pertinent concerning
the Copyright Claims Board.
§ 1410 – Funding
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to pay the costs incurred
under this chapter not covered by the filing fees collected under this chapter, including the costs
of establishing the Copyright Claims Board and its facilities.
§ 1411 – Technical amendments
[Conforming amendments as noted above and otherwise identified]
§ 1412 – Definitions
a) As used in this chapter, “party” refers to both a party and the party’s attorney, as applicable.
b) As used in this chapter, “person” (including “his” and “her”) refers to both an individual and
an entity that is amenable to legal process under applicable law.
c) “United States” has the meaning given in section 101 of this title.
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Section-by-Section Summary

§ 1401 – Copyright Claims Board and Staff
This section establishes the Copyright Claims Board (“Board”) as an optional alternative forum
within the U.S. Copyright Office to resolve certain copyright claims and sets forth the
qualifications, compensation, and term of the Board and staff. The Board consists of three
experienced attorneys called Claims Officers. The Librarian of Congress, after consulting with
the Register of Copyrights, appoints the Claims Officers and Claims Attorneys. The Claims
Officers must have at least seven years of legal experience, with two Claims Officers having
copyright litigation or adjudication experience and the third having alternative dispute resolution
experience. The Claims Officers are paid at the level of compensation for SL government
employees. They have six-year terms, but their initial terms are staggered at four, five, and six
years. The Claims Officers are assisted by two or more Claims Attorneys appointed by the
Register of Copyrights. The Claims Attorneys are paid at up to grade 15 of the General Schedule
for government employees. This section also provides for supervision and removal of the
Claims Officers and filling of vacancies on the Board.
§ 1402 – Authority and Responsibilities of the Copyright Claims Board
This section sets forth the duties and powers of the Claims Officers and Claims Attorneys. The
Claims Officers’ primary duty is to make determinations on eligible copyright claims. The
Claims Officers are also to review cases to make sure they are properly before the Board,
manage the proceedings and render rulings on matters relating to the consideration of claims,
request the production of information necessary to the resolution of claims, conduct hearings and
conferences, facilitate parties’ settlements, provide information to the public, and maintain
records of their proceedings. They may also be assigned other duties by the Register of
Copyrights.
Claims Attorneys assist the Claims Officers in performing their duties, provide assistance to
members of the public concerning the procedures and requirements of the Board, and engage in
any other duties assigned by the Register of Copyrights.
Although subject to general direction by the Register of Copyrights, the Board is to be
independent in making its determinations in proceedings and the Claims Officers and Claims
Attorneys cannot engage in conduct that would be inconsistent with their duties. Claims Officers
and Claims Attorneys must recuse themselves from any proceedings in cases where they
perceive a conflict of interest.
Parties are not permitted to have ex parte communications with a Claims Officer, but Claims
Attorneys may communicate with parties to provide assistance with Board procedures and
requirements.
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§ 1403 – Nature of Proceedings
This section establishes that proceedings before the Board are voluntary, provides for a threeyear statute of limitations with a tolling provision, and sets forth the permissible claims,
counterclaims, defenses and remedies available to parties coming before the Board. It confirms
that parties retain the right to proceed in federal court instead of before the Board if they choose.
Subject to applicable monetary limits, parties may bring the following types of claims to the
Board: a claim for infringement, or a declaration of noninfringement, of one of the exclusive
rights under section 106 of the Copyright Act; a claim of misrepresentation under section 512(f)
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”); and certain limited counterclaims arising
under sections 106 and 512(f) of the Copyright Act or an agreement concerning the same
transaction or occurrence. In addition, parties can assert any legal or equitable defenses to any
such claims or counterclaims. Claims can be brought by one or more claimants against one or
more respondents if all of the claims arise out of the same activity or a continuous course of
conduct and the total damages do not exceed the applicable monetary limit for a Board
proceeding.
Some claims and counterclaims are specifically excluded from Board determination, including
claims that are already pending before or adjudicated by a court, claims against a federal or state
government entity, claims against a person or entity residing outside of the United States, and
claims dismissed by the Board for good cause.
The Board can award a number of limited remedies. The Board can award monetary damages,
including actual damages and profits, or limited statutory damages where infringement is shown.
Limited statutory damages are capped at $15,000 per work for works timely registered pursuant
to section 412 of the Copyright Act (generally speaking, within three months of publication), and
$7,500 per work for works that are later registered in accordance with section 1404 (but not more
than a total of $15,000 for all such works). After the close of discovery, the party seeking
damages is to elect to pursue either actual damages and profits or limited statutory damages. The
Board will not consider whether the infringement was willful in assessing limited statutory
damages, but it can take into account an infringer’s willingness to cease or mitigate infringing
activities. The Board cannot make a total monetary award in a single proceeding of more than
$30,000, exclusive of any attorneys’ fees and costs awarded for bad faith conduct under section
1405 (which are capped at $5,000).
In addition to monetary awards, the Board can include in its determination a requirement for an
infringer to cease or mitigate infringing conduct if the infringer has agreed to do so (which
agreements can be the basis for an adjustment of damages).
Costs and attorneys’ fees are not available except in cases where it is established that a party has
proceeded (or failed to proceed) in bad faith.
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§ 1404 – Registration Requirement
Parties need not have a finalized registration from the Copyright Office for the work at issue
before bringing a claim before the Board (though the timing of registration affects the range of
available statutory damages). A party must apply for a registration of the work with the
Copyright Office, however, before bringing the claim. The Board will not render a
determination until a registration certificate is issued by the Copyright Office. The Board will
delay rendering a determination for a period of time if the registration has not yet issued, but will
dismiss the case if it does not issue or is refused within a certain period. Finally, if a copyright
was registered before or within five years of publication, the Board will apply the presumptions
of section 410 of the Copyright Act that the registration is valid and the information in the
registration is accurate.
§ 1405 – Conduct of Proceedings
Generally, proceedings are conducted by the Board from the Copyright Office based on written
submissions, with no requirement of personal appearances, and hearings conducted by internet
and other telecommunications facilities. Parties do not need to be represented by an attorney, but
attorney representation is permitted. The Board will maintain records documenting its
proceedings.
Proceedings are initiated by submitting a statement of facts in support of the claim, certified by
the claimant, and a filing fee established by the Register (which can be no less than $100). When
a claim or counterclaim is initiated, it is reviewed by a Claims Attorney to make sure that it
complies with Board requirements and can be served on the respondent. Parties who submit
noncompliant claims and counterclaims are provided limited opportunities to correct errors and
submit amended filings. When a claim is asserted against an online service provider for activity
that may be covered by the section 512(c) or 512(d) safe harbors, before the Board will allow the
claim to proceed, the claimant must certify that he or she served a DMCA takedown notice and
the service provider failed to remove or disable access to the infringing material within five
business days. If this is not the case, the Board will provide the claimant with information as to
how to serve a DMCA notice.
_______
Opt-Out Alternative:
Within 90 days of receiving the Board’s direction to proceed with service, the claimant must
serve formal notice of the proceeding and claim on the respondent in accordance with rules
modeled on Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As under Rule 4, the respondent
may waive formal service and agree to accept informal service (for example, by mail), but such
waiver of formal service does not constitute a waiver of the respondent’s right to opt out of the
proceeding. The content of the notice served on the opposing party will explain the nature of the
Board and proceeding, the respondent’s right to opt out, and the consequences of opting out and
not opting out. The respondent has 60 days to file an opt-out notice with the Board. If the
respondent does not opt out within 60 days of service, the proceeding is deemed an active
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proceeding and the respondent will be bound by the result. Otherwise, the proceeding will be
dismissed without prejudice.
Opt-In Alternative:
Within 60 days of receiving the Board’s direction to proceed with service, the claimant must
provide notice of the proceeding and claim to the respondent, but formal service is not required.
The content of the notice served on the opposing party will explain the nature of the Board and
proceeding, the respondent’s right to opt in, and the consequences of opting in and not opting in.
The respondent has 60 days to file an opt-in notice with the Board. If the respondent opts in
within 60 days of service, the proceeding is deemed an active proceeding and the respondent will
be bound by the result. Otherwise, the proceeding will be dismissed without prejudice.
_______
Once a proceeding is active, the Board will issue a scheduling order to govern the proceedings.
The Board may hold conferences as well as hearings to receive oral presentations on issues of
fact or law. There is no formal motion practice in a Board proceeding, but the parties can request
that the Board address case management and discovery issues and the Board can ask the parties
to make submissions addressing relevant questions of fact or law, or other matters.
Discovery is allowed but ordinarily limited to the production of relevant information and
documents, written interrogatories, and written requests for admission, with more particular
limitations to be imposed by regulation. The Board can approve additional discovery and
request specific information from parties and nonparties if good cause is shown. If a party does
not provide discovery documents in a timely manner, the Board can draw appropriate inferences
against that party.
The Board will accept both documentary and testimonial evidence without application of formal
rules of evidence. Testimonial evidence is normally limited to written statements of the parties
and nonexpert witnesses, but in exceptional cases expert evidence may be accepted. The Board
renders factual findings based on a preponderance of evidence standard.
Final determinations will be issued in writing by a majority of the Board, will explain the factual
and legal reasoning for the decision, and will include a clear statement of all relief awarded,
including any agreement to cease infringing activity or settlement terms. A dissenting Claims
Officer may issue a dissenting opinion. Determinations will be made available to the public on
the Board’s website.
A party can request that the Board reconsider and amend a determination if the party identifies a
clear error of law or fact that is material to the outcome, or a technical mistake. Additionally, a
party who has been denied reconsideration may, for an additional fee, seek review of the denial
by the Register of Copyrights under an abuse of discretion standard. If the Register finds that
reconsideration should have been granted, she will remand the matter to the Board for its further
review of specific concerns and issuance of an amended determination.
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Parties can agree to settle claims and counterclaims, and claims and counterclaims can be
voluntarily dismissed before a response is filed. The Board may dismiss claims and
counterclaims for good cause, including for failure to join a necessary party, or the lack of an
essential witness, evidence or expert testimony.
The Board may issue default determinations as well as determinations based upon failure to
prosecute.
_______
Opt-Out Alternative:
If a respondent has been properly served and not opted out and the proceeding is active, but the
respondent fails to appear or ceases participation in the proceeding, then the Board may issue a
default determination in favor of the claimant provided that the claimant can establish his or her
claim and provide evidence to support a damage award. Before the Board can enter a default, it
must attempt to notify the respondent and provide an opportunity to respond.
The Board may also issue a determination in cases where a claimant fails to prosecute by ceasing
participation in a proceeding, which may also provide for attorneys’ fees and costs to responding
parties.
Opt-In Alternative:
Following the same procedures as above, a default determination can be entered against a
respondent who has opted in but has ceased participation in the proceeding, and a determination
can be entered against a claimant who fails to prosecute a proceeding.
_______
Unless it does not serve the interests of justice, the Board must award attorneys’ fees and costs
against a party who is shown to have acted in bad faith (for a harassing or improper purpose or
without reasonable basis in law or fact), or a claimant who fails to prosecute a proceeding. The
Board may not award more than a total of $5,000 to all adversely affected parties (and no more
than $2,500 for costs only to a party acting pro se).
§ 1406 – Effect of Proceeding
As between the parties to a final determination, the determination precludes relitigation of the
claims and counterclaims asserted and determined by the Board before any court, tribunal or the
Board. But it does not preclude litigation as between the same or different parties of the same or
similar issues of fact or law in connection with claims or counterclaims not determined by the
Board, and it has no later preclusive effect as to copyright ownership issues. Decisions of the
Board may not be cited or relied upon as legal precedent, except to the extent the proceeding is
reviewed by a district court in accordance with section 1407.
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If a party brings a Board proceeding against the subscriber of an online service provider within
the applicable time frame seeking a declaration of infringement concerning material subject to a
DMCA takedown notice and timely notifies the service provider of the proceeding, then the
proceeding will satisfy section 512(g) of the DMCA and preclude the service provider from
replacing the material that was subject to the takedown notice.
A federal court is to stay proceedings or order other appropriate relief when a party files a claim
that is already the subject of an active proceeding before the Board. There are no compulsory
counterclaims before the Board, and failure to plead a counterclaim has no preclusive effect.
_______
Opt-Out Alternative:
If a party timely opts out or is dismissed from a proceeding before the issuance of a final
determination, the determination shall not be binding upon the party.
Opt-In Alternative:
If a party declines to opt in or is dismissed from a proceeding before the issuance of a final
determination, the determination shall not be binding upon the party.
_______
§ 1407 – Review and Confirmation by District Court
Parties who obtain a Board determination can file the determination within one year of its
issuance for confirmation by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a
manner similar to filing an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act. Such
confirmation renders the determination an enforceable judgment.
Within 90 days of the issuance of a determination by the Board, an aggrieved party can seek to
challenge the determination on the ground that it was issued or resulted from fraud, corruption,
or undue means, or as a result of misconduct; or where the Board exceeded its authority or so
imperfectly executed its duties that no final or definite determination was made; or, in the case of
a default determination or determination based on failure to prosecute, that the default or failure
was due to excusable neglect.
§ 1408 – Referral of Cases by District Courts
The Board qualifies as an alternative dispute resolution process under 28 U.S.C. § 651 for
purposes of referring cases from the federal courts.
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§ 1409 – Implementation by Copyright Office
The Copyright Office has authority to adopt regulations to implement the Board and may retain
outside vendors to establish the necessary facilities. Once the Board has been in operation for
three years, the Copyright Office is to issue a study regarding the use and efficacy of the Board
and whether any adjustments are needed.
§ 1410 – Funding
This section authorizes appropriations to fund the Board.
§ 1411 – Technical amendments
This section allows for conforming amendments to existing statutory provisions.
§ 1412 – Definitions
This section contains definitions for certain key terms.
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investigation in these cases would serve
no purpose since the petitioning group
of workers cannot be covered by more
than one certification at a time.
TA–W–80,427; Coastal Lumber
Company, Hopwood, PA
I hereby certify that the
aforementioned determinations were
issued during the period of October 11,
2011 through October 14, 2011. Copies
of these determinations may be
requested under the Freedom of
Information Act. Requests may be
submitted by fax, courier services, or
mail to FOIA Disclosure Officer, Office
of Trade Adjustment Assistance (ETA),
U.S. Department of Labor, 200
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20210 or tofoiarequest@dol.gov.
These determinations also are available
on the Department’s Web site at
http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact under
the searchable listing of determinations.
Dated: October 20, 2011.
Michael W. Jaffe,
Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2011–27847 Filed 10–26–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training
Administration
Investigations Regarding Certifications
of Eligibility To Apply for Worker
Adjustment Assistance and Alternative
Trade Adjustment Assistance
Petitions have been filed with the
Secretary of Labor under Section 221(a)
of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘‘the Act’’) and
are identified in the Appendix to this
notice. Upon receipt of these petitions,
the Director of the Division of Trade
Adjustment Assistance, Employment
and Training Administration, has
instituted investigations pursuant to
Section 221(a) of the Act.
The purpose of each of the
investigations is to determine whether
the workers are eligible to apply for
adjustment assistance under title II,
chapter 2, of the Act. The investigations
will further relate, as appropriate, to the
determination of the date on which total
or partial separations began or
threatened to begin and the subdivision
of the firm involved.

The petitioners or any other persons
showing a substantial interest in the
subject matter of the investigations may
request a public hearing, provided such
request is filed in writing with the
Director, Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance, at the address shown below,
not later than November 7, 2011.
Interested persons are invited to
submit written comments regarding the
subject matter of the investigations to
the Director, Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance, at the address shown below,
not later than November 7, 2011.
The petitions filed in this case are
available for inspection at the Office of
the Director, Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance, Employment and Training
Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, Room N–5428, 200 Constitution
Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210.
Signed at Washington, DC, this 20th day of
October 2011.
Michael Jaffe,
Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment
Assistance.

APPENDIX
[20 TAA petitions instituted between 10/10/11 and 10/14/11]
Subject firm
(petitioners)

Location

IBM (State/One-Stop) ...............................................................
TT Electronics (Company) .......................................................
LexisNexis (Company) .............................................................
Viam Manufacturing, Inc. (Company) ......................................
BASF Corporation (Company) .................................................
Haldex (State/One-Stop) ..........................................................
JVC–USA Product Return Center (State/One-Stop) ...............
Kerry Ingredients & Flavours (Union) ......................................
Stateline Warehouse (Workers) ...............................................
ON Semiconductor (Company) ................................................
Suntron Corporation (Company) ..............................................
Specialty Bar Products Co. (Workers) .....................................
Pilgrim’s Pride—Dallas Processing Plant (State/One-Stop) ....
Centurion Medical Products (Workers) ....................................
Intier Magna (State/One-Stop) .................................................
AI Android Industries (State/One-Stop) ...................................
Travelers (Workers) .................................................................
AGS Automotive (State/One-Stop) ..........................................
KV Pharmaceuticals (State/One-Stop) ....................................
Verso Paper Corp. (Union) ......................................................

San Francisco, CA ..................
Boone, NC ..............................
Miamisburg, OH ......................
Santa Fe Springs, CA .............
Belvidere, NJ ..........................
Kansas City, MO .....................
McAllen, TX ............................
Turtle Lake, WI .......................
Ridgeway, VA .........................
Phoenix, AZ ............................
Sugar Land, TX ......................
Blairsville, PA ..........................
Dallas, TX ...............................
Jeanette, PA ...........................
Shreveport, LA ........................
Shreveport, LA ........................
Elmira, NY ...............................
Shreveport, LA ........................
Bridgeton, MO .........................
Bucksport, ME ........................

TA–W
80500
80501
80502
80503
80504
80505
80506
80507
80508
80509
80510
80511
80512
80513
80514
80515
80516
80517
80518
80519

...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........
...........

[FR Doc. 2011–27846 Filed 10–26–11; 8:45 am]
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Remedies for Small Copyright Claims
Copyright Office, Library of
Congress.

AGENCY:
ACTION:

Notice of inquiry.

Date of
institution
10/11/11
10/11/11
10/11/11
10/11/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11
10/14/11

Date of
petition
10/07/11
10/10/11
10/06/11
10/06/11
10/11/11
10/12/11
10/12/11
10/12/11
10/07/11
10/06/11
10/12/11
10/05/11
09/30/11
10/13/11
10/13/11
10/13/11
10/13/11
10/13/11
10/13/11
10/13/11

The U.S. Copyright Office is
undertaking a study at the request of
Congress to assess whether and, if so,
how the current legal system hinders or
prevents copyright owners from
pursuing copyright infringement claims
that have a relatively small economic
value (‘‘small copyright claims’’); and
recommend potential changes in
administrative, regulatory, and statutory
authority to improve the adjudication of
these small copyright claims. The Office

SUMMARY:
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thus seeks comment on how copyright
owners have handled small copyright
claims and the obstacles they have
encountered, as well as potential
alternatives to the current legal system
that could better accommodate such
claims. This is a general inquiry and the
Office will publish additional notices on
this topic.
DATES: Comments are due January 16,
2012.
ADDRESSES: All comments and reply
comments shall be submitted
electronically. A comment page
containing a comment form is posted on
the Office Web site at http://www.
copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims. The
Web site interface requires submitters to
complete a form specifying name and
organization, as applicable, and to
upload comments as an attachment via
a browser button. To meet accessibility
standards, submitters must upload
comments in a single file not to exceed
six megabytes (MB) in one of the
following formats: the Adobe Portable
Document File (PDF) format that
contains searchable, accessible text (not
an image); Microsoft Word;
WordPerfect; Rich Text Format (RTF); or
ASCII text file format (not a scanned
document). The form and face of the
comments must include both the name
of the submitter and organization. The
Office will post all comments publicly
on the Office’s Web site exactly as they
are received, along with names and
organizations. If electronic submission
of comments is not feasible, please
contact the Office at 202–707–8380 for
special instructions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Catherine Rowland, Counsel, Office of
Policy and International Affairs, by
telephone at 202–707–8350 or by
electronic mail at crowland@loc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Copyright Act (the ‘‘Act’’), 17
U.S.C. 101 et seq., protects a wide
variety of works of authorship, ranging
from individual articles or photographs
that may not have a high commercial
value to motion pictures worth
hundreds of millions of dollars in the
marketplace. Copyright owners of all of
these works may seek remedies under
the federal Copyright Act in the event of
infringement. Not all of these copyright
owners, however, have the same
resources to bring a federal lawsuit,
which can require substantial time,
money, and effort. To the extent an
infringement results in a relatively small
amount of economic damage, the
copyright owner may be dissuaded from
filing a lawsuit because the potential

award may not justify the expense of
litigation. Even where statutory damages
and attorney fees are possible, they are
not available until the conclusion of the
litigation. Moreover, awards of statutory
damages may be as low as $750 (or, in
cases of innocent infringement, $200),
and may not always make the copyright
owner whole.
In light of these challenges, the House
of Representatives’ Subcommittee on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property held a hearing in March 2006
to learn more about the problems faced
by small copyright claimants (the
‘‘Small Claims Hearing’’).1 The hearing
focused on possible alternative dispute
resolution systems such as a copyright
‘‘small claims court’’ or other
mechanism. The testimony also
addressed some of the problems that
small copyright claim owners have with
the current system, as well as concerns
about defendants’ rights in an
alternative system. The Copyright Office
submitted a statement to the
Subcommittee regarding the small
copyright claims issue, noting these
difficulties, proposing to review
potential alternatives, and welcoming
the possibility of further study.2 The
Copyright Office also identified some of
these ‘‘small claims’’ challenges in its
2006 Report on Orphan Works,3 and
proposed legislation in 2006 and 2008
addressing orphan works included
provisions that specifically directed the
Copyright Office to conduct a study
addressing remedies for small claims,
but the legislation ultimately did not
become law.4
The Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee has recently asked the U.S.
Copyright Office to study the obstacles
facing small copyright claims disputes,
as well as possible alternatives. In a
letter dated October 11, 2011, Chairman
Lamar Smith requested that the Office
‘‘undertake a study to assess: (1) The
extent to which authors and other
1 Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_
house_hearings&docid=f:26767.pdf.
2 Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of the United States
Copyright Office), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat032906.html.
3 United States Copyright Office, Report on
Orphan Works 1 (2006), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full pdf.
4 Proposed bills include the Shawn Bentley
Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong.
(2008), which was passed by the Senate; the Orphan
Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008);
and the Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439,
109th Cong. (2006).
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copyright owners are effectively
prevented from seeking relief from
infringements due to constraints in the
current system; and (2) furnish specific
recommendations, as appropriate, for
changes in administrative, regulatory
and statutory authority that will
improve the adjudication of small
copyright claims and thereby enable all
copyright owners to more fully realize
the promise of exclusive rights
enshrined in our Constitution.’’
The Office therefore seeks comments
on how parties—both copyright owners
and those alleged to have infringed—
view the current system, what their
experiences with the current system
have been, and what types of
alternatives would be helpful and
viable.
A. Challenges of the Current Legal
System
Currently, copyright owners
interested in bringing a lawsuit to
enforce their copyrights must do so in
federal district courts, which have
exclusive jurisdiction over copyright
claims. 28 U.S.C. 1338. This is true
regardless of the monetary value of the
copyright claim. Vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in federal courts is generally
beneficial because copyright law is
federal law, and federal courts have
become familiar with copyright analysis
and thus should bring a level of
consistency to copyright cases.
Additionally, the Act aids some
copyright claimants by permitting
awards of reasonable attorney’s fees and
statutory damages to the prevailing
party, but a plaintiff may recover
statutory damages and attorney’s fees
only if the work was timely registered.
17 U.S.C. 412, 504, 505.
Despite the benefits of the current
system, there are some drawbacks to
requiring copyright owners and
defendants to engage in potentially
extensive federal litigation for all
copyright disputes. One of the major
impediments to federal lawsuits is the
cost of litigation. Although copyright
owners could proceed pro se in federal
court, they often need the assistance of
a lawyer to understand and handle
federal procedures and substantive law.
This is especially true because, unlike
in the state court system, there is no
streamlined ‘‘small claims’’ process for
claims with a lower monetary value. If
a copyright owner hires a lawyer, the
expenses can add up quickly.
Contingency fee arrangements are
relatively rare in copyright lawsuits;
thus most copyright owners will have to
pay an hourly fee for representation.
Lawyers charge hundreds of dollars per
hour, which could reach a total of tens
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or hundreds of thousands of dollars
when a case does not immediately settle
and instead requires discovery, motion
practice, and trial. In fact, one recent
survey found that, as of 2011, the
median cost for litigating a copyright
infringement lawsuit with less than
$1 million at risk was $350,000. Am.
Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n (‘‘AIPLA’’),
Report of the Economic Survey 2011 35
(2011). Even if a copyright owner
proceeds pro se, litigation itself includes
court costs and fees, which can add up
to a not insignificant sum. Many
individual copyright owners simply do
not have the resources to fund
expensive litigation. Moreover, even
though the Act allows some awards of
attorney’s fees, other costs, and statutory
damages, these awards are not
guaranteed—and may not be available at
all depending on the timeliness of
copyright registration—and are only
awarded at the end of litigation, likely
after a copyright owner has made
significant out of pocket payment to
cover legal fees and court costs.
Additionally, an award of attorney’s
fees—assuming that it is collectible—
will not necessarily reimburse the
copyright owner for all fees expended in
prosecuting a claim.
In federal litigation, the period of time
between the filing of a case and the final
determination can be lengthy. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
parties to engage in extensive discovery
and motion practice, which often take
far more than a year to complete. In fact,
the median time for all cases that went
to trial—not just copyright suits—was
twenty-three months in 2009–2010.5
This lengthy time frame requires
litigants to expend energy and effort
throughout a relatively long period of
time. This investment of time, not to
mention the associated expenses, may
not be feasible for individual authors,
who may not be able to dedicate
sufficient time to handle all of the
litigation burdens.
B. Potential Alternatives for Small
Copyright Claims
The Office is interested in learning
about alternatives to the current legal
system that might help alleviate some of
the burdens associated with pursuing
small copyright claims. Some
5 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, March 31,
2010, Office of Judges Programs, Statistics Division,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Table C–5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tables/
C05Mar10.pdf. The time frame differs significantly
between districts—from 11.1 months in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to
41.2 months in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.

alternatives were identified at the Small
Claims Hearing, including: (1) Using the
current Copyright Royalty Board (a
panel of administrative law judges
established under Chapter 8 of Title 17
that sets rates and terms for statutory
licenses and decides how to distribute
certain statutory license royalties); (2)
creating a federal ‘‘small claims court’’
or otherwise streamlining federal
procedures; (3) developing a staff of
dedicated administrative law judges to
specialize in small copyright claims; (4)
amending the Act to allow state courts
(including small claims courts) to hear
small copyright claims; and (5) allowing
trade associations or other group
representatives to bring a single, large
filing on behalf of a sizeable group of
small copyright owners. While these
alternatives deserve balanced
discussion, there may be other
potentially suitable options that were
not discussed at the Small Claims
Hearing.
There are, of course, a variety of
issues that require further consideration.
These include:
Degree of Difficulty Litigating Small
Copyright Claims in the Current System:
Before analyzing various alternatives to
the current system, it is important to
further explore the obstacles that the
district court process presents in small
copyright claim cases. This would help
focus future analysis and any potential
alternative legal processes.
State Court Involvement: State courts
do not have expertise in copyright
jurisprudence. As noted above, Section
1338 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code vests
federal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over copyright claims.
Moreover, Section 301 of the Act
explicitly preempts state claims ‘‘that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103.’’ Thus, state courts are not
experienced in the nuances of copyright
law and may not have sufficient
resources to devote to a claim’s
intricacies, especially when limited in a
small claims court context.
Nevertheless, state courts commonly
handle small disputes, and thus they
likely have the structure to handle the
logistics of such claims. State court
involvement, however, is only one
possible avenue to explore and there are
also several federal options that should
be considered in the discussion.
Location of Federal Court/Tribunal:
Creating a federal ‘‘small claims court’’
or administrative judge panel would

create logistical rather than
jurisdictional challenges, including
where the court(s) and panel(s) would
be located. If there are several courts or
panels located throughout the country,
it may provide more convenience to the
parties, but it may also reduce
consistency and add to administrative
costs. Alternatively, if there is only one
court or panel, the guiding rules could
allow for liberal use of telephone
conferences and videoconferences, and
the procedures could focus more on a
paper practice with fewer (if any)
hearings. The court or tribunal could
also limit the types and amount of
discovery in the interest of expediency.
Affiliation With the Copyright Office
or Copyright Royalty Board: The
Copyright Office administers the
Copyright Act, is a substantive expert on
provisions of copyright law, and has
statutory responsibilities in both
litigation and administrative law. It may
thus be appropriate for the Office to be
associated with a new process.
Similarly, the Copyright Royalty Board
is already proficient in handling
administrative procedures under the
Act, and it may have the capability of
expanding its scope to handle
additional claims.
Determination of ‘‘Small’’ Copyright
Claims: Although many copyright
owners are concerned about the cost of
litigating ‘‘small’’ copyright claims in
federal court, the definition of ‘‘small’’
is unclear. Any changes in legal process
must take a balanced approach to
determine which claims are deemed
‘‘small’’ enough to fit into the new
system.
Voluntary or Mandatory: A major
question is whether a new small
copyright claim process would be
voluntary or mandatory. Copyright
owners may want the option of choosing
which type of court hears a claim, and
defendants might similarly wish to
remove a claim filed in a new court or
panel to federal district court.
Additionally, the question arises about
how to appeal an adverse decision—and
to what court or other body.
Fair Use: The affirmative defense of
fair use defense is extremely factspecific and typically requires courts to
examine decades of judicial precedent.
The ability to present and have heard a
fair use defense is therefore a concern.
Defendants’ Appearance: It has been
suggested that defendants should not be
required to appear at a small copyright
claim proceeding until the copyright
owner provides a prima facie case of
infringement. This ostensibly would
prevent a copyright owner from
dragging a defendant into a legal
proceeding without cause. It is unclear
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whether this would be necessary, or
whether an alternative small copyright
claims proceeding might instead rely
upon a rule akin to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, which requires plaintiffs
to certify the veracity of the claim.
Available Remedies: Because a small
copyright claim process likely would be
limited to reduce costs and time, it is
unclear what types of remedies should
be offered. The Act itself offers a
number of infringement remedies,
including injunctions, monetary relief
(including statutory damages),
impounding of infringing copies and of
the articles by means of which
infringing copies may be reproduced,
costs and attorney’s fees. Consideration
should be given to whether an
alternative small claims process could
or should provide this whole panoply of
remedies, and whether the new system
would also allow preliminary relief to
prevent impending or continuing
infringement, similar to a temporary
restraining order or preliminary
injunction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65.
These are but a few of the factors to
analyze before deciding whether to
move forward with a new small
copyright claim system, and, if so, what
that new process might be.
II. Subjects of Inquiry
The Office seeks comment on how
copyright owners and defendants use
the current legal system for small
copyright claims, including information
on the obstacles and benefits of using
federal district courts. Additionally, the
Office requests comment on potential
alternatives for handling copyright
claims that have a relatively small
economic value. The Office is interested
in comment on the logistics of potential
alternatives, as well as the benefits and
risks presented by different types of
processes.
III. Conclusion
The Office hereby seeks comment
from the public on factual and policy
matters related to the treatment of small
copyright claims. If there are any
additional pertinent issues not
discussed above, the Office encourages
interested parties to raise those matters
in their comments. In addition, the
Office is considering having one or more
roundtables or formal hearings on the
matters raised above in the coming
months. It is also likely that, following
receipt of the comments in response to
this Notice, the Office will publish a
further Notice of Inquiry posing specific
questions and possibly exploring
additional alternatives.

Dated: October 24, 2011.
Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights.
[FR Doc. 2011–27824 Filed 10–26–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION
Records Schedules; Availability and
Request for Comments
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA).
ACTION: Notice of availability of
proposed records schedules; request for
comments.
AGENCY:

The National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA)
publishes notice at least once monthly
of certain Federal agency requests for
records disposition authority (records
schedules). Once approved by NARA,
records schedules provide mandatory
instructions on what happens to records
when no longer needed for current
Government business. They authorize
the preservation of records of
continuing value in the National
Archives of the United States and the
destruction, after a specified period, of
records lacking administrative, legal,
research, or other value. Notice is
published for records schedules in
which agencies propose to destroy
records not previously authorized for
disposal or reduce the retention period
of records already authorized for
disposal. NARA invites public
comments on such records schedules, as
required by 44 U.S.C. 3303a(a).
DATES: Requests for copies must be
received in writing on or before
November 28, 2011. Once the appraisal
of the records is completed, NARA will
send a copy of the schedule. NARA staff
usually prepare appraisal
memorandums that contain additional
information concerning the records
covered by a proposed schedule. These,
too, may be requested and will be
provided once the appraisal is
completed. Requesters will be given 30
days to submit comments.
ADDRESSES: You may request a copy of
any records schedule identified in this
notice by contacting Records
Management Services (ACNR) using one
of the following means:
Mail: NARA (ACNR), 8601 Adelphi
Road, College Park, MD 20740–6001.
E-mail: request.schedule@nara.gov.
Fax: 301–837–3698.
Requesters must cite the control
number, which appears in parentheses
after the name of the agency which
SUMMARY:
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submitted the schedule, and must
provide a mailing address. Those who
desire appraisal reports should so
indicate in their request.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Laurence Brewer, Director, National
Records Management Program (ACN),
National Archives and Records
Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road,
College Park, MD 20740–6001.
Telephone: 301–837–1539. E-mail:
request.schedule@nara.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Each year
Federal agencies create billions of
records on paper, film, magnetic tape,
and other media. To control this
accumulation, agency records managers
prepare schedules proposing retention
periods for records and submit these
schedules for NARA’s approval, using
the Standard Form (SF) 115, Request for
Records Disposition Authority. These
schedules provide for the timely transfer
into the National Archives of
historically valuable records and
authorize the disposal of all other
records after the agency no longer needs
them to conduct its business. Some
schedules are comprehensive and cover
all the records of an agency or one of its
major subdivisions. Most schedules,
however, cover records of only one
office or program or a few series of
records. Many of these update
previously approved schedules, and
some include records proposed as
permanent.
The schedules listed in this notice are
media neutral unless specified
otherwise. An item in a schedule is
media neutral when the disposition
instructions may be applied to records
regardless of the medium in which the
records are created and maintained.
Items included in schedules submitted
to NARA on or after December 17, 2007,
are media neutral unless the item is
limited to a specific medium. (See 36
CFR 1225.12(e).)
No Federal records are authorized for
destruction without the approval of the
Archivist of the United States. This
approval is granted only after a
thorough consideration of their
administrative use by the agency of
origin, the rights of the Government and
of private persons directly affected by
the Government’s activities, and
whether or not they have historical or
other value.
Besides identifying the Federal
agencies and any subdivisions
requesting disposition authority, this
public notice lists the organizational
unit(s) accumulating the records or
indicates agency-wide applicability in
the case of schedules that cover records
that may be accumulated throughout an
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APPENDIX—Continued
[32 TAA petitions instituted between 8/6/12 and 8/10/12]
Subject Firm
(petitioners)

Location

IS One, Inc./E&R Industrial Sales (Workers) .........................
Sihi Pumps (Workers) ............................................................
Acme Electric (Company) ......................................................
Phoenix Services (State/One-Stop) .......................................
CCC Information Systems, Inc. (State/One-Stop) .................
Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (Company) ..............
Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (Company) ..............
Fusion Contact Centers (Workers) ........................................
Sykes, Inc. (Workers) .............................................................
Legacy Custom Plastics LLC (State/One-Stop) .....................
Parkway Knitting (Workers) ....................................................
Darly Custom Technology, Inc., Engineering Design and
Drafting Department (Company).
Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (Company) ..............
Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (Company) ..............
Harsco Metals (Workers) .......................................................
Wheeling Corrugating Company (Union) ...............................
RG Steel, LLC (Union) ...........................................................
NCO/APAC Teleservices (Workers) ......................................
Sabritec (State/One-Stop) ......................................................
United Steelworkers (USW), Local 9477 (State/One-Stop) ...
New CIDC Delaware Corporation (Company) .......................
NCO Financial Systems (State/One-Stop) .............................

East Syracuse, NY ................
Grand Island, NY ...................
Lumberton, NC ......................
Sparrows Point, MD ...............
Cerritos, CA ...........................
Simsbury, CT .........................
Windsor, CT ...........................
Santa Maria, CA ....................
Langhorne, PA .......................
Clearwater, FL .......................
Hillsville, VA ...........................
Windsor, CT ...........................

08/07/12
08/07/12
08/07/12
08/07/12
08/07/12
08/07/12
08/07/12
08/08/12
08/08/12
08/09/12
08/09/12
08/09/12

07/30/12
07/31/12
08/05/12
08/06/12
08/06/12
08/06/12
08/06/12
08/06/12
08/07/12
08/08/12
07/23/12
08/09/12

Overland Park, KS .................
San Antonio, TX ....................
Warren, OH ............................
Beech Bottom, WV ................
Wheeling, WV ........................
Greensboro, NC .....................
Irvine, CA ...............................
Baltimore, MD ........................
Cambridge, MA ......................
Getzville, NY ..........................

08/09/12
08/09/12
08/09/12
08/09/12
08/09/12
08/10/12
08/10/12
08/10/12
08/10/12
08/10/12

08/08/12
08/08/12
08/07/12
08/07/12
08/07/12
07/26/12
08/09/12
08/09/12
08/06/12
08/09/12

TA–W
81864
81865
81866
81867
81868
81869
81870
81871
81872
81873
81874
81875

.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............

81876
81877
81878
81879
81880
81881
81882
81883
81884
81885

.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............

[FR Doc. 2012–20765 Filed 8–22–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2011–10]

Remedies for Small Copyright Claims:
Additional Comments
Copyright Office, Library of
Congress.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
AGENCY:

This is the second request for
public comment pertaining to a study
undertaken by the U.S. Copyright Office
at the request of Congress on the topic
of adjudicating small copyright claims.
The study will assess whether and, if so,
how the current legal system hinders or
prevents copyright owners from
pursuing claims that have a relatively
small economic value and will discuss,
with appropriate recommendations,
potential changes in administrative,
regulatory, and statutory authority. At
this time, the Office seeks additional
comments on some of the possible
alternatives. The Copyright Office also
announces two public meetings
following the comment period, to be
held during November 2012 in New
York and Los Angeles, respectively.
DATES: Comments are due September
26, 2012.
SUMMARY:

All comments and reply
comments shall be submitted
electronically. A comment page
containing a comment form is posted on
the Office Web site at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims.
The Web site interface requires
commenting parties to complete a form
specifying name and organization, as
applicable, and to upload comments as
an attachment via a browser button. To
meet accessibility standards,
commenting parties must upload
comments in a single file not to exceed
six megabytes (MB) in one of the
following formats: the Adobe Portable
Document File (PDF) format that
contains searchable, accessible text (not
an image); Microsoft Word;
WordPerfect; Rich Text Format (RTF); or
ASCII text file format (not a scanned
document). The form and face of the
comments must include both the name
of the submitter and organization. The
Office will post the comments publicly
on the Office’s Web site exactly as they
are received, along with names and
organizations. If electronic submission
of comments is not feasible, please
contact the Office at 202–707–8350 for
special instructions.
Public Meetings: The public meeting
in New York will be held in the Jerome
Greene Annex of Columbia Law School,
410 West 117th Street, New York, New
York 10027, on November 15, 2012 from
9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and on November
16, 2012 from 9:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. The
public meeting in Los Angeles will be

ADDRESSES:

Date of
institution

Date of
petition

held in Room 1314 of the UCLA School
of Law, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los
Angeles, California 90095, on November
26, 2012 from 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and
on November 27, 2012 from 9:30 a.m. to
3:30 p.m. The agendas and the process
for submitting requests to participate in
or observe one of these meetings will be
published on the Copyright Office Web
site no later than October 15, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jacqueline Charlesworth, Senior
Counsel, Office of the Register, by email
at jcharlesworth@loc.gov or by
telephone at 202–707–8350; or
Catherine Rowland, Counsel, Office of
Policy and International Affairs, by
email at crowland@loc.gov or by
telephone at 202–707–8350.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
At the request of Congress, the
Copyright Office is conducting a study
to assess whether and, if so, how the
current legal system hinders or prevents
copyright owners from pursuing
copyright infringement claims that have
a relatively small economic value
(‘‘small copyright claims’’ or ‘‘small
claims’’), and to recommend potential
changes in administrative, regulatory,
and statutory authority to improve the
adjudication of such claims. The Office
published a general Notice of Inquiry in
the fall of 2011 and received numerous
comments regarding the current
environment in which small copyright
claims are (or are not) pursued and
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possible alternatives to address
concerns about the current system. See
the original Notice of Inquiry, 76 FR
66758 (Oct. 27, 2011), and comments
received in response thereto, which are
posted on the Copyright Office Web site,
at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
smallclaims/comments/. The Copyright
Office also notes the roundtable
discussion on small claims sponsored
by George Washington University Law
School (‘‘GW’’) on May 10, 2012. The
GW discussion covered topics ranging
from constitutional considerations to
the definition of a ‘‘small claim’’ to
potential features of a streamlined
adjudicatory process, and included the
participation of both the Copyright
Office and the Patent and Trademark
Office. See http://www.uspto.gov/blog/
director/entry/
uspto_co_sponsors_ip_small.
At this time, the Copyright Office
seeks further input concerning how a
copyright small claims system might be
structured and function. Accordingly,
the Office seeks responses on the
specific subjects below (some of which
were identified by the Office in its
earlier Notice), including from parties
who did not previously address those
subjects, or those who wish to amplify
or clarify their earlier comments or
respond to the comments of others. (The
Office has studied and will take into
consideration the comments already
received, so there is no need to restate
previously submitted material.) A party
choosing to respond to this Notice of
Inquiry need not address every subject
below, but the Office requests that
responding parties clearly identify and
separately address each subject for
which a response is submitted.
Subjects of Inquiry
Assuming a system for small
copyright claims is created:
1. Nature of tribunal/process. Provide
a general description of the small claims
system you believe would work best.
Should it be a streamlined process
within the existing Article III court
structure, or an alternative process
administered by the Copyright Office,
the Copyright Royalty Judges, and/or
some other type of tribunal? If an
alternative process, should it include a
right of review by an Article III court?
Should the process be adjudicatory in
nature, or instead consist of, or include,
arbitration or mediation, or be some
combination of these? (See below for
more specific questions on review/
appeals and the potential role of
arbitration and/or mediation.)
2. Voluntary versus mandatory
participation. Explain whether the small
claims process would best be structured

as a voluntary or mandatory system.
Should a prospective plaintiff with a
claim that meets the small claims
criteria retain the option of choosing the
existing federal district court process
instead? Should a defendant be
permitted to opt out of the small claims
forum in favor of federal district court?
If one or both parties’ participation in
the small claims process is voluntary,
what incentives—such as damages
limitations, attorneys’ fees awards, or
other features—might be instituted to
encourage voluntary participation by
plaintiffs and/or defendants?
3. Arbitration. Explain what role, if
any, arbitration might play in the small
claims process. Should matters be
decided through some sort of
specialized arbitration? Would such
arbitration be binding? If so, how would
the arbitrator’s award be enforced and
under what circumstances, if any, could
it be set aside (and how might the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et
seq., apply)? How would arbitrators be
trained and selected? Are there any
existing arbitration models that might be
especially useful as a model for
arbitrating small copyright claims?
4. Mediation. Explain what role, if
any, mediation might play in the small
claims system. Should parties be
required to participate in mediation
before proceeding with a more formal
process? Would it be useful to offer a
copyright-focused voluntary mediation
service? How would mediators be
trained and selected?
5. Settlement. Please comment on
how the small claims process might be
structured to encourage voluntary
settlements in lieu of litigated
proceedings. Should a plaintiff be
required to make a settlement offer to a
prospective defendant before
proceeding with a claim? Should the
defendant be required to respond?
6. Location of tribunal(s). Could the
small claims tribunal be centrally
located, or should there be regional
venues? If centrally located, where
should it be? If in multiple locations,
what should those be?
7. Qualifications and selection of
adjudicators. Who should the
adjudicators be? If the small claims
system is a streamlined process within
the Article III court structure, is there a
role for magistrate judges or staff
attorneys? If it is an alternative process,
what qualifications should the
adjudicators have, and how should they
be selected?
8. Eligible works. Are some types of
copyrighted works more amenable to, or
in need of, a small claims system than
others? Should the small claims process
be limited to certain classes of works,
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for example, photographs and
illustrations, or should it be available
for all types of copyrighted works?
9. Permissible claims. Discuss the
types of claims that could or should be
eligible for the small claims process. For
example, should the process be limited
solely to claims of infringement, or
should it be possible to bring a related
claim arising out of the same dispute,
such as a Lanham Act claim? What
about an infringement claim that is tied
to a contractual issue, as in the case
where the defendant is alleged to have
infringed by exceeding the terms of a
license? Should issues of copyright
ownership be amenable to decision
through the small claims process? What
about a user’s claim that a takedown
notice contained a material
misrepresentation in violation of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(‘‘DMCA’’), 17 U.S.C. 512(f)?
10. Permissible claim amount.
Assuming there would be a cap on the
amount of damages that could be sought
by a plaintiff or counterclaimant in the
small claims process, what should that
amount be? What is the rationale for the
cap proposed? Should there be any
independent analysis of the damages
claim by the tribunal? Should it be
permissible for a copyright owner to
pursue multiple claims in the same
proceeding provided that, either
individually or, alternatively, in the
aggregate, they do not exceed the cap?
What if, during the course of the
proceeding, additional infringements
are discovered such that the plaintiff’s
potential damages exceed the cap? What
if a defendant asserts a counterclaim
that exceeds the cap?
11. Permissible defenses and
counterclaims. Discuss what limitations,
if any, there should be on the types of
defenses and counterclaims that could
be decided through the small claims
process. For example, could a defense of
fair use or independent creation be
adjudicated through the process? What
about defenses or counterclaims arising
under the DMCA, such as an assertion
that the plaintiff’s claim is subject to
one of the safe harbor provisions of 17
U.S.C. 512(a) through (d), or that a
takedown notice violated 17 U.S.C.
512(f)? To the extent such defenses or
counterclaims were not subject to
adjudication through the small claims
process and would require removal of
the action to federal district court,
would this provide defendants with a
means to ‘‘opt out’’ of the small claims
system in a substantial number of cases?
12. Registration. Should registration
of the allegedly infringed work be
required in order to initiate a claim
through the small claims process or,
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alternatively, should proof of filing of an
application for registration suffice?
Should the process permit claims to be
brought for unregistered works? Should
the registration status of a work affect
the availability of statutory damages or
recovery of attorneys’ fees, assuming
such remedies are available through the
small claims process?
13. Filing fee. Discuss the merits of
requiring a filing fee to pursue a claim
through the small claims process and
the amount, if any, that would be
appropriate. Should the filing fee vary
with the size of the claim? Are there
existing standards that might be
informative?
14. Initiation of proceeding. Explain
what would be required to initiate a
proceeding. Should some sort of
attestation and/or a prima facie showing
of infringement be required of a
copyright owner with the initial filing?
Should a copyright owner need to
establish a prima facie case of
infringement before the defendant is
required to appear and, if so, how
would it be determined that this
requirement had been met? By what
means would the defendant be served or
otherwise notified of the action? Should
a defendant that is sued in federal
district court for copyright infringement
be permitted to transfer the matter to the
small claims tribunal if the plaintiff’s
alleged damages are within the small
claims damages cap? Should a party
who has been put on notice of an
alleged infringement be able to initiate
an action by seeking a declaratory
judgment of no infringement?
15. Representation. Describe the role
of attorneys or other representatives, if
any, in a small claims copyright system.
Should individual copyright owners be
permitted to be represented by an
attorney and/or a non-attorney advocate,
in addition to appearing pro se? Should
corporations and other business entities
be permitted to appear through
employees instead of attorneys?
16. Conduct of proceedings. Describe
how the small claims proceeding would
work. Could the process be conducted
by paper submission, without the
requirement of personal appearances?
Should the tribunal have the option to
hold teleconferences or
videoconferences in lieu of personal
appearances? Should non-party
witnesses be permitted to participate
and, if so, by what means? Should
expert witnesses be permitted? Should
the tribunal have any sort of subpoena
power? Should there be an established
time frame for adjudication of the
matter?
17. Discovery, motion practice and
evidence. Explain what types of

discovery, if any, should be permitted in
the small claims system. For example,
should depositions (either oral or by
written question), requests for
production of documents,
interrogatories and/or requests for
admission be permitted and, if so, to
what extent? Should motion practice be
allowed and, if so, to what extent? What
types of testimony and/or evidence
should be accepted (e.g., written, oral,
documentary, etc.), and what standards
of admissibility, if any, should apply?
18. Damages. Describe the damages
that would be available through the
small claims system. Should damages be
limited to actual damages, or could
statutory damages also be awarded? If
statutory damages were available,
should they adhere to the existing
statutory damages framework of 17
U.S.C. 504(c) (subject to any cap
applicable in the small claims system),
or could an alternative approach be
adopted, such as a fixed amount to be
awarded in the case of a finding of
infringement?
19. Equitable relief. Describe the
equitable relief, if any, that should be
available through the small claims
system. Should the small claims
tribunal be able to grant declaratory
relief, issue an injunction to halt the
infringing use of a work, impose license
terms (such as for the continued
distribution of a derivative work) and/
or award other forms of equitable relief?
20. Attorneys’ fees and costs. Explain
how attorneys’ fees and costs might be
handled within the small claims system.
Should a prevailing plaintiff and/or
defendant be entitled to recover its
attorneys’ fees and costs? If so, should
such fees and costs be awarded
according to the standards that have
evolved under 17 U.S.C. 505, should
they be awarded as a matter of course,
or should other criteria apply? Should
there be a limit on the amount of
attorneys’ fees that could be sought and/
or awarded in the small claims system?
21. Record of proceedings. Describe
the record of proceedings that should be
kept by the tribunal. Should decisions
of the tribunal be rendered in writing?
Should they include factual findings,
legal explanation and/or other analysis?
Should the records be publicly
available?
22. Effect of adjudication. Explain the
nature and effect of a small claims
adjudication. Should a decision of the
small claims tribunal constitute a final
and enforceable judgment (subject to
any further review or appeal)? Should it
be published and/or carry any
precedential weight? Should it have any
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect,
or should it be limited to the specific

activities at issue and parties in
question?
23. Enforceability of judgment. With
respect to monetary judgments and any
equitable or other relief awarded by the
small claims tribunal, through what
means would such remedies be
enforceable? Should there be any
special procedures for enforcement? Are
there existing judicial or nonjudicial
resources that might be useful in this
regard?
24. Review/appeals. Should there be a
right of review or appeal and, if so,
under what circumstances, and by or to
what body or court? What would be the
appropriate standard of review (e.g., de
novo, clearly erroneous, abuse of
discretion, etc.)? Aside from any
applicable filing fee, should there be
any conditions for seeking review (such
as posting of a bond)? Should a
prevailing party in a review or appeal
process be entitled to recover its
attorneys’ fees or costs?
25. Group claims. Should multiple
copyright owners or a trade association
or other entity acting on behalf of
copyright owners be permitted to
pursue multiple infringement claims
against a single defendant, or multiple
defendants, in a single proceeding?
Should there be specialized rules of
standing or procedures to permit this
within the small claims system?
26. Frivolous claims. How might the
small claims system deter frivolous and
unwarranted filings? What measures—
such as the awarding of attorneys’ fees
or other financial sanctions, or the
barring of copyright owners that have
repeatedly pursued frivolous claims
from further use of the small claims
process—might be taken to discourage
the assertion of bad faith or harassing
infringement claims, defenses and
counterclaims?
27. Constitutional issues. Comment
on whether a small claims system might
implicate any one or more of the
following constitutional concerns—or
any other constitutional issue—and, if
so, how the particular concern might be
addressed:
a. Separation of powers questions
arising from the creation of specialized
tribunals outside of the Article III
framework, including how a right of
review by an Article III court might
impact the analysis;
b. The Seventh Amendment right to
have a copyright infringement case tried
to a jury, as confirmed in Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523
U.S. 340 (1998);
c. Constitutional requirements for a
court’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction, in particular when

Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 164 / Thursday, August 23, 2012 / Notices
adjudicating claims of a defendant
located in another state; and/or
d. Due process considerations arising
from abbreviated procedures that
impose limitations on briefing,
discovery, testimony, evidence,
appellate review, etc.
28. State court alternative. As an
alternative to creating a small claims
system at a federal level, should the
statutory mandate of exclusive federal
jurisdiction for copyright claims be
altered to allow small copyright claims
to be pursued through existing state
court systems, including traditional
state small claims courts? What benefits
or problems might flow from such a
change?
29. Empirical data. Commenting
parties are invited to cite and submit
further empirical data (in addition to the
anecdotal and survey information
already cited or submitted to the
Copyright Office in connection with this
proceeding) bearing upon:
a. Whether copyright owners are or
are not pursuing small infringement
claims through the existing federal court
process, and the factors that influence
copyright owners’ decisions in that
regard, including the value of claims
pursued or forgone;
b. The overall cost to a plaintiff and/
or a defendant to litigate a copyright
infringement action to conclusion in
federal court, including costs and
attorneys’ fees, discovery expenditures,
expert witness fees and other expenses
(with reference to the stage of
proceedings at which the matter was
concluded);
c. The frequency with which courts
award costs and/or attorneys’ fees to
prevailing parties pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
505, and the amount of such awards in
relation to the underlying claim or
recovery; and/or
d. The frequency with which litigants
decline to accept an outcome in state
small claims court and seek de novo
review (with or without a jury trial) or
file an appeal in a different court.
30. Funding considerations. Aside
from filing fees, by what means might a
small claims system be partially or
wholly self-supporting? Should winning
and/or losing parties be required to
defray the administrative costs of the
tribunal’s consideration of their matter,
in all or in part? If so, by what means?
If the system consists of or includes
arbitration or mediation, should parties
bear the cost of these alternatives?
31. Evaluation of small claims system.
Should the small claims system be
evaluated for efficacy and, if so, how?
Should it be subject to periodic review
or adjustment? Should it be launched

initially as a pilot program or on a
limited basis?
32. Other issues. Are there any
additional pertinent issues not
identified above that the Copyright
Office should consider in conducting its
study?
Dated: August 20, 2012.
Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights.
[FR Doc. 2012–20802 Filed 8–22–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–316; NRC–2012–0199]

Indiana Michigan Power Company,
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2,
Environmental Assessment and
Finding of No Significant Impact
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC or the Commission) is considering
issuance of an exemption and an
amendment to Renewed Facility
Operating License No. DPR–74, issued
to Indiana Michigan Power Company
(the licensee), for operation of Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (CNP–2),
located in Berrien County, Michigan, in
accordance with §§ 50.12 and 50.90 of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR). In accordance
with 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC performed
an environmental assessment
documenting its findings as follows:
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Actions
The proposed actions would issue an
exemption from certain requirements of
10 CFR, Section 50.46 and Appendix K,
regarding fuel cladding material, and
revise the Technical Specifications
document, which is Appendix A to
Renewed Facility Operating License
DPR–74, to permit use of a
Westinghouse proprietary material,
Optimized ZIRLOTM, for fuel rod
cladding. The licensee will be
authorized to a peak load average
burnup limit of 62 gigawatt-days per
metric ton uranium (GWD/MTU).
The proposed actions are in
accordance with the licensee’s
application dated September 29, 2011,
as supplemented on July 25, 2012.
The Need for the Proposed Actions
The proposed actions to issue an
exemption to the fuel cladding
requirement of 10 CFR 50.46 and
Appendix K, and to amend the
Technical Specifications to permit use
of Optimized ZIRLOTM clad fuel rods to
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a peak rod average burnup limit of 62
GWD/MTU would allow for more
effective fuel management. If the
exemption and amendment are not
approved, the licensee will not be
provided the opportunity to use
Optimized ZIRLOTM fuel design with a
peak rod average burnup as high as 62
GWD/MTU; the licensee would thus
lose fuel management flexibility.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed
Actions
In this environmental assessment
regarding the impacts of the use of
Optimized ZIRLOTM clad fuel with the
possible burnup up to 62 GWD/MTU,
the Commission is relying on the results
of the updated study conducted for the
NRC by the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL), entitled
‘‘Environmental Effects of Extending
Fuel Burnup Above 60 GWD/MTU’’
(NUREG/CR–6703, PNNL–13257,
January 2001). Environmental impacts
of high burnup fuel up to 75 GWD/MTU
were evaluated in the study, but some
aspects of the review were limited to
evaluating the impacts of the extended
burnup up to 62 GWD/MTU, because of
the need for additional data on the effect
of extended burnup on gap release
fractions. All the aspects of the fuelcycle were considered during the study,
from mining, milling, conversion,
enrichment and fabrication through
normal reactor operation,
transportation, waste management, and
storage of spent fuel.
The amendment and exemption
would allow CNP–2 to use Optimized
ZIRLOTM clad fuel up to a burnup limit
of 62 GWD/MTU. The NRC staff has
completed its evaluation of the
proposed actions and concludes that
such changes would not adversely affect
plant safety, and would have no adverse
effect on the probability of any accident.
For the accidents that involve damage or
melting of the fuel in the reactor core,
fuel rod integrity has been shown to be
unaffected by extended burnup under
consideration; therefore, the
consequences of an accident will not be
affected by fuel burnup to 62 GWD/
MTU. For the accidents in which the
reactor core remains intact, the
increased burnup may slightly change
the mix of fission products that could be
released, but because the radionuclides
contributing most to the dose are shortlived, increased burnup would not have
an effect on the consequences beyond
the consequences of previously
evaluated accident scenarios. Thus,
there will be no significant increase in
projected dose consequences of
postulated accidents associated with
fuel burnup up to 62 GWD/MTU, and
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(g) Batteries in the surveying
equipment will be changed out or
charged in fresh air out of the return.
(h) Qualified personnel who use
surveying equipment will be properly
trained to recognize the hazards
associated with the use of
nonpermissible surveying equipment in
areas where methane could be present.
(i) The nonpermissible surveying
equipment will not be put into service
until MSHA has initially inspected the
equipment and determined that it is in
compliance with all the terms and
conditions in this petition.
The petitioner asserts that the
proposed alternative method will at all
times guarantee no less than the same
measure of protection as that afforded
by the existing standard.
Docket Number: M–2013–013–C.
Petitioner: Peabody Midwest Mining,
LLC, Three Gateway Center, Suite 1500,
401 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania 15222–1000.
Mine: Wildcat Hills Underground
Mine, MSHA I.D. No. 11–03156, located
in Saline County, Illinois.
Regulation Affected: 30 CFR
75.1002(a) (Installation of electric
equipment and conductors;
permissibility).
Modification Request: The petitioner
requests a modification of the existing
standard to permit an alternative
method of compliance to allow the use
of battery-powered nonpermissible
surveying equipment within 150 feet of
pillar workings, including, but not
limited to, portable battery-operated
mine transits, total station surveying
equipment, distance meters, and data
loggers. The petitioner states that:
(1) To comply with requirements for
mine ventilation maps and mine maps
in 30 CFR 75.372 and 75.1200, use of
the most practical and accurate
surveying equipment is necessary. To
ensure the safety of the miners in active
mines and to protect miners in future
mines that may mine in close proximity
to these same active mines, it is
necessary to determine the exact
location and extent of the mine
workings.
(2) Application of the existing
standard would result in a diminution
of safety to the miners. Underground
mining, by its nature and size and the
complexity of mine plans, requires that
accurate and precise measurements be
completed in a prompt and efficient
manner. The petitioner proposes the
following as an alternative to the
existing standard:
(a) Nonpermissible electronic
surveying equipment may be used. Such
nonpermissible surveying equipment
includes portable battery-operated total

station surveying equipment, mine
transits, distance meters, and data
loggers.
(b) All nonpermissible electronic
surveying equipment to be used within
150 feet of pillar workings will be
examined by surveying personnel prior
to use to ensure the equipment is being
maintained in a safe operating
condition. These examinations will
include the following steps:
(i) Checking the instrument for any
physical damage and the integrity of the
case.
(ii) Removing the battery and
inspecting for corrosion.
(iii) Inspecting the contact points to
ensure a secure connection to the
battery.
(iv) Reinserting the battery and
powering up and shutting down to
ensure proper connections.
(v) Checking the battery compartment
cover to ensure that it is securely
fastened.
(c) The results of such examinations
will be recorded and retained for one
year and made available to MSHA on
request.
(d) A qualified person as defined in
30 CFR 75.151 will continuously
monitor for methane immediately before
and during the use of nonpermissible
surveying equipment within 150 feet of
pillar workings.
(e) Nonpermissible surveying
equipment will not be used if methane
is detected in concentrations at or above
one percent for the area being surveyed.
When methane is detected at such levels
while the nonpermissible surveying
equipment is being used, the equipment
will be deenergized immediately and
the nonpermissible electronic
equipment withdrawn further than 150
feet from pillar workings.
(f) All hand-held methane detectors
will be MSHA-approved and
maintained in permissible and proper
operating condition as defined in 30
CFR 75.320.
(g) Batteries in the surveying
equipment will be changed out or
charged in fresh air more than 150 feet
from pillar workings.
(h) Qualified personnel who use
surveying equipment will be properly
trained to recognize the hazards
associated with the use of
nonpermissible surveying equipment in
areas where methane could be present.
(i) The nonpermissible surveying
equipment will not be put into service
until MSHA has initially inspected the
equipment and determined that it is in
compliance with all the terms and
conditions in this petition.
The petitioner asserts that the
proposed alternative method will at all

times guarantee no less than the same
measure of protection as that afforded
by the existing standard.
Dated: February 21, 2013.
George F. Triebsch,
Director, Office of Standards, Regulations and
Variances.
[FR Doc. 2013–04370 Filed 2–25–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–43–P

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
United States Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2011–10]

Remedies for Small Copyright Claims:
Third Request for Comments
U.S. Copyright Office, Library
of Congress.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
AGENCY:

The United States Copyright
Office is requesting public comment for
the third time on the topic of
adjudicating small copyright claims.
The Office is studying whether and, if
so, how the current legal system hinders
or prevents copyright owners from
pursuing copyright claims that have a
relatively small economic value and
will discuss, with appropriate
recommendations, potential changes in
administrative, regulatory, and statutory
authority. At this time, the Office seeks
additional comments on possible
alternatives to the current system to
improve the adjudication of such
claims.

SUMMARY:

DATES:

2013.

Comments are due April 12,

All comments are to be
submitted electronically. A comment
page containing a comment form is
posted on the Office Web site at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims.
The Web site interface requires
commenting parties to complete a form
specifying name and organization, as
applicable, and to upload comments as
an attachment via a browser button. To
meet accessibility standards,
commenting parties must upload
comments in a single file not to exceed
six megabytes (MB) in one of the
following formats: The Adobe Portable
Document File (PDF) format that
contains searchable, accessible text (not
an image); Microsoft Word;
WordPerfect; Rich Text Format (RTF); or
ASCII text file format (not a scanned
document). The form and face of the
comments must include both the name
of the submitter and organization. The
Office will post the comments publicly
on the Office’s Web site exactly as they
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are received, along with names and
organizations. If electronic submission
of comments is not feasible, please
contact the Office at 202–707–8350 for
special instructions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jacqueline Charlesworth, Senior
Counsel, Office of the Register, by email
at jcharlesworth@loc.gov or by
telephone at 202–707–8350; or
Catherine Rowland, Senior Counsel,
Office of Policy and International
Affairs, by email at crowland@loc.gov or
by telephone at 202–707–8350.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
At the request of Congress, the
Copyright Office is conducting a study
to assess whether and, if so, how the
current legal system hinders or prevents
copyright owners from pursuing
copyright infringement claims that have
a relatively small economic value
(‘‘small copyright claims’’ or ‘‘small
claims’’), and to recommend potential
changes in administrative, regulatory,
and statutory authority to improve the
adjudication of such claims. To aid with
this study, the Office has published two
prior Notices of Inquiry seeking public
comment, and the Office also has held
public hearings on small copyright
claims issues. The Office’s first general
Notice of Inquiry, published in the fall
of 2011, generated numerous comments
regarding the current environment in
which small copyright claims are (or are
not) pursued, and possible alternatives
to address concerns about the current
system. See the original Notice of
Inquiry, 76 FR 66758 (Oct. 27, 2011),
and comments received in response
thereto, which are posted on the
Copyright Office Web site, at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/
comments/. The Copyright Office
published a second Notice of Inquiry in
the summer of 2012 that announced
public hearings and set forth a list of
specific topics relating to the small
copyright claims process, which
resulted in additional public comments.
See the second Notice of Inquiry, 77 FR
51068 (Aug. 23, 2012), and comments
received in response thereto, posted on
the Copyright Office Web site, at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
smallclaims/comments/noi_10112012/
index.html. Finally, in November 2012,
the Office held two two-day public
hearings on small copyright claims in
New York City and Los Angeles, during
which participants provided their views
on the adjudication of small copyright
claims.
At this time, the Copyright Office
seeks additional comments regarding

how a small copyright claims system
might be structured and function,
including from parties who have not
previously addressed these issues, or
those who wish to amplify or clarify
their earlier comments, or respond to
the comments of others. The Office is
interested in additional comments about
the potential benefits and risks of
creating a new procedure for
adjudicating small copyright claims, as
well as how such a system might be
implemented—for example, as a new
adjudicative body, as part of the existing
federal court system, by extending the
jurisdiction of state courts, or as some
form of arbitration or mediation system.
Based on its review of previously
submitted comments and statements at
the public hearings, the Office in
particular seeks further commentary on
the specific subjects set forth below, as
the Office believes they warrant further
analysis.
While commenting parties may
address any matter pertinent to the
adjudication of small copyright claims,
they should be aware that the Office has
studied and will take into consideration
the comments already received, so there
is no need to restate previously
submitted material. A party choosing to
respond to this Notice of Inquiry need
not address every topic below, but the
Office requests that responding parties
clearly identify and separately address
those subjects for which a response is
submitted.
II. Subjects of Inquiry
1. Voluntary versus mandatory
participation. Stakeholders voiced
opinions in their comments and at the
Office’s two public hearings regarding
the benefits and risks of voluntary
versus mandatory small copyright claim
resolution systems. Specifically,
members of the public expressed
conflicting views concerning the
efficacy of incentives for participation
in a voluntary system and the
constitutional implications of a
mandatory system. The Office is
interested in learning more about the
feasibility and constraints of voluntary
and mandatory systems, and how these
alternatives might be implemented.
Among other questions, the Office is
interested in whether a voluntary
system could be implemented on an
‘‘opt out’’ basis—that is, whether a
properly served defendant might be
deemed to consent to participate in the
voluntary process unless he or she
affirmatively opts out within a certain
time frame. Some stakeholders
suggested that such a framework might
be helpful to address the problem of
alleged infringers who fail to respond to
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notices of infringement and thus might
also be unlikely to respond to notice of
a lawsuit.
2. Eligible works. The previous round
of comments and public hearings
explored the issue of what types of
works should be covered by a small
copyright claims process; that is,
whether the procedure should cover
only certain types of copyrighted works,
such as photographs, illustrations, and
textual works, or should cover all types
of works. For example, certain music
organizations proposed that musical
works and sound recordings be
excluded from the process (at least for
the time being) as, in their view, music
publishers, performing rights societies,
and record companies already
adequately address small copyright
claims on behalf of the songwriters and
recording artists they represent. At the
same time, others pointed out that some
songwriters and recording artists—for
example, those who are selfrepresented—may not have access to
such resources and, even if they are
represented through a larger
organization, may not be successful in
convincing that organization to take
legal action. The Office invites further
comment on whether musical works,
sound recordings, or any other type of
copyrighted work should be excluded
from the small claims process and, if so,
how it might impact individual and
small copyright owners of that type of
work.
3. Permissible claims. Some of the
comments and public hearing
participants analyzed what types of
claims should be eligible for the small
copyright claims process. These
comments and discussions raised
questions regarding how to define what
claims might or might not be amenable
to the small copyright claims procedure.
While it seems clear that a copyright
small claims tribunal would address
infringement matters, some
infringement claims are intertwined
with other issues, such as contractual or
ownership disputes, thus suggesting a
need for any such tribunal to address
these additional types of claims and
defenses as well. Some commenters
indicated that plaintiffs should be
limited to asserting infringement claims,
with contractual or ownership issues to
be adjudicated only when raised as
defenses. Others suggested that certain
types of issues, such as ownership
disputes, should be excluded from the
small claims process altogether. The
Office is interested in further thoughts
on the types of claims that should be
included in a small copyright claims
process and how the system might
address situations where an allegedly
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infringing act implicates an additional
cause of action or defense, such as
breach of contract, an ownership issue,
a trademark violation, or some other
claim.
4. Injunctive relief. In the comments
and during the public hearings, some
stakeholders argued strongly that any
small claims system should include the
possibility of injunctive relief to end
infringing behavior, including in
situations where the infringing conduct
exploits the work in a manner that the
copyright owner would not license, or
violates an exclusive arrangement
between the copyright owner and a
third party. However, others noted that
injunctive relief could be a complicated
undertaking in a small claims context,
partly if the unauthorized use is but one
part of a larger work such as a film,
book, or sound recording. It was
suggested that in such a case, a
plaintiff’s monetary damages might be
small but the economic consequences of
an injunction may be considerably
larger, perhaps exceeding in value any
damages cap adopted for the small
claims process. Stakeholders expressed
differing views as to whether injunctive
relief should be available through a
small claims system and, if so, how the
nature or scope of such relief might be
tailored to the small claims context.
Particular concerns raised in the
comments and at the hearings included:
whether preliminary injunctive relief is
compatible with a small claims process;
the procedural safeguards that would
adequately protect parties against whom
injunctive relief was sought; whether
injunctive relief awarded through the
small claims process should be
reviewable by an Article III court; and
whether Article III review would be a
practical alternative for parties of
limited means. A related consideration
is how the question of injunctive relief
might be affected by whether the small
claims process is voluntary or
mandatory. The Office welcomes
additional thoughts on these issues.
5. Secondary liability. Although much
of the public commentary and
discussion of small copyright claims has
focused on direct infringement, it has
also touched upon issues of secondary
liability, including the relationship of a
small claims procedure to the notice
and takedown requirements of Section
512 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 512.
The Office is interested in further views
concerning the intersection of a small
claims process with Section 512 and,
more generally, any recommended
approaches to claims of contributory
and vicarious infringement within the
small claims context.

6. Role of attorneys. Written
comments and discussion at the two
hearings revealed a range of opinions as
to the role of attorneys in a small
copyright claims system. Some believe
attorneys should be excluded from the
proceedings as the ability to retain
counsel would tend to favor defendants
with greater resources over small
copyright owner plaintiffs who are
compelled to proceed pro se. Other
commenters believe that access to legal
representation would be important to
both sides—especially in cases with a
degree of legal complexity—and the
system should be designed to encourage
attorneys to take lower-value cases by
offering fee awards. It was further
suggested that such fee awards might be
capped to reflect the streamlined
procedures and lower recoveries of a
small claims process. The Office
welcomes further consideration of these
issues.
7. Guiding law. If the small claims
tribunal was to be centrally located (or
even if it were in multiple locations),
what decisional law should it follow? In
addition to the United States Supreme
Court, should it look primarily to
copyright decisions of any particular
circuit—for example, based upon its
location, the location of the infringing
conduct, or the location of the parties?
Should its own decisions have any
precedential effect, at least with respect
to future decisions of the small claims
tribunal? In this regard, some expressed
the concern that if small claims
decisions had effect beyond the
immediate dispute, defendants might be
inclined to opt out of a voluntary
system. The Office invites further
thoughts on the decisional law that
should guide the small claims tribunal.
8. Willful and innocent infringement.
At the hearings, it was suggested by
some that a small claims process should
not include a potential finding of
willfulness, in part because it could be
more difficult to establish the
appropriate evidentiary record to
support such a finding under a
streamlined procedure. In addition, a
damages cap for small copyright claims
appreciably below the existing $150,000
maximum in statutory damages for
willful infringement—for example, a
ceiling of $30,000, as has been suggested
by some—would limit the economic
significance of a willfulness finding. See
17 U.S.C. 504(c)(2). If the willfulness
element were to be eliminated in the
small claims context, a question also
arises as to whether the ‘‘innocent
infringer’’ distinction—which permits a
court to reduce statutory damages to as
low as $200 for a defendant who was
not aware and had no reason to believe

his or her actions were infringing—
should remain. See id. Should the small
claims procedure eliminate distinctions
as to the nature of the infringement,
along with their potential impact on
damages awards?
9. Service of process. At the hearings,
participants shared views on how
potential small claims defendants might
be notified of the action. A particular
concern is that copyright owners of
limited means may have difficulty
effectuating traditional service on
distant or elusive defendants. It was
suggested that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4, including the provision
that permits a defendant to be notified
of an action by mail or other means via
a waiver of formal service of process,
could be appropriate for the small
claims system. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. It
was also suggested that a Web site might
properly be served by sending electronic
notice to an agent designated to receive
notifications of infringement pursuant
to Section 512 of the Copyright Act. See
17 U.S.C. 512(c)(2). In addition, it was
observed that the small claims tribunal
might handle service of defendants, as
is sometimes the case in other contexts
(including in some state courts). The
Office seeks further comments on
potential procedures to notify
defendants that an action has been filed.
10. Offers of judgment. Some
commenters have suggested that a
process such as that contemplated by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68—
which allows a defendant to make an
offer of judgment and recover certain
costs if the plaintiff rejects the offer and
fails to obtain a more favorable
outcome—could play a useful role in
the small claims setting. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 68. Others feel that once a plaintiff
has filed an action, pretrial settlement
procedures would merely delay the
process in most cases. The Office is
interested in additional comments as to
whether and how a mechanism akin to
Rule 68 might be useful in the small
claims context.
11. Default judgments. Current federal
district court procedures allow a
plaintiff to seek default judgments if a
lawfully served defendant fails to
appear. The Office is interested in
whether such a procedure should be
available in a small copyright claim
proceeding. If plaintiffs are able to seek
default judgments, what are the
procedural safeguards that should
apply, what type of remedies should be
available, and what type of showing
should be required to justify relief?
12. Enforceability of judgments. A
primary concern of commenters and
participants at the small claims hearings
is that a small claims judgment—in
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particular one rendered through a
voluntary system—should be
enforceable. In addition to monetary
damages, such a judgment might
include some form of injunctive relief.
Participants offered a range of
suggestions on the matter of
enforcement. Some indicated that the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et
seq., might to some degree serve as a
model for obtaining an enforceable
federal court judgment following
adjudication by the small claims
tribunal. Participants also commented
on the practical aspects of collecting on
judgments. Noting that the challenges of
enforcing a judgment, once obtained, are
not unique to the copyright context,
some suggested that successful small
claims plaintiffs could avail themselves
of existing federal and state court
procedures. The Office welcomes
further discussion of existing or
potential mechanisms that successful
plaintiffs might employ to enforce small
claims judgments without incurring
prohibitive costs.
13. Unknown defendants. Some
hearing participants observed that in
many instances—especially in the case
of internet-based infringement—the
infringer’s identity may not be known
and/or the infringer may be difficult to
locate. Web sites may lack usable
contact data and/or may be registered
anonymously. Should the small claims
procedure permit parties to pursue
claims against ‘‘John Doe’’ defendants,
including, when appropriate, the means
to subpoena an internet service provider
to learn the identity and location of
such a defendant? The Office invites
comments on how such a process might
work, with reference to existing
practices in other courts as appropriate.
14. Multiple tracks or proceedings.
During the hearings, some participants
discussed the possibility of having more
than one type of small copyright claims
proceeding—a highly simplified process
for straightforward claims with perhaps
only a few hundred or few thousand
dollars at stake, and a more robust
process for matters of greater complexity
or economic consequence that are still
too small to be practically pursued in
federal district court. Stakeholders
considered whether, even within the
small claims context, there should be a
greater amount of discovery and
procedure in certain types of cases, for
example, when an injunction is sought.
The Office seeks further comment on
whether a tiered system would be
desirable, or whether a single, unified
approach to small claims is the better
alternative, perhaps with the possibility
of developing additional ‘‘tracks’’ over
time if warranted.

15. Constitutional issues. The Office
continues to be interested in learning
more about the constitutional impact of
any small copyright claims procedure.
Thus, the Office requests additional
comments on whether a small copyright
claims system might implicate any one
or more of the following constitutional
concerns—or any other constitutional
issue—and, if so, how the particular
concern might be addressed:
a. Separation of powers questions
arising from the creation of specialized
tribunals outside of the Article III
framework, including how a right of
review by an Article III court might
impact the analysis;
b. The Seventh Amendment right to
have a copyright infringement case tried
by a jury, as confirmed in Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523
U.S. 340 (1998);
c. Constitutional requirements for a
court’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction, in particular when
adjudicating claims of a defendant
located in another state; and/or
d. Due process considerations arising
from abbreviated procedures that
impose limitations on briefing,
discovery, testimony, evidence,
appellate review, etc.
16. International issues. At the public
hearings, some participants sought to
ensure that the small claims procedure
would be available to foreign plaintiffs
seeking redress for infringing activity in
the United States, as well as to U.S.
plaintiffs seeking to take action against
foreign defendants, as is permitted
under the existing federal system. The
operation of a small copyright claims
system could have implications for the
United States’ rights and responsibilities
under the Berne Convention, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
and other instruments. The Office
welcomes additional comments on the
international implications of a small
claims system, including how the
voluntary or mandatory nature of such
a system might affect the analysis.
17. Empirical data. Previous
comments provided helpful empirical
data relevant to the adjudication of
small copyright claims, including
surveys by the American Bar
Association Section on Intellectual
Property Law and the Graphic Artists
Guild. The Office welcomes additional
surveys and empirical studies bearing
upon:
a. Whether copyright owners are or
are not pursuing small infringement
claims through the existing federal court
process, and the factors that influence
copyright owners’ decisions in that
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regard, including the value of claims
pursued or forgone;
b. The overall cost to a plaintiff and/
or a defendant to litigate a copyright
infringement action to conclusion in
federal court, including costs and
attorneys’ fees, discovery expenditures,
expert witness fees and other expenses
(with reference to the stage of
proceedings at which the matter was
concluded);
c. The frequency with which courts
award costs and/or attorneys’ fees to
prevailing parties pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
505, and the amount of such awards in
relation to the underlying claim or
recovery; and/or
d. The frequency with which litigants
decline to accept an outcome in state
small copyright claims court and seek
de novo review (with or without a jury
trial) or file an appeal in a different
court.
Parties considering the submission of
additional survey or empirical data may
wish to review the studies mentioned
above, which are available at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/.
18. Other issues. Please comment on
any other issues the Copyright Office
should consider in conducting its small
copyright claims study.
Dated: February 20, 2013.
Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights.
[FR Doc. 2013–04466 Filed 2–25–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2013–0038]

Electric Power Research Institute;
Seismic Evaluation Guidance
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Endorsement letter; issuance.
AGENCY:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing an
endorsement letter with clarifications of
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)1025287, ‘‘Seismic Evaluation
Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and
Implementation Details (SPID) for the
Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term
Task Force Recommendation 2.1:
Seismic,’’ Revision 0, hereafter referred
to as the SPID report. This SPID report
provides guidance and clarification of
an acceptable approach to assist nuclear
power reactor licensees when
responding to the NRC staff’s request for
information dated March 12, 2012,
Enclosure 1, ‘‘Recommendation 2.1:
Seismic.’’ The NRC staff’s endorsement
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Commenting Parties and Roundtable
Participants

Parties Who Responded to First Notice of Inquiry
1.

American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)

2.

Alliance of Visual Artists (AVA) (on behalf of Evidence Photographers International
Council (EPIC), Professional Photographers of America (PPA), and Student
Photographic Society (SPS))

3.

American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and SESAC, Inc.
(SESAC)

4.

American Society Of Media Photographers (ASMP)

5.

American Photographic Artists (APA)

6.

Association of American Publishers (AAP)

7.

Atkinson, Dale

8.

Authors Guild

9.

Beasley, Joe

10. Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)
11. Broeder, Kay
12. Byron, Robert
13. California Lawyers for the Arts (CLA)
14. Cannings, James (on behalf of himself and Our Own Performing Society, Inc.)
15. Chu, Lynn
16. Copyright Alliance
17. Craig, M. Tom
18. D’Angelo, Steven
19. Damstra, Emily S.
20. Donald A. Gardner Architects, Inc.
21. Gilmartin, Robert E.
22. Google Inc.
23. Graphic Artists Guild (GAG)
24. Gray Matters
25. Hoch, Judy
26. Illustrators’ Partnership of America (IPA)
27. Independent Film & Television Alliance (IFTA)
28. Keck, Cheryl
29. Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts
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30. Koenig III, C. Frederick
31. McDermott Medical Illustration
32. McGowan, Michael
33. Michelsen, SJ
34. Microsoft Corporation
35. National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA), American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), and SESAC, Inc. (SESAC)
36. National Press Photographers Association (NPPA)
37. National Writers Union (UAW Local 1981, AFL-CIO) (NWU)
38. New Media Rights
39. OnLock Digital Authentication
40. Pepi, Eugene
41. Perry4Law
42. Picture Archive Council Of America, Inc. (PACA)
43. Planetemeraldjungle LLC
44. Public Knowledge (PK), Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and Future of Music
Coalition (FMC)
45. R. Kunstadt, P.C. (on behalf of Robert Kunstadt and Fritjof Haft)
46. Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and American Association of
Independent Music (A2IM)
47. Rosen, Barry
48. Rosenthal, Morris
49. Schnackel, Cindy
50. Sherwin, Brian
51. The Songwriters Guild of America (SGA) and The Nashville Songwriters Association
International (NSAI)
52. Traynor, Michael, Spelman, Katherine C., and Cohen, Sophie
53. Westwood, William B.
54. Williamson, Miryam Ehrlich
55. ZipCourt, Inc.
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Parties Who Responded to Second Notice of Inquiry
1.

Alliance of Visual Artists (AVA) (on behalf of Professional Photographers of America
(PPA) and Student Photographic Society (SPS))

2.

American Bar Association’s Section of Intellectual Property Law (ABA IP Section)

3.

American Photographic Artists (APA)

4.

American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP), American
Association of Independent Music (A2IM), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), National
Music Publishers Association (NMPA), Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA), and SESAC, Inc. (SESAC)

5.

American Society of Media Photographers (ASMP)

6.

Association of American Publishers (AAP)

7.

Blitch, Michael

8.

Cannings, James (on behalf of himself and Our Own Performing Society, Inc.)

9.

Dreyfus, Rochelle C. (Pauline Newman Professor of Law and Co-Director, Engelberg
Center on Innovation Law & Policy)

10. Gear Publishing Company
11. Getty Images
12. Graphics Artists Guild (GAG)
13. Gunewardene, R
14. Hegazy, Eman
15. Independent Book Publishers Association (IBPA)
16. Independent Film & Television Alliance (IFTA)
17. Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts
18. Kirk, Thaddeus S.
19. National Press Photographers Association (NPPA)
20. New Media Rights
21. Picture Archive Council of America, Inc. (PACA)
22. The Songwriters Guild of America (SGA)
23. Soulen, Julie Magers
24. Southworth, William
25. Starstone Media
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Parties Who Responded to Third Notice of Inquiry
1.

American Photographic Artists (APA)

2.

American Society Of Media Photographers (ASMP)

3.

Association of American Publishers (AAP)

4.

Blum, Richard

5.

Cifrino, Christopher

6.

Devorah, Carrie

7.

Federal Legal Assistance Self Help Center (FLASH)

8.

Firth, Sheana

9.

Hibberd, Rick

10. Hollaar, Dr. Lee A. (Professor in the School of Computing at the University of Utah in
Salt Lake City, representing himself)
11. Getty Images
12. Graphic Artists Guild (GAG)
13. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA)
14. National Music Publishers’ Association, Inc. (NMPA), The Harry Fox Agency, Inc.
(HFA), American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI), SESAC, Inc. (SESAC), and the Church Music Publishers
Association (CMPA)
15. National Press Photographers Association (NPPA)
16. National Writers Union (UAW Local 1981, AFL-CIO) (NWU)
17. Nelson and McCulloch LLP
18. Odyssey Entertainment, Inc.
19. Peterson, Elsa
20. Picture Archive Council of America, Inc. (PACA)
21. Sisk, Lorene Leftwich
22. The Songwriters Guild of America (SGA)
23. Studio 1, Inc.
24. Sun-Glo Records, Inc. and Upward Bound Music Company, Inc.
25. VIPO Inc.
26. Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc. (VLA)
27. Umans, Rudy
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Participants in New York Hearings
1.

Badavas, Christos (The Harry Fox Agency, Inc.)

2.

Cannings, James (Our Own Performance Society, Inc.)

3.

Chaitovitz, Ann (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office)

4.

Davis, Susan (National Writers Union)

5.

DiMona, Joseph (Broadcast Music, Inc.)

6.

Fertig, Rachel (Association of American Publishers)

7.

Holland, Brad (Illustrators’ Partnership of America)

8.

Lehman, Bruce (Former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks 1993-1999)

9.

Leichtman, David (Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc.)

10. Loftus, Mary Fran (We Research Pictures, LLC)
11. Mopsik, Eugene (American Society of Media Photographers)
12. Osterreicher, Mickey (National Press Photographers Association)
13. Perlman, Victor (American Society of Media Photographers)
14. Rosenthal, Jay (National Music Publishers Association)
15. Sanders, Charles (The Songwriters Guild of America)
16. Shaftel, Lisa (Graphic Artists Guild)
17. Taylor, Randy (Copyright Defense League, LLC)
18. Willmer, Lisa (Getty Images)
19. Wolff, Nancy (Picture Archive Council of America, Inc.)
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Participants in Los Angeles Hearings
1.

Brennan, Lorin (Linde Law Firm)

2.

Bristol, Erica (Mediator)

3.

Calzada, Alicia (National Press Photographers Association)

4.

Chaitovitz, Ann (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office)

5.

Cleary, Susan (Independent Film & Television Alliance)

6.

Clinton, George (Musician)

7.

Cohan, Timothy A. (Peermusic)

8.

Field, Corey (Ballard Spahr, LLP)

9.

Grecco, Michael (American Photographic Artists)

10. Hasbrouck, Edward (National Writers Union)
11. Knappen, Molly (Designer and Developer)
12. Kunze, Erin (California Lawyers for the Arts)
13. Neil, Art (New Media Rights)
14. Reed, Kendall (Mediator, Arbitrator, Attorney)
15. Robinson, Alma (California Lawyers for the Arts)
16. Tommaselli, Kim (Independent Film & Television Alliance)
17. Traynor, Michael (Cobalt, LLP)
18. Wright, Carolyn (Law Offices of Carolyn E. Wright, LLC)
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5

Tex.

11

Tenn.

Pa.

7

10

8

9

N.Y.

Mich.

6

1

Mass.

Ill.

Ga.

4

Fla.

3

Cal.

2

State

Justice Courts

New York City
Civil Courts,
City Courts
outside New
York City,
District
Courts, and
Justice Courts
(Small Claims
Parts)
Magisterial
District
Judges
Court of
General
Sessions

District Court

County
Circuit Courts
District Court
Department
and Boston
Municipal
Court
Department

Magistrate
Courts

Small Claims
Court
(Division of
Superior
Court)
County
Courts

Courts

10

25

12

3 or 5

5

7

10

15

5

10

Monetary
Limit
($000s)

Limited

Permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Not
Available

Limited

Permitted

Not permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Not
Available

Limited

Available

Available

Permitted

Permitted

Not
Available

Not
Available

Not permitted

Attorney
Representation
for Individuals

Limited

Equitable
Relief

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Simplified
Pleadings

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Answer
Required

1

Required

Required

Required

Required

Permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Permitted

Required

Required

Counterclaims
Must Be Filed
In Advance of
Hearing

25

42

30-‐75

10-‐20

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

20-‐
140

25-‐65

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Costs
Recoverable

10-‐
150

< 22

50-‐
295

30-‐
100

Filing
Fees
($)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Specialized
Procedure

Limited

Relaxed

Traditional

Traditional

Depositions &
Interrogatories
Not Permitted
Available

Relaxed

Relaxed

Not Permitted
Without a
Court Order

Not Permitted

Relaxed

Not Permitted
unless good
cause shown

Not
allowed

Available

Not
allowed

Not
allowed

Either Party

Either Party

Either Party

None,
unless no
substantial
justice.

None,
unless
appealing
from a
magistrate

Defendant
may
request

By
Defendants

By Either
Party

By Either
Party

By Either
Party

By
Defendants

Appeals

Not
allowed

Available

Not
allowed

Traditional
w/ liberal
construction
Relaxed

Available

Not
allowed

Jury Trials

Relaxed

Relaxed

Evidentiary
Rules

By Leave of
Court

By Leave of
Court

Limited

Not Permitted

Discovery
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MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8401 (2012) (courts); id. (monetary limit); id. § 600.8302(1) (equitable relief); id. § 600.8408(1) (attorney representation); MICH. CT. R. 4.302 (simplified
pleadings); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.8404 (2013) (answer required); id. § 600.8422 (advanced counterclaim); id .§ 600.8420(1) (filing fees); id. § 600.8421 (costs recoverable); id.
§§ 600.8401-‐.8427 (specialized procedure); MICH. CT. R. 2.302(A)(3) (discovery); MICH. R. EVID. 1101(b)(5) (evidentiary rules); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8411(2) (2013) (jury trials);
id. §§ 600.8412, 600.8427 (appeals).

7

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 21 (2013) (courts); id. (monetary limit); Mass. Unif. Small Cl. Standards § 702 (equitable relief); MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. R. 7(g) (attorney representation);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 22 (2013) (simplified pleadings); MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. R. 3(b) (answer required); id. R. 3(c) (advanced counterclaim); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 22 (2013)
(filing fees); Mass. Unif. Small Cl. Standards § 7:05 (costs recoverable); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 21 (2013) (specialized procedure); MASS. UNIF. SM. CL. R. 5 (discovery); Mass.
Unif. Sm. Cl. Standards § 6:10 (evidentiary rules); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 23 (2013) (jury trials); id. (appeals).

6

ILL. SUP. CT. R. 282 (courts); id. at § 281 (monetary limit); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (2013), see also Wicks v. Bank of Belleville, 371 N.E.2d 1007 (Ill. App. 1977) (noting that small
claims court procedures govern but, where silent, general procedural rules govern), see also Iowa-‐Illinois Gas & Electric Co. v. Fisher, 114 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ill. App. 1953) (finding
that Illinois circuit courts derive original jurisdiction in all equity cases from section 12 of article 6 of the constitution, and that the legislature cannot validly limit those powers)
(equitable relief); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 282, Illinois Attorney General, Small Claims Court, Things You Should Know About, http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/smlclaims.html
(attorney representation); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 282(a) (simplified pleadings); id. R. 286(a) (answer required); see id. (advanced counterclaim); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/27.1a -‐ 105/27.2a
(2013) (filing fees); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 281, 19TH JUDICIAL CIR. CT. R. 7.07 (costs recoverable); id. R. 281 – 89 (specialized procedure); id. R. 287(a) (discovery); id. R. 286(b) (evidentiary
rules); id. R. 285 (jury trials); id. R. 301 (appeals).

5

GA. CODE ANN. § 15-‐10-‐2(5) (2013) (courts); id. (monetary limit); GA. CONST. art. VI, § IV (equitable relief); GA. UNIF. MAGISTRATE CT. R. 7.1 (attorney representation); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 15-‐10-‐43(a),10-‐48 (2013) (simplified pleadings); id. § 15-‐10-‐43(c) (answer required); id. § 15-‐10-‐45(a)-‐(b) (advanced counterclaim); id. § 15-‐10-‐80(a) (filing fees); id. § 15-‐10-‐
80(d) (costs recoverable); id. § 15-‐10-‐42 (specialized procedure); GA. UNIF. MAGISTRATE CT. R. 40 (discovery); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-‐10-‐44(b) (2013) (evidentiary rules); id. § 15-‐10-‐41
(jury trials); id. § 15-‐10-‐41(b)(1) (appeals).

4

FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.010(a) (courts); id. R. 7.010(b) (monetary relief); id. (equitable relief); id. R. 7.020(b) (attorney representation); id. R. 7.050(a)(1) and R. 7.300 (simplified
pleadings); id. R. 7.090(c) (answer required); id. R. 7.100 (advanced counterclaim); FLA. STAT. § 34.041(1)(a) (2013) (filing fees); FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.175 (costs recoverable); id. R 7.010
– 7.350 (specialized procedure); id. R. 7.020(b) (discovery); id. R. 7.140(f) (evidentiary rules); id. R. 7.150 (jury trials); id. R. 7.230 (appeals).

3

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.210 (2013) (courts); id. § 116.221 (monetary limit) (for natural persons in most situations); id. §§ 116.220(a)(5), 116.220(b) (equitable relief); id. §
116.530 (attorney representation); id. §§ 116.310(a), 116.320(b) (simplified pleadings); id. § 116.330 (answer required); id. § 116.360 (2013) (advanced counterclaim); id. §
116.230(b)-‐(c) (filing fees); id. § 116.610(g)(1) (costs recoverable); id. § 116.110-‐.950 (specialized procedure); id. § 116.310(b) (discovery); id. § 116.520 (evidentiary rules);
Crouchman v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Cal. 1988) (jury trials); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.710 (2013) (appeals).

2

The ten states represented in this chart contain the ten district courts in which the most copyright-‐related cases were filed from 2000-‐2012. Copyright Cases Filed by Year, LEX
MACHINA, https://winslow.lexmachina.com/court/tableTop (last visited Jul. 16, 2013).

1

3

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.060(a) (West 2013) (courts); TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.3(a) (monetary limit); SMU LAW LIBRARY, SMALL CLAIMS COURT – TEXAS,
http://library.law.smu.edu/Research-‐Tools/Research-‐Guides/Texas-‐Law-‐%28300%29/307-‐Small-‐Claims-‐Court-‐-‐-‐Texas (equitable relief); TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.4(a)(3), (b)(3) (attorney
representation); id. 502.2(a) (simplified pleadings); id. 502.5(a) (answer required); id. 502.6(a) (requiring that counterclaims be served in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 501.4
(requiring that any counterclaim be filed three days prior to any hearing)) (advanced counterclaim); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 101.151 (a)(1)(B) (West 2013) (filing fees); TEX. R. CIV.
P. 505.1(d) (costs recoverable); id. 500 – 507 (specialized procedure); id. 500.9(a) (discovery); id. 500.3(e) (evidentiary rules); id. 504.1(a) (jury trials); id. 506.1 (appeals).
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TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-‐15-‐501(d)(1) (2013) (courts); id. (monetary limit); id. (equitable relief); see, e.g., TENN. SHELBY CNTY, GEN. SESS. CT. R. 7 (attorney representation); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 16-‐15-‐710 (2013) (simplified pleadings); see id. § 16-‐15-‐714 and SE. TENN. LEGAL SERVS. 3, General Sessions Court: Advice for Persons Who Want to Represent Themselves,
available at http://www.selegal.org/Self-‐Help/Booklets/GENERAL%20SESSIONS%20COURT%20BOOKLET.pdf (answer required); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-‐15-‐724 (2013) (advanced
counterclaim); id. § 8-‐21-‐401(f)(1) (filing fees); id. § 20-‐12-‐101 (costs recoverable); id. §§ 16-‐15-‐501 to -‐15-‐502, 16-‐15-‐710 to -‐15-‐735, 16-‐15-‐901 to -‐15-‐905, TENN. R. CIV. P. 1
(specialized procedure); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-‐9-‐102(a) (discovery); id. § 16-‐15-‐721 (evidentiary rules); TENN. R. CIV. P. 38.03 (jury trials available only if case is removed by appeal
or otherwise from the Court of General Sessions) (jury trials); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-‐5-‐108 (2013) (appeals).
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42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1123(a)(4), 1515(a)(3) (2013) (courts); id. § 1515(a)(3) (monetary limit); id. (equitable relief); PA. R.C.P.D.J. NO. 207(A)(1) -‐ (2) (attorney representation); id.
No. 304 (simplified pleadings); id. No. 305 (answer required); id. No. 315 (advanced counterclaim); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1725.1 (a) (2013) (filing fees); PA.R.C.P.D.J. No. 206(B)
(costs recoverable); id. No. 201 – 324 (specialized procedure); id. No. 210 (discovery); id. No. 321 (evidentiary rules); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1123(a)(4) (2013) (defendant has no
right to jury trial in municipal court but has to right jury trial on appeal) (jury trials); PA.R.C.P.D.J. No. 1002 (appeals).

9

N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1802 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1802 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1802 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1802
(Consol. 2013) (courts); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1801 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1801 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1801 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM
JUST. CT. ACT § 1801 (Consol. 2013) (monetary limit); Cucinotta v. Hanulak, 647 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (equitable relief); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. R. § 208.41(f), N.Y
UNIFORM CITY CT. R. § 210.41(f)(1), N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. R. § 212.41(f)(1), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. R. §214.10(h), (j) (attorney representation); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1803
(Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1803 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1803 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1803 (Consol. 2013) (simplified pleadings);
N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1803 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1803 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1803 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1803
(Consol. 2013) (answer required); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1803(c) (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1803(c) (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1803(c)
(Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1803(c) (Consol. 2013) (advanced counterclaim); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1803(a) (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1803(a)
(Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1803(a) (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1803(a) (Consol. 2013) (filing fees); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1901(c) (Consol. 2013),
N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1901(c) (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1901(c) (Consol. 2013) (costs recoverable); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1801-‐15 (Consol. 2013), N.Y.
UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1801-‐15 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1801-‐15 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1801-‐15 (Consol. 2013) (specialized procedure); N.Y.
UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol.
2013) (discovery); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV.
CT. ACT § 1804 (Consol. 2013) (evidentiary rules); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1806 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1806 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT §
1806 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1806 (Consol. 2013) (jury trials); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1807 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1807 (Consol. 2013), N.Y.
UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT § 1807 (Consol. 2013), N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1807 (Consol. 2013) (appeals).

8

u.s. copyright office

·

library of congress

·

101 independence avenue se

· washington, dc 20559-6000

· www.copyright.gov

